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Abstracts
Chapter 1: In the introductory chapter, I place my thesis in an empirical research tradition going back to the
mid-19S0s, investigating the economics of technological change. Key issues have been the private and social
returns to R&D, and the scope for technology policy in enhancing economic growth. It is widely accepted that
the social returns to R&D is greater than the private returns, and that public support for R&D may be welfare
improving. At the same time, a number ofissues regarding the extent of the market failure and the governments'
ability to improve on the market solution are unresolved. The main part of the introduction summarizes the
following four chapters of the thesis. At the end I briefly reflect on my findings and their relevance for
technology policy.
Chapter 2: Economists have recently drawn attention to the importance of generic or general purpose
technologies (GPTs) and their significance for economic growth. An interesting part of this research identifies
coordination problems in the introduction of GPTs, and the potentially large benefits in coordinating research
and product development. Thinking about information technology as a GPT, with the associated coordination
problems, seems to fit well with the motivation behind governmental support schemes to IT and related high-
tech industries in Norway. The first part of this essay focuses on a series of such IT-programs that have been
implemented in Norway from the early 1980s with the objective of coordinating the development of information
technology and its application throughout the economy. The second part of the essayexamines in some detail the
largest of these programs through its planning and implementation stages, and emphasizes how closely it is
connected to recent economic analysis ofGPTs. The third part examines to what extent these governmental plans
and subsidy schemes have been successful in creating economic results in terms of growth and profits in the IT
and IT-related industries. The final part of the essay discusses some lessons about the problems with technology
policy at a practicallevel.
Chapter 3: A number of market failures have been associated with R&D investments, and significant amounts
of public money have been spent on programs to stimulate innovative activities. This essay reviews some recent
microeconometric studies evaluating effects of government-sponsored commercial R&D, and pays particular
attention to the conceptual problems involved. Neither the firms receiving support, nor those that do not receive
support, constitute random samples. Furthermore, those not receiving support may be affected by the programs
due to spillover effects which often are the main justification for R&D subsidies. Constructing a valid control
group under these circumstances is difficult, and the essay draws attention to some recent advances in
econometric methods for evaluation studies based on non-experimental data. The essayalso discusses some
analytical questions beyond these estimation problems that need to be addressed in order to assess whether R&D
support schemes can be justified. For instance, what are the implications if firms' R&D investments are
complementary to each other, and to what extent are potential R&D spillovers internalized in the market?
Chapter 4: Labor mobility is often considered to be an important source of knowledge spillovers, making it
difficult for firms to appropriate returns to R&D investments. In this essay I argue that inter-firm transfers of
knowledge embodied in people should be analyzed within a human capital framework. Testing such a
framework using a matched employer-employee data set, I find that the technical staff in R&D-intensive firms
pays for the knowledge they accumulate on the job through lower wages in the beginning of their career. Later
they earn a return on these implicit investments through higher wages. This suggests that the potential
externalities associated with labor mobility, at least to some extent, are internalized in the labor market.
Chapter 5: Most R&D projects fail from a commercial point ofview, and technological shifts may quickly turn
even successful innovations into failure. It is, however, possible that projects which fail commercially produce
knowledge with some social value. Such knowledge is likely to be embodied in workers or teams ofworkers. In
order to evaluate the social returns to research, it is therefore desirable to trace workers as they move across
firms and industries. In this essay I utilize a large matched employer-employee data set and test for the existence
of potential knowledge spillovers transmitted through the labor market. The specific case analysed is a series of
Norwegian IT-programs so far considered unsuccessful, but which recently have been linked to the rise of a new
generation ofsuccessful IT-firms. It has been argued that know-how and networks built up in leading companies
during the programs still 'fertilize' the Norwegian IT-industry. I find little support for this claim. Workers with
experience from companies that received R&D subsidies were largely re-employed in IT-industries, but they
have not outperformed similar workers without such experience. An analysis of firms that are spin-offs from
formerly subsidized IT-firms reveals that they perform below, rather than above, average.
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Introduction and summary *
1 R&D-investments and economic growth
From the very beginning, economists have been preoccupied with economic growth and
appreciated that improvements in material well-being is closely linked to innovation and
technological change. It was not until the mid-fifties, however, that economists seriously
started to study technological change as the outcome of purposeful investments made in
response to anticipated profits. Interestingly, it was empirically minded economists that
most strongly emphasized the view that technological change was determined inside the
economic system, and their analyses preceded the fully fledged endogenous growth theory
by three decades.'
The first attempt to calculate returns to R&D was done by Theodore W. Schultz (1953)
investigating the relationship between output growth in agriculture and public investments
in agricultural research. It was Zvi Griliches, however, who most vigorously followed up
this line of research, applying the tools of modem econometrics to investigate the activi-
ties ti lat cause productivity growth. I think of my thesis as part of a research program that
was initiated by Griliches' (1957) landmark study of hybrid com, and over the next four
decades developed into a major field by him, his students and numerous other economists.
A central issue in this research is the private and social benefits that arise from new
technologies, and the closely related question of whether entrepreneurs and private firms
have sufficiently strong incentives to invest in R&D. Kenneth Arrow (1962) provided an
illuminating theoretical analysis ofthis question, pointing out that a free market economy
will underinvest in research for several reasons. First, the outcome of such investments
are highly uncertain, and insurance against this risk cannot be provided without severely
weakening the incentives to succeed. Second, innovators can only to a limited extent
appropriate the return to their innovations because valuable information easily leak out
to competitors and others. This is often referred to as knowledge spillovers. Third, there
are increasing returns to scale in knowledge production because ideas are nonrivalous, i.e .
• l have reduced the number of references in this introduction to a minimum. Full references can be
found in the chapters summarized. I am grateful to Hans Jarle Kind, Tor Jakob Klette and Erik 0. Sørensen
for useful comments.
IThe call for an endogenous growth theory is particularly clearly stated in Jacob Schmookler (1965).
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their use by one person or finn does not diminish their availability. In recent years, the
last two points have been re-emphasized and further developed in the newendogenous
growth theory, cf. e.g. Paul M. Romer (1990).
If a free market economy does not allocate an optimal amount of resources to in-
ventive activity, public support mechanisms may be welfare improving. Actually, some
major mechanisms were in place long before the economic profession started to ponder
this question. Governments and patrons have financed research at universities since the
Middle Ages, and the first patent laws, securing inventors the exclusive right to exploit
their ideas commercially, were in place in Venice as early as 1474. Governments also
have a long history of stimulating technological development through military spendings
and other public procurements. Finally, individuals that make significant discoveries have
always been rewarded with fame, an important incentive mechanism in any society.
When entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison and Henry Ford made their great inven-
tions, however, they did so without receiving R&D subsidies or tax credits. Subsidies to
commercial R&D became commonplace in the OECD countries after World War II, and
the main argument has been that there are positive externalities, spillovers, associated with
R&D investments. To what extent such spillovers justify subsidies, is the overall theme
addressed by the four essays in this thesis. Opponents of subsidies claim that the degree
of underinvestment in private R&D is exaggerated, and that governments lack the ability
to stimulate R&D in an efficient manner. The expected private return to R&D is in many
cases large enough to justify investments without public support, and the fact that social
returns may be far larger is then irrelevant. It is only projects that are profitable from a
social point of view, but not from a private point of view, that should receive subsidies.
It is difficult for bureaucrats to identify such projects. Subsidies may crowd out private
R&D investments and lead firms to engage in unproductive rent-seeking activities. There
also exist market mechanisms that can induce too much, rather than too little, R&D in-
vestments. If a finn can gain large market shares by making a small quality improvement
in a product, the private return may be larger than the social return because other firms'
R&D investments become obsolete.
Most economists agree that technology policy is important, and that the government
should stimulate research. Designing an optimal policy, however, is difficult. A number
of questions can only be resolved through empirical analysis, and finding the neccessary
answers takes the joint effort ofmany economists. The essays collected in this thesis shed
light on some issues that I consider particularly important in this respect. The rest of this
introductory chapter is organized as follows: The next four sections summarize chapter
two, three, four and five, respectively. In the last section I briefly reflect on my findings
and their relevance for technology policy.
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2 From growth theory to technology policy -
coordination problems in theory and practise
As already mentioned, externalities associated with R&D, learning and innovation have
been emphasized in the new growth theory, and it has been widely recognized that these
externalities create coordination problems and scope for welfare improving government
interventions. It has also been emphasized that the development of new industries in the
presence of such externalities tend to create multiple equilibria where one equilibrium
corresponds to the new industry never reaching a 'critical mass' or never 'taking off',
while other equilibria correspond to the industry 'taking off' and starting on a cumulative
growth process.
A particular coordination problem that my co-author Tor Jakob Klette and I focus on
in chapter 2, arises when the technology in question is 'generic'. Information technology
is one example of this, and it is a technology which has been actively promoted by most
OECD governments, including Norway. Traditionally, economists have had difficulties
making sense of such terms as 'generic technology'. Timothy Bresnahan and Manuel
Trajtenberg (1995), however, introduced the notion of 'general purpose technologies', and
have by their analysis drawn attention to the potential importance of generic or general
purpose technologies for economic growth.
General purpose technologies (GPTs) are characterized by their wide applicability,
their potential for development and what Bresnahan and Trajtenberg call innovative com-
plementarities. By innovative complementarities they have in mind positive pecuniary
externalities between the development ofthe basic general purpose technology and inno-
vations in the sectors using this technology. Such externalities tend to create coordination
problems and Bresnahan and Trajtenberg argue that due to the pervasive applicability
of 'general purpose technologies', these coordination problems might be large even in a
macroeconomic perspective.
Thinking about information technology as a GPT, with the associated coordination
problems, seems to fit well with the motivation behind governmental support schemes to
IT and related high-tech industries in Norway. Chapter 2 focuses on a series of such IT-
programs that were implemented in Norway from the early 1980s. The motivation was to
promote the production and utilization of information technology, and also to coordinate
the various policy tools involved. The major part of these IT-programs became targeted
directly at promoting the manufacturing of IT-products, and their considerable size is
indicated by the total expenditures amounting to NOK 4.4 billon for the largest of the
programs, the National Program for Information Technology, implemented over the four-
year period 1987-1990.
In the first part of chapter 2 we examine in some detail this program through its plan-
ning and implementation stages and emphasize how closely the program is connected to
the economic analysis of GPTs. The second part of chapter 2 examines to what extent this
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and the other IT programs of the 1980s and 1990s were successful in creating economic
results.
We start the quantitative analysis by comparing the performance of targeted firms to
other firms in high-tech industries. The econometric analysis reveals few significant dif-
ferences between the supported and the non-supported firms, despite the large amounts of
R&D support provided. Next, we present a more aggregated analysis, based on industry-
level data for Norway and other OECD countries. The motivation for this is that some
of the benefits from the program may have spilled over to non-supported firms with the
result that the comparison betweenthe supported firms and the non-supported firms will
underestimate the effect of the program. It is, however, difficult to identify a similar non-
supported industry that can serve as a control group. We consider two alternatives. The
first comparison is between the targeted high-tech industries and the rest of the manu-
facturing sector as a whole. This is clearly not a clean quasi-experiment, but it is nev-
ertheless interesting to compare e.g. the profit rates and the returns to investments in
the targeted industries to other industries. The second comparison contrasts the targeted
high-tech industries in Norway with the same industries in other OECD countries. Once
again, the comparison is not a clean quasi-experiment, because high-tech industries in
other OECD countries also received considerable governmental support. The OECD data
suggest, however, that the increase, and perhaps also the level (relative to private R&D
spending) of governmental support to these industries was significantly larger in Norway
than in most other countries.
We find that the targeted industries did not show any outstanding performance com-
pared to the rest of the manufacturing sector in Norway, nor in comparison to the same
industries in other OECD countries. Our general conclusion, therefore, is that the IT-
programs, while well justified according to economic theory, seem to have failed in pro-
moting the development of the IT manufacturing sector. In the last part of chapter 2, we
proceed to discuss why the technology programs were unsuccessful despite their appeal
ex ante.
In order to understand why the programs failed, it is important to notice that in the sim-
plistic game theoretic models often used to illustrate coordination problems, information
is given. In real world coordination problems, however, obtaining relevant information
is a serious obstacle. Exactly which firms and what activities should be coordinated and
in what way? These questions are very hard to answer in a rapidly developing field such
as information technology and they might be particularly hard to solve in a small open
economy where a large majority of the innovations take place abroad. Institutional re-
sistance and inertia put further constraints on the governments' ability to implement and
coordinate technology policy.
To conclude, we believe that industrial innovation is an activity where coordination
problems and market failure can be pervasive, but we also think it is an activity where
policy makers and bureaucrats often lack the information and adaptive capacity needed to
improve on the market solution. On the positive side, however, we point out that coor-
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dination problems created by complementary innovative activities across different firms
seem in many cases to be partly resolved by private institutions such as industry associa-
tions, privately funded research joint ventures and other cooperative research agreements.
These are mechanisms that deserve attention in future research.
3 Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce market
failure? Microeconometric evaluation studies
Inspired by the study in chapter 2, chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of the conceptual
difficulties involved in evaluating effects of R&D subsidies. Compared to the emphasis
put on technology policy by politicians, and the size of the programs implemented, the
effort put into evaluating in quantitative terms the economic benefits and costs of R&D
subsidies has been rather modest. Most evaluations are based on case studies whose rep-
resentativeness and objectiveness may be questioned. Together with my co-authors Tor
Jakob Klette and Zvi Griliches, therefore, I draw in chapter 3 attention to some recent
contributions to the evaluation literature that use econometric techniques based on micro-
data, and to some policy questions we think need further clarification. We start the chapter
by reviewing five microeconometric studies that try to evaluate the effects of government
sponsored commercial R&D, and refer to these studies in the methodological discussion
that follows.
When evaluating the effects of government sponsored research, one tries to unveil
what would have taken place without the subsidies, and it is important to realize that eval-
uating large scale subsidy programs is an exercise in counterfactual analysis. This poses
a number of challenges, and the first methodological problem we discuss is selection.
Although the political economy process that determines the allocation of R&D subsidies
may introduce a considerable element of randomness, it is clearly dubious to assume that
the outcome of governments' deliberate selection process is largely random. The per-
formance of the non-supported firms may differ systematically from what the supported
firms would have experienced in the absence of the support schemes. Such systematic dif-
ferences do not make traditional evaluation results uninteresting, but it limits the kind of
questions the evaluations can answer. In our discussion, we try to clarify the potential bi-
ases involved in various studies, and we explain how evaluation studies may be improved
if they utilize some recent advances in econometrics associated with the evaluation of
labor market programs and so-called 'difference-in-difference' estimators.
There is much to learn from the literature on evaluation of labor market programs, but
the labor market analogy is not adequate in all respects. Having discussed the basic selec-
tion problem, we point out some further methodological problems that are unique to R&D
subsidy programs. First, spillovers to technologically related firms are often a major jus-
tification for the programs. This implies that the performance ofthe non-supported firms
may be influenced by the support given to the program firms. An intriguing problem then
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arises: If the program is successful in creating innovations that spill over to technologi-
cally related firms, it is very difficult to find similar non-supported firms that can identify
the counterfactual outcome for the supported firms. This leads to the paradoxical situa-
tion that if an evaluation study finds little difference between the supported firms and the
non-supported firms, it could either be because the R&D program was unsuccessful and
generated little innovation, or because the R&D program was highly successful and gen-
erated new innovations that created large positive spillovers to the non-supported firms.
Resolving this problem is difficult, and we suspect further progress will require theoretical
modellingthat imposes more structure on the analysis.
A second methodological problem that is unique to R&D subsidy programs, is the
highly skewed distribution of returns to R&D. This skewness might be particularly pro-
nounced for the outcome of government sponsored R&D projects because governments
often intend to support high-risk R&D. One may argue, therefore, that the main param-
eter of interest is not the average impact of the R&D-support on the supported firms,
but the average rate of return to the whole R&D subsidy program. In this perspective,
the weighted average estimates provided by the 'difference-in-differences' estimator or
similar estimators, may not apply the economically relevant weights to the individual ob-
servations. We suggest in response to this that it may be fruitful to combine econometric
analyses with case studies of the most successful projects.
The rest of chapter 3 discusses R&D-spillovers. Not only do spillovers make it diffi-
cult to assess the benefits to private firms receiving support, but measuring the magnitude
of the spillovers is by itself a crucial part of evaluating the programs. We argue that
most studies do not go as far in this respect as one would like from a theoretical point
of view. In particular, pecuniary externalities to customers and consumers are often ex-
cluded from the analyses. This being said, it is widely acknowledged that it is hard to
distinguish knowledge spillovers from rent spillovers, and even the best methodologies
used to estimate knowledge spillover cannot, in our opinion, satisfactorily distinguish be-
tween true externalities and knowledge transfers that are internalized in the market. We
have, however, no doubt that spillovers exist, or that their magnitude is substantial. The
last part of chapter 3, therefore, discusses what policy implications can be drawn, given
that spillovers exist.
If spillovers can be received without costs, it is quite obvious that the main argument
in favor of subsidies is valid: Firms performing R&D do not reap the whole benefit, and
as they equate marginal cost to marginal private benefit, their investments will be below
the social optimum. There is, however, a number of reasons why this argument is in-
complete, and we discuss four issues that deserve further attention when evaluating the
net welfare gains associated with R&D subsidies. First, the empirical evidence regard-
ing the relationship between own and others' R&D suggests that complementarities in
R&D are important in many cases, and it is easy to envisage that firms must invest in
research themselves in order to benefit from external knowledge pools. This may cre-
ate a positive feedback mechanism between R&D investments in technologically related
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firms. Spillovers, therefore, may be somewhat less of an impediment to R&D investments
than many economists and policy makers believe. On the other hand, positive feedback
mechanisms may create multiple equilibria, and support to targeted high-tech sectors is
often rooted in the view that subsidies are needed to get emerging industrial activities to
'take off' and reach 'a critical mass', cf. chapter 2. This is a valid argument in favor of
R&D subsidies, but as emphasized in chapter 2, it is important to analyze to what extent
governments in practice have the necessary capabilities to improve on the market solution.
A second issue we draw attention to in chapter 3 regards technology policy in small
open economies. Empirical results suggest that knowledge spillovers to some extent are
geographically bounded, a first prerequisite for national policies to influence comparative
advantages. A careful analysis of the likely distribution of spillovers is still necessary,
however. As already mentioned, the total gain from national R&D investments includes
not only knowledge spillovers, but also rent spillovers to end customers and buyers of
intermediate goods. Rent spillovers may be considerable, and ifprofits are driven to zero
by competition as many theoretical models assume, only rent spillovers are relevant for
policy. In export sectors, often targeted by R&D subsidy programs, the share of the rent
spillovers accruing to non-nationals may be substantial. One may then question why the
government of the source country should bear the financial burden. On the other hand, the
existence of international spillovers gives scope for increased global efficiency through
R&D cooperation between countries.
A third issue in the last part of chapter 3, is R&D joint ventures. Inspired by the Coase
theorem and observations on cooperative agreements, some ofthem reported in chapter 2,
we argue that the ability of the market to internalize knowledge externalities should not be
neglected. Our point is not that spillovers are fully taken care of by contracting, but that
both in theoretical and empirical analysis more attention should be paid to the contractual
arrangements utilized and invented by firms to overcome the potential spillover problems
generated by innovative activities. The final issue we raise in chapter 3 relates this Coasian
perspective to the labor market, and we discuss to what extent labor mobility should be
considered a source ofknowledge spillovers. Among the many topics for further research
suggested in chapter 3, this is the one I have given most attention so far. The resulting
analysis is reported in chapter 4.
4 Is Mobility of Technical Personnel a Source
of R&D Spillovers?
Numerous workers have access to valuable research results and trade secrets. These work-
ers may be tempted to exploit this knowledge by leaving their current employer and join-
ing a competitor or starting their own business. This has led many economists to consider
labor mobility an important source ofknowledge externalities or spillovers. The problem
is highly relevant for technology policy because spillovers inhibit firms in appropriating
19
the full returns to their R&D investments and will cause underinvestment in R&D.
In chapter 4, I argue that the view laid out above is too simple. Labor mobility is
no doubt an important source of knowledge diffusion, but inter-firm transfers of knowl-
edge embodied in people should be analyzed within a human capital framework. Such a
framework suggests that there might be market mechanisms that, at least to some degree,
internalize the potential externalities associated with labor mobility. The argument is sim-
ple: To the extent that workers in R&D-intensive firms get access to valuable knowledge
on the job, they will expect higher wages in the future. When holding jobs that give access
to such knowledge, they should therefore be willing to pay for what they learn by accept-
ing wages below their alternative wage. Put differently and a bit more generally, one may
think of jobs as tied packages of work and learning. Workers sell the services of their
skills and simultaneously purchase an opportunity to augment those skills. The difference
between the maximum market rental of a worker's existing skills and the wage that he or
she receives in a given job is an implicit price paid for learning. Human capital theory
also predicts that workers' incentive to pay for human capital accumulation is largest at
young age. As workers grow older they will have fewer years to collect returns on a given
investment, and obviously workers have no incentive to pay for increasing their human
capital in the last year before retirement.
In the first part of chapter 4, I try to clarify how labor mobility can affect R&D in-
vestments by discussing in detail the arguments presented above. I draw in particular on
theoretical models by Sherwin Rosen (1972) and Ariel Pakes and Shmuel Nitzan (1983).
Next, I present a framework to test the hypothesis that workers implicitly pay for the
knowledge they accumulate in research firms, and finally I present empirical findings
based on a large matched employer-employee data set from the Norwegian machinery
and equipment industry, suggesting that such wage mechanisms actually exist.
The price paid for 'on-the-job-Iearning' should vary according to how much a worker
may potentially learn on the job. In my analysis I use the employer's R&D intensity as a
proxy for this variable. When testing the market value of the accumulated knowledge it is
necessary to decompose workers' human capital, and estimate the price or relative weight
ofthe various components. I do this using a standard log-linear hedonic wage regression.
Some problems are, however, immediately evident. Work experience needs to be decom-
posed according to the training or research content of the jobs that the workers have had
at different stages oftheir career, but complete information about the workers' career his-
tories is not available. Furthermore, it is far from obvious how one can summarize what is
known about the workers' experience from different firms into a good measure ofhuman
capital. I suggest several solutions to these problems.
My first approach is to assume that workers career trajectories are such that their re-
search exposure is constant over the career. Mobility patterns found in the data suggest
that this assumption is not unreasonable, Le. workers tend to move between firms with
similar R&D-intensities. This implies that R&D intensity at each point of time in a ca-
reer reveal information both about current learning and about the workers' accumulated
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R&D experience. More specifically, the estimated joint effect will give the returns to
R&D experience minus the cost of current learning. Working for a highly R&D intensive
employer should cause a large negative wage premium early in the career, reflecting the
implicit price paid for R&D experience. At that point in the career, this experience has
not had much time to affect the stock of human capital, but as time goes by, workers'
willingness to pay for human capital accumulation decreases and approaches zero, while
differences in previous R&D experience will translate into differences in human capital.
Workers who are in R&D intensive firms and have a long R&D intensive career behind
them, should therefore have a large positive wage premium reflecting the human capital
accumulated.
Utilizing this approach, I find that scientists and engineers who choose an 'R&D in-
tensive' career accept a wage discount of about six percent in their first year after grad-
uation. This may be a conservative estimate, because there may be a tendency for R&D
intensive firms to hire the best workers. Towards the end oftheir career, scientists and en-
gineers receive a wage premium of about seven percent. Similar results apply for workers
with secondary technical education. The fact that I find as strong results for workers
with secondary technical education as for scientists and engineers, indicates that firms'
R&D-intensity is not only a measure of learning associated with doing research, but also
a proxy for the value of general work experience from high-tech firms. This is not sur-
prising. There may be more to learn in firms conducting research because such firms are
likely to use the most up-to date technology and frequently change their products and
production processes.
The analysis summarized above utilizes cross sectional information only, and esti-
mates, as explained, the return to previous R&D experience minus the price paid for
current learning. Utilizing the longitudinal dimension of the data set, it is possible to
specify these two components separately. The learning opportunity that a worker faces
depends only on current R&D intensity, while average R&D intensity in previous years
reveal information about workers' R&D experience. A more sophisticated approach is
thus to estimate the price paid for learning separately from the return to research experi-
ence, by including both a measure of previous R&D experience and the R&D intensity
of the current employer. This is more demanding with respect to data, but an explorative
analysis suggest that having work experience from R&D intensive firms is associated
with higher wages, while the employers' current R&D intensity reduce wages for work-
ers with less than 20 years experience. Furthermore, as predicted by human capital theory,
the youngest workers appear to invest most heavily in on-the-job learning.
Chapter 4 is, as far as I know, the first paper to look at the effect of R&D on wages.
There exists, however, a large literature on the effect of formal on-the-job training. In this
literature, a number of authors have found training to be correlated with wage growth,
but finding support for a negative effect on starting wages such as human capital theory
predicts is unusual. Common interpretations are that workers do not pay for general
training, or that the implicit price is masked by a positive ability bias. In this perspective,
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the strong negative effect of R&D on starting wages present in my sample, is remarkable.
It suggests that firms' technology levels are more important to wages than formal training.
One explanation for this could be that while most formal training is short term, working
in a technologically challenging environment affects human capital accumulation for the
entire duration of a job.
An important question that my analysis does not clarify is whether workers pay for
the/ull value of the knowledge they accumulate in R&D intensive firms. From a theoret-
ical point ofview it is conceivable that labor mobility creates some externalities. If firms
have limited ability to commit themselves to share future profits with their employees, or
if several workers have access to exactly the same research results, this may undermine
the wage contracts necessary to assure optimal R&D investments. Furthermore, informa-
tion asymmetries and other barriers to mobility may enhance firms' ability to appropriate
rents, while at the same time reduce workers' incentives to pay for knowledge accumula-
tion. Mechanisms which induce employers to pay for general human capital accumulation
create a positive externality to the worker's future employer if the worker decides to quit
or if the firm goes out of business. A complete welfare analysis must also incorporate
that even if workers pay for all the knowledge they accumulate, this 'solution' to the
spillover problem does not guarantee optimal R&D investments. If workers co-finance
R&D through lower wages, and the value of the knowledge they accumulate depend on
the outcome of the R&D project, they become exposed to the risk associated with the
project. Risk aversion among workers may then become a new source of distortion since
human capital investments cannot be diversified. Liquidity constraints making workers
unwilling to trade off current wage for future wage on a large scale, may also create prob-
lems. I believe the best way to investigate these issues is to model explicit mechanisms
that might cause externalities, and derive testable implication from such specific models.
5 Spin-offs and spillovers: Tracing knowledge by
following employees across firms
Most R&D projects fail from a commercial point of view, and technological shifts may
quickly tum even successful innovations into failure. This reflects the high risk associated
with research, but also that it is difficult to appropriate the returns to knowledge. For this
reason it is possible that projects and firms that fail commercially still produce knowledge
with some social value. This possibility seems particularly relevant for subsidized R&D,
since subsidies are deliberately aimed at projects with high risk and large externalities.
The substantial amount of money spent by OECD governments on R&D subsidies makes
this an important hypothesis to test. A possible 'scrap value' associated with unsuccessful
projects and firms can significantly influence the social returns to R&D subsidies and
reduce the overall risk associated with technology programs.
This issue has so far not been investigated in the technology program evaluation lit-
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erature, but case studies from the semi-conductor industry point to employee mobility
and the creation of spin-off firms as important vehicles for R&D spillovers. The recent
availability of large matched employer-employee data sets makes it possible to analyze
statistically the importance of human capital and employee mobility suggested by such
case studies. In chapter 5 I illustrate how this can be done by taking a second look at the
technology programs evaluated in chapter 2.
As emphasized in chapter 4, research is a learning process. Knowledge built up in
failed projects and firms is therefore likely to be embodied in workers or teams of work-
ers. In order to assess the value of such knowledge, it is necessary to trace workers as they
move across firms and industries seeking to maximize the returns to their human capital.
Furthermore, tracing knowledge flows by following employees is not only relevant when
firms fail. It can also be useful when analyzing particularly successful firms and technolo-
gies, since entrepreneurs often 'cash out' on their investments by selling their company to
larger, established firms. Analyses of the opposite process, i.e. the formation of spin-off
firms, is also possible within a framework where employees are followed over time and
across firms. I hope, therefore, that the ideas presented in chapter 5 may be useful in a
more general context than program evaluation.
Chapter 2 concluded that the Norwegian IT-programs in the 1980s and early 1990s
were largely unsuccessful. An important motivation for making a further analysis ofthese
programs is recent claims that the growth of the Norwegian IT-industry in the late 1990s
was stimulated by knowledge built up in formerly subsidized firms. In particular, employ-
ees of the fallen industry leader, Norsk Data, have been pointed to as key contributors in
a new generation of successful firms. One expression ofthe idea that this company had a
lasting impact on the industry, can be found in Norway's leading engineering magazine,
Teknisk Ukeblad. In the fall of 1999, in an article titled "The lighthouse ofthe Norwegian
IT-industry" it was argued that
[a]ll over Norway we see spin-off effects from the Norsk Data era; thousands
of people that worked in or with Norsk Data built up know-how whose ex-
istence it is hard to imagine without this company. Many of these people
started new firms together with old colleagues or business contacts, others
have contributed with their experience in other sectors of the economy.
The article leaves the impression that the statement is based on knowledge about a
handful of cases. In order to evaluate whether these cases are representative for 'thousands
ofpeople', a quantitative framework is called for.
The first step in my analysis is to see where the technical expertise in the subsidized
firms became employed later on. I find that many of the workers separating from subsi-
dized IT manufacturing firms transferred to the growing IT service industry. This suggests
that there is a link between the R&D subsidies awarded in the 1980s and the strong growth
in the IT-service sector in the 1990s, but obviously it does not prove that subsidies caused
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this growth. Looking next at unemployment, re-education, relocations and similar vari-
ables, the positive 'first impression' is strengthened as workers from subsidized firms do
not seem to have faced any particular difficulties in finding new jobs. Their knowledge,
therefore, is likely to have been at least partly transferable. Having established this, I
move on to analyze earnings, which is the main indicator of labor market success.
Ifknow-how accumulated in subsidized firms provided a basis for growth elsewhere,
we would expect experience from subsidized firms to have higher value in the labor mar-
ket than experience from other firms. This assertion can be tested using extended wage
regressions. Lacking a 'pre treatment' period I start out exploring scientists and engi-
neers' wage level during the program. Next, I investigate wage growth following the
program, and finally I look at the wage level after the program.
The wage regressions from the program years suggest that working in IT firms at the
time was an investment in general human capital, much more so than working in other
R&D firms. There is, however, nothing in the data suggesting that investments in general
human capital were particularly large for workers in subsidized firms. It is still possible
that human capital built up in subsidized firms during the program years proved itself
to be particularly productive later on, but the analyses that follow show that scientists
and engineers with experience from subsidized firms perform exactly as good, or bad,
as workers from non-subsidized firms. Workers in all IT-firms seem to have invested in
general human capital by accepting wages below their alternative wage in the 1980s, but
they have not experienced higher wage growth than otherwise similar workers later on.
With respect to workers in subsidized firms, they do not seem to have gained anything
in particular from participating in the subsidized projects. This suggests that the return
to the knowledge investments made by the government and the workers themselves was
zero.
A complementary approach to looking at the performance of individual workers is to
focus on the performance ofspin-off firms defined by groups ofworkers that have stayed
together. This approach is explored in the last part of chapter 5. When several workers
from the same firm continue to work together, it is reasonable to assume that they are
exploiting know-how accumulated in their previous work environment, and that there are
positive complementarities between them that make them stay together. It is also possible
that firm profits is a better performance measure than wages, particularly if the spin-off
firms to some extent are worker-owned.
The first performance measure I consider is sales growth. It seems that spin-off firms
perform slightly better than other firms along this dimension, but the difference is not
significant. Next I look at profitability. Whether looking at return on sales, return on
assets or return on equity, I find that spin-off firms are significantly less profitable than
other firms. It is difficult to explain this result, but one possibility is that the spin-off firms
mostly consists oftroubled remnants ofpreviously subsidized units, and that they are kept
running because their core know-how has low alternative value. In any case, the analysis
does not support the idea that important returns from the IT-program ended up outside the
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originally subsidized units.
6 Concluding remarks
On May 8th 2001, in a statement to the Norwegian Parliament about the government's IT-
policy, the Norwegian minister oftrade and industry, Grete Knudsen, explained that when
her government took office a year earlier they "realized that an even stronger co-ordination
ofthe IT-policy was necessary", and she proclaimed: "The IT revolution is not dead. It is
now it really starts't.? For someone who have studied the history of Norwegian IT-policy,
these statements have a familiar ring to them. Norwegian governments have since the late
1940s consistently tried to promote electronics and information technology, but there is
little evidence to suggest that these efforts have been successful. This, of course, does
not prove the minister wrong. An even stronger focus on, and co-ordination of, the IT-
policy may clearly be desirable, and we may currently experience a period where the 'IT
revolution' is gaining momentum rather than leveling off. It is, however, important that
new initiatives are made in light of past experiences.
I have in this thesis questioned the government's ability to improve on the market
solution, I have questioned some of the arguments in favor of subsidies to commercial
R&D and I have emphasized that there are market mechanisms capable of internalizing
some of the many externalities associated with innovative activities. My main point is
not that there is no scope for public intervention, nor that such interventions have to fail.
Evaluation studies from other countries, some ofthem summarized in chapter 3, suggests
that technology programs can stimulate private R&D and generate positive externalities.
My point is that we should be humble about what we know and what can be achieved.
Uncertainty with respect to the effect of technology programs and their optimal de-
sign implies that there is much to gain from systematic accumulation ofknowledge. We
need to learn more about what works and what does not work, and we need to feed this
information back into public agencies so that their programs are continuously redesigned
according to best practice. I have in this thesis discussed some of the difficulties involved
in policy evaluation, and suggested some non-experimental methodologies that may be
applied in future studies. A more radical approach to enhance our understanding, would
be to experiment deliberately. Adam Jaffe (2000) has said that he is "personally puz-
zled as to why it is okay to randomize when people's lives are at stake (drug trials), but
not when research money is at stake". I strongly agree with him at this point. I also
agree with his final conclusion, that much can be achieved without introducing explicit
randomization if program evaluation is built "into the design of public research support
programs". This approach requires that data on project characteristics for all applicants is
accumulated and made available to researchers together with data on awarded subsidies.
2 "Redegjørelse av nærings og handelsministeren om IT-politikk", Forhandlinger i Stortinget nr. 192,
page 2853-2858. My translation.
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In future work, I hope to utilize such data from the Research Council of Norway in order
to investigate whether current technology programs produce more positive outcomes than
those evaluated in this thesis.
Finally, I would like to stress that R&D subsidies is not the only policy instrument rel-
evant to high-tech industries. Higher education, academic research and economic policy
in general are areas of vital importance. Educated workers is a key input, and academic
research is important both to technological progress and to technology transfer. Further-
more, what is good for the economy at large is good for high-tech industries. A stable and
efficient tax system, a high quality legal system and good infrastructure may in the long
run be more important than specific technology programs. This last statement, however,
does not imply that l consider such programs unimportant or uninteresting. Having spent
several years working on the topic, I am eager to continue in the field.
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Tor Jakob Klette* and Jarle Møen**
From Growth Theory to
Technology Policy -
Coordination Problems in
Theory and Practice
Information technology has been recognized
as a 'generic technology' with 'strategic
importance' for economic development by
many commentators and governments. In
this spirit a number of countries, including
Norway, have implemented governmental
programs to promote the production and
application of information technology.
Economists have had a hard time making
sense of terms such as a 'generic technology'
and a technology being of 'strategic import-
ance', at least until Bresnahan and Trajten-
berg (1995) introduced the notion of 'general
purpose technologies', and examined their
potential importance for economic growth.
General purpose technologies are characre-
rized by their wide applicability, their
potential for development and what
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg called innovative
complementarities. By innovative comple-
mentarities they had in mind positive
pecuniary externalities between the develop-
ment of the basic general purpose technology
and innovations in the sectors using this
technology. Such externalities tend to create
coordination problems and Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg argued that due to the pervasive
applicability of 'general purpose techno-
logies', these coordination problems might be
large even in a macroeconomic perspective.
As weexplainin detail below,the analysisof
coordination problems associatedwith 'general
purpose technologies' seems to capture quite
well the motivation behind the substantial
effort and money spent by governmental
agenciesinNorway to promote the production
and utilization of information technology, and
also the many attempts to coordinate the
various policy tools involvedin this effort.The
dominating part of these If-programs became
targeted directly at promoting the manu-
facruring of IT-products. The IT-programs
were implemented throughout the 19805and
1990s, and their considerable size is indicated
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by the total expenditures amounting to NOK
4.4 billon ($ 620 Mill.) for the largest of the
programs irnplernenred over the four year
period 1987-1990.
Having discussed the theory and the
programs in the first two sections, we present
a quantitative analysis of the impact of the IT-
related technology programs on the
manufacturing part of the IT-industry
including closely related high tech manufact-
uring sectors. In the first part of this analysis
we compare the performance of targeted
firms to other firms in the same industries.
Next, we consider the development of the IT-
industry and the related high tech manu-
facturing sectors relative to the performance
of the manufacturing sector at large, and
finally we compare the performance of these
sectors in Norway to their performance in
other OECD economies.
The general conclusion is that the IT-
programs, while well justified according to
economic principles, seem to have failed in
promoting the development of the IT
manufacturing sector in Norway. In the last
part of the paper we discuss various explana-
tions for the failure of these programs such as
informational problems and institutional
inertia in the governmental agencies heading
their implemenration.
From new growth theory and
coordination problems to
technology policy
Innovation, economic growth and technology
policy
Externalities associated with R&D, learning
and innovation have been emphasized in
recent developments in growth theory, and it
has been widely recognized that these
externalities create coordination problems
and possibly scope for welfare improving
government interventions. Theoretical work
on economic development and growth has
emphasized that the development of new
industries in the presence of such externalities
tend to create multiple equilibria where one
equilibrium corresponds ro the new industry
never reaching a 'critical mass' or never
'taking off", while other equilibria corre-
spond to the industry 'taking off' and starring
on a cumulative growth process', It is the
complementarity in activities across indepen-
dent firms, e.g. in innovation activities, that
give rise to multiple equilibria with high and
low levels of growth.
There are several policy tools available to
deal with externalities and coordination
problems in innovative activities as discussed
by Romer (1993) and many others. In theory,
external effects can be corrected for by tax
credits, grants, public production and
extending property rights through patents or
copyrights. All these means have been used by
the OECD countries to promote R&D and
innovation. However, the issue of optimal
design of R&D and innovation policies is far
from settled, and the practice of technology
policy vary substantially across countries,
technological fields and various stages of the
innovation process",
A particular coordination problem that
we want to focus on arises when the
technology in question is 'generic'. Infor-
mation technology is one example of this,
and it is a technology which has been actively
promoted by most OECD governments.
1. See the appendix in Da Rin and Hellman (1997) for a formal discussion of the notion of critical mass and take
off problems in the presence of positive externalities and complemen rarities.
2. See e.g. Murphy et al. (1989), Milgrom et al. (l991), and for a survey. Matsuyama (1995).
3. See Mowery (1995).
32
I
From growth theory ro technology policy - coordination problems in theory and practice 55
An economic analysis of 'generic'or general
purpose' tecbnologies
According to Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995), economic models, including most
growth theoretical models, tend ro "treat all
forms of technical change in the same, diffuse
manner", and there has been little economic
analysis suggesting that research and
innovation associated with 'generic' techno-
logies such as information technology require
particular attention. This motivated
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) to
introduce the notion of 'General purpose
technologies'" (hereafter GPTs), which they
characterized by: (i) pervasiveness, (ii)
potential for technical improvements, and (iii)
innovational complementarities. Drawing on
studies by economic historians on the role of
the steam engine, the factory system and
electricity, they argue that GPTs may be
essential to understand the importance of
innovation for economic growth. With
respect to recent history, Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg focus on the development of
semiconductors and IT.
There are two features of general purpose
technologies that we should emphasize. First,
generality of purpose which means that a
GPT potentially can be applied in several
application sectors. Second, that such applica-
tions require complementary innovations. That
is, there is complementarity between inno-
vations in the GPT and innovations in the
related application sectors. An innovation in
an application sector will make the GPT
more useful and thereby extend its market. A
larger market means that further innovations
in the GPT will be profitable. A berter GPT
will in turn widen its usefulness in the
application sectors and thereby make further
complementary innovations in the applica-
4. See also the subsequent work in Helpman (1998)
tion sectors profitable. This complementarity
between innovations in the GPT and an
associated application sector involves
pecuniary externalities which tend to create a
coordination problem.
There is a second type of complement-
arity associated with GPTs. An innovation in
one application sector will, as we JUSt have
explained, create incentives to develop
further improvements in the GPT. Improve-
ment of the GPT will benefit other applica-
tion sectors associated with the GPT, and
hence, there is complementarity not only
between the GPT and each application
sector, but also between innovations in
different application sectors. This creates
further pecuniary externalities, and a need for
coordinating innovations both between the
GPT and each application sector and
between different application sectors asso-
ciated with the same GPT.
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) argue
that the development of a GPT and its
applications have a sequential order. Specific
innovations in the application sectors can
only be implernenred profitably when the
GPT has reached a certain stage of develop-
ment. This sequential aspect of innovations
in the GPT and innovations in the applica-
tion sectors reinforce the desirability of
coordinating R&D and innovative activities.
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg point to the
current complaints of software developers
against Microsoft as an illustration of the
coordination problems that might arise.
Software developers argue that Microsoft
'excessively' exploits its coordination advan-
tage as the developer of both Windows and
other software, by not disclosing as soon as
possible features in new versions of Windows.
The general point is that there might be a
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significant advantage for the developers of
various applications to have detailed insights
into the research and development of the
basic technology, i.e. the GPT itself.
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg conclude that
arm-length market transactions between the
GPT and its users will give 'too little, too late'
innovation. Difficulties in forecasting and
coordinating the technological developments
in the GPT or in the various application
sectors can lower the rate of technical
advance, diffusion and development of new
as well as old sectors of the economy.
Economists, when recognizing these coordi-
nation problems and their undesirable
consequences for economic growth, tend to
point our the scope for welfare improving
government intervention.
Technology policy and IT as a general purpose
technology
Information technology at several levels can
be characterized as a GPT. First, at a basic
technological level, the development of
semiconductors and integrated circuits have
served as a GPT for a vast number of
application sectors, and there have been
strong innovational complernentarities
between the development of the integrated
circuits and innovations in various kinds of
computers, telecommunication equipment
and a whole range of other electronic devices.
Second, if we focus on the development of
the computer, in particular the PC, this
represents a GPT in itself, having e.g.
different pieces of software serving as
application sectors. Thinking further about
various kinds of software associated with the
PCs, we can recognize e.g. the worksheet or
word processors as GPTs at a new level.
Our pomt is that the introduction of
various parts of information technology often
involve innovative complementarities and
might therefore create some of the
coordination problems that we discussed
above. This perceived need for coordination
seems to capture quite well the motivation
behind the policy initiatives related to
production and application of information
technology made by the Norwegian govern-
ment in the 1980s and 1990s. Similar
initiatives were launched by the governments
in other OECD economies.
Introducing the National Program for
Information Technology for the period 1987-
90, the government wrote in its budget
report':
The motivation for the program is
information technology's role as a
strategically important field for manu-
facturing growth, and furthermore its
general significance for increasing
productivity and growth m other
industries and services.
This argument was elaborated on m the
report from the offici.p commission
evaluating the program, where the following
aspects of information technology were
emphasized't
Information technology has broad
industrial and economy wide appli-
cations, but this is not entirely excep-
tional. More basic for this type of
technology is the need not only to develop
the technology itself, but to adopt the
technology to the needs in quite different
applications; in manufacturing, the public
5. 'Statsbudsjettet 1986/87', St.prp. nr. 1, p. 40. Our translation.
6. Harlem et al. (1990), p. 235. Our translation.
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sector and in the economy at large. In this
situation there are two essential factors
relevant for the development of a
coordinated technology policy: The
applications represent the market for the
manufacturers while the manufacturers
are problem solvers for the users. This
creates a demand for an IT-policy
reflecting the integration between
researchers, users and producers.
The report from the officialcommission then
goeson to discuss to what extent the targeted
program for information technology was an
appropriare policy tool, and we will return (O
their conclusions below.
The Norwegian policy initiatives on
information technology in the 1980s and
1990swere motivated by an understanding of
the broad set of potential applications for IT
and the interaction between the basic
innovations and the adoption and develop-
ment of these innovations in the applications
sectors.This motivation for a coordinated plan
and a government initiative targeted at
information technology, is in our interpre-
tation congruent to the analysisof GPTs and
the coordination problems emphasized by
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).
Coordination problems and the
Norwegian IT-programs
The technology programs related to information
technology in the 1980s and 1990s
In Norway in the 1980s, there were some
widely held worries about the state of the
domestic information technology industries,
and the emphasis was on the following three
sets of problems: (i) Fragmentation of public
funds for R&D, innovation and utilization of
IT-technology, (ii) too many small and
independent firms, and (iii) little long term
planning and originality in product
development". The promotion of the IT-
industry in the period we consider from 1982
to 1995 was organized and coordinated
through a number of plans and programs of
various size".The largest plan in this period
was the aforementioned National Program for
Information Technology', lasting from 1987
to 1990. This program had total expenditures
of NOK 4.4 billion'? and included a number
of'subprograms' (seebelow).
Before 1987, the RoyalNorwegianCouncil
for Scientificand Industrial Research(NTNF)
had implemented several funding schemes
which were predecessors to the National
Program for Information Technology" , and
7. See Hervik and Guvåg (1989), p. 7 and Harlem et al.(l990), ch.3 .
8. The R&D subsidy programs have been administered by various research councils and governmental funds.
With respect to the high tech industries the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Indusrrial Research
and the Fund for Industry were the most prominent agencies. In the early 1990s the various research councils
were merged into the Norwegian Research Council, and most governmental industry funds were merged into
the Norwegian Industry and Regional Development Fund. Besides these agencies, R&D grants have also been
awarded directly through ministries.
9. 'Den nasjonale handlingsplan for informasjonsteknologi'. See Harlem et al. (1990) and Buland (1996) for
detailed documentation.
10. Approximately $ 620 Mill. NOK 2.1 billion of the expenditures were 'fresh money', see Harlem et al.O 990),
ch.7.2.4.
11. These included: (i) 'Nyskapningsplanen 1977-82', see Grønhaug and Fredriksen (1984). (ii) 'NTNFs
Handlingsprogram for Mikroelektronikk og Databehandling 1982-85', see Klerte and Søgnen (1986). (iii)
'Nyskapning i næringslivet' which started in 1984. (iv) 'NTNF's spesialprogram for mikroelektronikk' which
started in 1985 . All these activities were related and the last twO programs were continued within the National
Program for Information Technology from 1987. The research councils also sponsored a number of individual
research projects related to IT. See 'Srortings prp. nr. 133, 1977178' for details.
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the industrial part of the National Program for
Information Technology was succeeded by
the 'National Plan for Improved Utilization
ofInformation Technology in the Norwegian
Industry 1992-95'12.This last program was
small in terms of its independent budget, and
its main objective was to coordinate ongoing
public support schemes related ro informa-
tion technology.
In the rest of this paper we will refer to the
various support schemes for industrial
applications of information technology as the
'IT-programs'. Before we turn to an overall
evaluation of the economic impact of the IT-
programs, we will discuss more closely the
National Program for Information Techno-
logy. As stated, this was the most important
and ambitious of the programs, and its
implementation and organization are
extensively documented in Harlem et al.
(1990), Buland (1996) and other
publications.
A closer look at the National Program for
Information Technology,1987-90
The National Program for Information
Technology was a broad plan to coordinate
activities aimed at promoting the production
and applications of information technology.
The plan covered basic research, education,
production of integrated circuits and
computers, and applications of information
technology throughout the economy
including the public sector". Even though
the original plan had a very broad scope, the
actual irnplernentation of the program
focused heavily on manufacturing of
electronics and other IT-products. According
to Harlem et al. (1990) 14:
The program's focus on manufacturing
can be observed in the distribution of
project grants by institution; 48 percent of
the budget went to firms [which were
mainly firms in electronics and related
high tech industries], while another 33
percent went ro government labs which in
practice also were focused on applied
research for the manufacturing sector.
The project funds were very unevenly
distribured across firms, with the ten largest
recipients receiving 35 percent of the funds.
These firms were producing electronic
products, telecommunication equipment,
instruments and compurers". The largest
recipient, Norsk Data, received by itself more
than 12 percent of the budget allocated to
firms".
Table 1 presents the expenditures for the
National Program for Information Techno-
logy 1987-90. To illustrate the considerable
magnitude of the numbers in Table l, one
should notice that e.g. publicly funded
technological and scientific R&D in
universities and governmentallabs in 1989 in
total amounted to NOK 2542 Mlll".
As can be seen from Table l, a significant
12. "IT-plan for næringslivet 1992-95", see Olsen et al. (1997) for details.
13. See Harlem et al. (I990), chs. 4 and 7.2 .
14. P. 64, our translation.
15. The ten largest recipients were Norsk Data, Autodisplay, EB Nera, Nordic VLSI, EB, LCD Vision, Seatex,
Micron, Simrad Subsea and Alcatd/STK. The order reflects the size of the funding.
16. This percentage does not includ the so-called FUNN-project. See Harlem et al. (I990), especially ch. 4.1.1 for
further details on Norsk Datas projects within the National Program for Information Technology.
17. See NIFU (1991), Table T6 and N2. Publicly funded technological R&D in universities and governmentallabs
in total amounted to NOK 1245 Mill, while the public funding for scientific research in universities was NOK
1297 Mill. Publiclyfunded R&D in private firms was NOK 465 Mill. in 1989.
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Table 1.Expenditure within the «National Program for Information Technology
1987-90» broken down by field and year. Million NOK
1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Education 306 373 426 427 1 532
Research 138 132 135 130 534
Product development 134 151 239 220 745
Applications 329 369 398 474 1570
Total 907 1025 1 197 1252 4381
Source: Own computations based on Harlem et al. (1990), chapter 7.2.4.
part of the National Program for Information
Technology's budget went to education and
to a lesserdegree also to basic research related
to IT. At least the educational part of the
program has been considered successful by
Harlem et al. (1990) and others, but our
focus is on the substantially larger parts of the
IT-programs that were targeted more directly
at industrial production and applications of
information technology.
Aquantitative assessment of the
economic results of high tech
support in the 1980s and 19905
Expectations about the 4flcts of the IT-policy
Basedon the theoretical arguments related to
GPTs, one would expect the IT programs and
the coordination effort to stimulate economic
performance in the targeted firms and
industries. Such expectations were most
clearly stated by the committee heading the
implementation of the National Program for
Information Technology from 1988-90,
which anticipated an annual growth of 15
percent in sales and 20 percent in exports
from IT manufacturing as a result of the
Program; seeHarlem et al. (1990), pp. 173-4.
It is not obvious how one could test such
predictions, since we do not know what
would have happened if the program had not
been initiated. We have confronted the
predictions with observed outcomes in a
number of ways. Our first approach is based
on comparing the performance of the firms
receiving R&D support to other firms
operating in the same industries, and the
prediction we consider is that the supported
firms performed better than other firms. The
hypothesis is that the supported firms belong
to targeted technology groups which will
benefit more from the IT programs and are
more able to exploit the innovative
opportunities related to IT than other firms
in the IT industry.
One can argue that the comparison
between supported and other firms in the
same industry is too narrow a view and that
the IT-programs have created benefits for all
firms in IT-related industries. .As a second
approach we therefore consider the
performance of the supported industries
relative to the rest of the manufacturing
sector, and finally, we also compare the
performance of the high tech industries in
Norway to their performance in other
OECD economies. The last comparison
must be interpreted with caution since the IT
industry have been strongly supported also in
other OECD economies, as we will discuss
below.
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The magnitude of the R&D support to the high
tech industries
We define the IT or information technology
industry as consisting of the manufacture of
office machinery and communication
equipment, i.e. ISIC 3825 and 3832. This is
the kind of production most intensely
promoted by the governmental programs
described above, and consequently the sectors
where we should expect to see the main
effects. However, related sectors also received
significant support, and many companies
have both production and research activities
covering a broader class of produces. Due to
this and due to the associated classification
problems and possible spillovers between
closely related production activities within
companies, we have in our econometric work
decided to use R&D data aggregated to the
three digit line of business level. Our sample,
therefore, covers more general high tech
industries than IT, namely the manufacture of
. machinery, electrical equipment and technical
instruments, i.e. ISIC 382, 383 and 38518•
The R&D support most relevant for our
discussion is the subsidies administered by the
research councils and industry funds, and this
R&D support has on average been about 80
million NOK a year, having a maximum of
123 million NOK in 1987. Since then the
support has decreased by 46 percent in
nominal terms or by 58 percent if the figures
are deflated by the consumer price index. In
1995 the support was about 67 million kroner
which was about 1250 kroner per employee in
the high tech industries". The research
councils and industry funds financed about 6
percent of the total R&D investments in these
industries in 1987 and about 3 percent in
1995. Including the grants awarded directly
through ministries, the shares increases to
about 24 percenr and 11 percent respectively.
Microeconometric evidence on
subsidized versus non-subsidized
firms
Short and medium run effects of public R&D
support
It is difficult to find one variable that defines
the success of a firm. We therefore study the
effect of receiving public R&D support on a
variety of differenr performance measures.
Furthermore, as there is no theoretical model
predicting how a particular level of subsidy
will affect these different measures, we use a
simple dummy variable approach, following
Irwin and KIenow (1996). Our basic idea is
to compare subsidized and non-subsidized
firms to clarify whether subsidized firms on
average have performed better than the
others. The advantage of doing this within a
regression framework, is that it enables us to
control for other variables that might be
correlated both with performance and with
the probability of receiving a subsidy. Based
on the time series files of the Norwegian
manufacturing stansncs collected hy
Statistics Norway, we have constructed eight
performance measures containing informa-
tion on four different aspects of firm success.
Information on R&D and R&D subsidies is
merged in from the R&D surveys conducted
by the Royal Norwegian Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF) in
the years 1982-1989 and by Statistics
Norway in the years 1991-1995.
18. In a previous version of this paper Kletre and Meen (1998), we also presented an analysis based on a sample for
the more narrowly defined IT industry consisting of ISle 3825 and 3832.
19. Looking at the IT-industry in isolation, the suppon per employee from the Research Council and the Industry
Fund was three times larger.
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The R&D subsidy dummies are based on
the share of subsidies to total R&D over the
three years prior to the year of observation.
We do not expect a small subsidy to have
much effect on performance, and therefore
we do not distinguish between zero and less
than a five percenr subsidy share. On the
other hand, a large subsidy might affect a firm
differently than a medium subsidy, and to test
this hypothesis we have one dummy
indicating more than a 5 percent subsidy
share and an additional dummy indicating
more than a 25 percent subsidy share20• Using
these definitions, there are 841 observations
with more than a 5 percent subsidy share, and
357 of these have more than a 25 percent
subsidy share. There are 1958 observations
with positive R&D in at least one of the three
years prior to the year of observation, and
altogether our sample consists of about 6000
plant-year observations spanning ISle 382,
383 and 385 in the years 1983 to 1995. A
previous version of this paper (Klette and
Møen, 1998a) gives further details on sample
and variable construction.
We have started out regressing each
performance measure on the two subsidy
dummies, time and industry dummies. It is
possible that significant coefficients on the
subsidy dummies are due to reversed
causality, i.e. that successful, or possibly
unsuccessful, firms have a better chance of
receiving subsidies. This can, at least partly,
be controlled for by introducing plant
specific fixed effects, which is equivalent to
measuring all variables as deviations from the
firm specific means. Unfortunately, this
comes at a cost, as the downward bias on the
estimated coefficients due to measurement
errors, is likely to increase".
It should be emphasized that the units of
observation in the regressions are manu-
facturing plants, while the R&D statistics for
these plants are based on the R&D activity at
the level of the business unit within the firm
which they belong to. With plants as units of
observation we are able to keep track of the
history of production activities that belong to
restructured firms. This is essential since
several of the largest IT-firms, e.g. Norsk
Data and Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, were
restructured within the period covered byour
sample. To keep the terminology simple we
will, however, refer (O R&D firms and other
firms in the discussion of our results, ramer
than more precise terms such as plants
belonging to R&D performing firms.
We starr out by analyzing the effect of
subsidies on firm growth, and me results are
given in the first two columns in Table 2.
Table 2.A reports results from ordinary OLS
regressions, while Table 2.B reports results
from regressions that incorporate plant fixed
effects. In column 1, the growth measure is
based on man-hours, and in column 2 the
growth measure is based on sales. No matter
which measure is used, there do not appear to
be important differences between subsidized
and non-subsidized firms. The point
estimates are negative but statistically
insignificant for firms receiving between 5
and 25 percent subsidies, and positive or close
to zero (but statistically insignificant) for firms
receiving more than 25 percent subsidies". In
20. Firms with a subsidy share exceeding 25 percent arc quite similar ro amer firms wirh respect to size, capital
intensity and profit margins. However, they recieve 70 percent of total R&D support, but only 39 percent of
the R&D support from the research councils. These firms account for 33 percent of total R&D in the high tech
industries we consider.
21. Cf Griliches and Hausman (1986)
22. This effect is given by the sum of the two coefficients. Testing robustness, we have found that the results
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passing, we notice that the results in Table 2
also show that R&D firms have on average
grown more slowly than non-R&D firms,
both in terms of man-hours and sales23•
The effect of subsidies on profitability are
examined in column 3 and 4 in Table 2. We
measure profitabiliry both as return to assets
and by the profit margin. One might argue
that return to assets is the more relevant
measure of the two, but the reliability of this
measure is reduced by the large measurement
errors associated with the capital variable.
This is evident from the small R-square and
the large root mean square error in column 3,
and there are no significant coefficients
emerging from these regressions, whether
estimated with or without fixed effects.
Neither does column 4 show any significant
difference in the profit margins between
firms with and without R&D subsidies.
However, there seems to be a general
characteristic of all R&D performing firms
that they have higher profit margins than
firmswithout R&D, as shown by the positive
and significant coefficient for the dummy for
firms reporting R&D.
Turning to the effect of subsidies on
productivity, the regression results are
reported in columns 5 and 6. We have used
both labor productivity, column 5, and total
factor productivity, column 6, as the
dependent variable.Our results show that the
subsidized firms have a lower level of
productivity, and the differences are
statistically highly significant when fixed
effectsare included.
The effect of subsidies on the investment
intensity is reported in column 7 in Table 2.
The investment intensity is defined as
investments in machinery and buildings
relativeto sales, and we consider this measure
as a proxy for expected growth in sales.
Furthermore, we believe that expected growth
in salesis positivelycorrelated with the success
of the firm's R&D projects, particularly after
industry differences have been controlled for.
Looking at column 7, we find that there are
no sysrernatic differences between subsidized
and non-subsidized firms in this respect.
Private R&D expenditure could also be
considered a proxy for past R&D success,and
besides this, stimulating R&D expenditure
has been an explicit aim of the technology
programs. From column 8 we see that there
are no significant difference between the
intensity of privately financed R&D in
subsidized and non-subsidized firms. In an
ongoing companion study, Klette and Møen
(1998b), we examine the effect of R&D
subsidies on private R&D expenditure in
more detail, applying various econometric
approaches. Preliminary results from that
study confirm that subsidies do have some
effect on private R&D expenditure.
Longer run effocts
Studying the effect of R&D within the high
tech industries, it is customary to assume a
one year lag between the R&D investments
and the first effect on production. This is
justified by the short-term nature of much
commercial R&D, but it seems likely that the
peak of the impact has more than a one year
lag. For this reason we defined aur subsidy
dummy in the last section using a three year
'window'. However, it could be that R&D
projects supported by public agencies have a
particularly long-term nature, and it has been
presented in Table 2 are largely unchanged if we neglect the firms receiving large, defense related R&D
contracts.
23. This is consistent with the findings reported in Kiene and Ferre (1998).
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Table 3. The aggregate development for R&D finns established in ISle 382,383 or
385 not later than 1985
R&D firms with R&D R&D firms with R&D subsidy
subsidy share less than 5% share greater than or equal to 5%
1985 1995 Growth 1985 1995 Growth
Private R&D investments 990 850 -14% 810 660 -18%
- average 8.8 10.5 19% 8.4 9.9 17%
R&D intensity 4.1% 4.8% 15% 8.1% 6.7% -17%
Employment 22280 14940 -33% 16480 9400 -43%
- average 199 184 -8% 172 140 -19%
Sales 14530 18080 24% 10380 12370 19%
- average 130 223 72% 108 185 71%
Labor productivity ]51 253 68% 146 253 74%
Capital intensity 0.46 0.66 44% 0.61 0.97 60%
Return on assets 19.1% 24.7% 30% 12.4% 18.0% 45%
Return on sales 13.4% 13.5% 0.5% 11.9% 13.2% 11%
No. of plants 112 81 -28% 96 67 -30%
The subsidy share is the parr of the firm's deflated R&D investments in 1985-1993 which was financed by public
grants.R&D investments are deflated by a wage index and given in millions of 1995 NOK. Sales are given in
nominal millions NOK. Labor productivry is value added per manhour in nominal NOK. Capital intensity is
assets per employee. given in nominal millions NOK. The calculations are based on plant level dara.
argued that the effect of the subsidies given in
the late 1980s has not been visible until
latelf4. Against this, one might argue that the
growth experienced during the last years, is
more likely to be an ordinary business cycle
effect than an effect of previous technology
programs, as there has been strong growth in
all sectors of the Norwegian economy. In
order to investigare this issue closer, we have
compared the growth of subsidized and non-
subsidized firms that existed in 1985, over the
entire decade 1985 to 1995. We have defined
subsidized firms as firms who had more than
five percent of their R&D expenses over the
years 1985 to 1993 financed by the govern-
ment and we have aggregated across all firms
in each group", The results are reported in
Table 3. Once again we have used several
different performance measures, and we have
deliberately chosen measures that are easy to
interpret.
Looking at Table 3, we may first note
that subsidized firms have a higher R&D
intensity than non-subsidized firms. This
indicates rhar the chance of getting R&D
subsidies has been greater for the R&D
24 See e.g. the front page of Computer World no. 38, 1997.
25. In an earlier version of this paper, KIene and Møen (1998a), we also considered the performance of the median
firm in each group, and we examined differences in performance within the more narrowly defined IT-industry.
Considering the IT industry narrowly defined, there is some evidence that the subsidized firms have performed
better than the non-subsidized ones, but the evidence is not very strong.
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intensive firms. However, we see that the
growth in private R&D investments as well
as in R&D intensity have been greater for
the non-subsidized firms, and consequently
the subsidies do not seem to have stimulated
R&D investments. With respect to growth,
whether in employees or sales, we see a
similar pattern as the non-subsidized firms
have performed better than the subsidized
ones. Looking at labor productivity, we find
that both the level and the growth rate were
of about the same magnitude for the two
groups. However, as the subsidized firms
started out with a higher capital intensity
and had a stronger growth in the capital
intensity, they seem to have performed
worse than the non-subsidized firms with
respect to total factor productivity. Turning
to profitabiliry which might be considered
the most important measure, the non-
subsidized firms were the most profitable
both in the beginning and in the end of the
period, and the subsidized firms had by
1995 not even caught up with the 1985 level
of the non-subsidized firms. On the other
hand, the subsidized firms did have a
stronger growth in profitabiliry than the
non-subsidized ones. Finally, looking at the
exit rate given in the last row, we see that
there is no significant difference between the
two groups.
lndustrial growth
The aim of the technology programs have
been to promote the entire Norwegian IT
industry, and in addition to R&D subsidies,
relevant education and academic research
have also been supported. One way to
evaluate the totality of these efforts is to
compare the experience of the Norwegian
high tech industries to total Norwegian
manufacturing and to the IT industries in
other OECD countries. We have performed
international comparisons using data from
the OECD STAN, ANBERD and BERO
databases,
Starting out looking at Table 4, we can see
that in Norway the share of IT and general
high tech in total manufacturing is smaller
than the OECD average. Furthermore, from
1983 to 1995, these shares do not change
significantly'". Despite these industries being
less important in Norway than overall in the
OECD, Norway is conducting more of its
total manufacturing R&D within these
industries. The reason for this is most likely
the composition of Norwegian manu-
facturing, its major sectors having low R&D. . .intensmes.
The disrribution of subsidies is given in
the last two rows. In Norway, the ratio
between the share of R&D subsidies received
by high tech industries and these industries'
share of total R&D, is higher than the
OECD average. The Norwegian high tech
industries also have a higher share of their
R&D financed by subsidies than the
corresponding OECD average. The
difference is most significant in 1987 when
Norway launched the National Program for
Information Technology as described above.
The Norwegian industry received about the
same amount of R&D support as the OECD
average (in relative terms) at the beginning of
the time period studied, but by 1987 this had
changed as the Norwegian IT industry at that
time received significantly more suPPOrt than
the OECD average. One should, however,
notice that international comparisons of
public R&D support are problematic, as it is
hard to identify with much precision how
much of e.g. defence related research that
26. Defining [he manufacruring IT-industry as most ofNACE sectors 30-33, gives the same conclusion.
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Table 4. The importance of high technology and IT relative to total manufacturing
1983 1987 1991 1995
Norway OECD Norway OECD Norway OECD Norway OECD
Employment 19% 24% 21% 25% 20% 25% 19%
Value added 19% 22% 20% 21% 19% 22% 19%
Total R&D including R&D
institures 54% 41 % 54% 43% 47% 43%
Total intramural R&D 60% 37% 54% 40% 51% 40%
Total subsidy (O intramural R&D 80% 48% 85% 34% 76% 39%
Subs. as share of (at. intramural
R&D 12% 11% 20% 10% 15% 8%
ISIC 382. 383 and 385. The OECD columns give the aggregate of 13 major indusrrialized countries for which we
have complete data. These are Norway, Sweden.Finland, Denmark, Germany. UK, France. Italy, Spain, USA,
Canada, Australia and Japan. All variables, except subsidy as share of total intramural R&D, are measured in
percent of all manufacturing industries.
Source: OECD, DSTI(STAN, ANBERO and BERO).
benefits the IT industry. Furthermore, in
several OECD countries significant amounts
of public R&D support are given in terms of
tax reliefs, and such tax allowances are not
reflected in the numbers reported in Table
427• In this perspective, one should not take
the OECD numbers presented in Table 4 at
face value and conclude that Norway had a
subsidy share in R&D which in 1987 was
twice as large as in other OECD countries.
Despite this reservation about the OECD
numbers, we believe it is interesting to
compare the performance of the Norwegian
IT industry to the IT industry in other
OECD countries as we do in Figure l which
displays the relationship between R&D
intensity and production". Not surprisingly,
it is evident that Norway has a very small
share of the world market. At me same time,
the R&D intensity in the Norwegian IT
industry is very high, and only Sweden had a
comparable increase in the R&D intensity.
Despite the increased R&D intensity, in me
years 1988 to 1992 Norway was the only
country with a fall in production. This fall in
production is obviously related to the severe
recession experienced in Norway during these
years, but if the Norwegian IT industry had
been internationally compennve, the
condition on the domestic market should not
have been too severe an obstacle in a period of
growth in the international marker",
Summary of economic results
Most countries support IT and related high
tech industries. In Norway, the R&D
27. See Bloom et al. (1997) for an analysis ofR&D tax subsidies in a number of OECD countries.
28. In Klene and Møen 0998a), we also examine the differences across OECD contries in terms of R&D,
employment growth, labor productivity and export performance for the IT-industry. Notice that Figure l is
based on the If-industry narrowly defined.
29. Further discussion of the magnitude of the IT program in Norway compared to other OECD countries can be
found in Buland (1996, ch. 2) and Harlem et al. (1990, ch. 2).
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Figure 1. R&D intensity and production in the IT industry (ISIC 3825 and 3832).
Norway compared to other OECD countries.
-/
USØ3 4 /:æsaB50
48
4S
lJI(82 UK88
Ge83
>Ge88...
UKII3-
44
Sw. • Sw93
42 Fi
40
38
4 6 8 10 12 14
R&D intensity
2016 18
Production is measured as the log of gross output in 1985 dollars. R&D intensity is R&D investments in percent
of gross output.
'Source: DECO. DSTI(STAN and ANBERD).
subsidies were particularly large in the second
half of the 1980s, both in a national and
probably also in an international perspective.
In this section we have investigated the effect
of these subsidies, using several different
approaches and data sources. First,
comparing subsidized and non-subsidized
firms within the high tech industries, there is
little evidence in favor of the subsidized firms
being more successful. Second, looking at
these industries relative to aggregate
Norwegian manufacturing, their importance
have not increased. Third, comparing the
development of the Norwegian IT industry
to the IT industry of other OECD countries,
the Norwegian industry does not perform
particularly well. Obviously, if someone
claims that the subsidized firms and the entire
Norwegian IT industry would have
performed a lot worse without the support,
we cannot prove him or her wrong'".
Nonetheless, we believe a reasonable inter-
30. In that case. however. it would still be difficult to argue in favour of the subsidies. as the rate of return on
invested capital in technology industries has been lower than the rate of return in other manufacturing
industries, according to the Federation of Norwegian Engineering Industries (1998).
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pretation of our results is that the public
financial support to R&D and innovation in
the IT industry did not create a substantial
stimulus to its performance, in contrast to what
one would expect from the arguments made by
the promoters of the IT-programs and from the
theoretical arguments presented above.
Coordination problems and
technology policy in practice
The IT -programs - coordination failures at the
policy level
We have pointed out that GPTs - general
purpose technologies often create
coordination problems that will tend to slow
down the development of the GPTs and
thereby the emergence of new industries and
economic growth more generally. We have
also argued that it is reasonable to interpret
the Norwegian IT-programs as governmental
efforts to overcome these coordination
problems and thereby encourage R&D,
innovation and utilization of IT-related
products.
Our empirical analysis of the economic
performance in the firms and sectors targeted
by the IT-programs revealed few results
suggesting that they have benefitted
significantly from the financial stimulation
and the coordination effort of the programs.
These findings lead ro the conclusion stated
above that the Norwegian governmental
effort ro stimulate and coordinate the
development ofIT-products and applications
have not been very successful. We are,
however, not the first evaluation study to
recognize the failure of the coordination
activities in the IT-programs; this aspect has
been emphasized in all previous evaluation
reports. A report evaluating the part of the
National Program for Information
Technology organized by the Industry Fund,
concluded that they found few concrete
results with respect to the creation of
'strategic alliances' or 'coordinated groups'
which was an explicit and major objective of
this part of the program!'. In the overall
evaluation a year later, Harlem et al. (1990)
concluded that "the plan has undoubtedly
failed in improving coordination and
inregration of policy towards information
technology"32. The difficulties involved in
implernenting coordinating activities could
clearly be recognized during the operation of
the program as the committee heading the
implementarion was entirely reorganized
twice during the program's four years of
existence. The reorganization of the heading
committees was to a large extent due to
dissatisfaction in the Ministry of Industry
with the way the various activities were
organized and the lack of broader
coordination, as described in Harlem et al.
(1990), ch. 533.
Two years later, in the governrnent's report
to the Parliament on the research activity in
the Norwegian economy, it was referred to
this negative conclusion by Harlem et al.
(I990) and the report elaborated on ir34:
"The main conclusion is that [the research
programs including the research activities
31. See Hervik and Guvåg (989).
32. P. 233, our translation. We recognize that the focus on coordination failures in this and other evaluation reports
often refers to problems in coordinating institutional arrangments rather than the projects directly. However, it
seems likely that poor coordination at an institutional level will show up as poor coordination also at a project
levd and our empirical findings confirm this expectation by showing that the coordination at the project levd
was not very successful.
33. See also Buland (1996), especially chs. 9 and 10.
34. Cf. Ministry of Church, Education and Research (1992), p. 92-94.
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within the National Program for Information
Technology] did not lead to the intended
coordination for the programs as a whole, not
in the relationship between the government
agencies and the private agents, nor between
the various government agencies." Further-
more, "the research programs have not been
successful as policy tools, neither with respect
to organization, planning or information.
Research activities have to a large extent
remained as fragmented as before the
programs were implernented." These conclu-
sions were based on an assessment of 9
research programs, including research
programs on biotechnology, offshore and
other activities, in addition to information
technology which was by far the largest
among them.
Given these clearly recognized problems
with the coordination efforts up to 1992, it is
a bit depressing to read the main conclusions
of the report on the evaluation of the
'National Plan for Improved Utilization of
Information Technology in the Norwegian
Industry 1992-95' presented in Olsen et al.
(1997)35:
[The plan] never became an instrument for
coordination of governmental institutions
and means .... The plan never managed to
mobilize any strategic use of other resource
and means present in governmental
institutions ... To explain this poor
coordinating performance, several factors
ought to be mentioned. First, it appears as
very unclear exactly what the plan was
going to coordinate, and why coordination
was Important. Second, institutional
resistance ... never produced a climate
conducive for cooperation and coordina-
tion among the relevant institutions.
The explanatory factors emphasized in this
quote from Olsen et al. (1997) deserve
further attention and we will return to them
below. First, we want to point out that the
two important questions of what the plans
were supposed to coordinate, and why
coordination was important, were only
considered in general and superficial terms in
the evaluation repans. The evaluation reports
unanimously complain about poor
coordination, but there is a striking omission
of analysis at a practical level of what the
plans were supposed (O coordinate, and why.
For instance, none of the reports identified or
examined concrete examples of opportunities
for beneficial coordination that were missed.
One interpretation of this omission is that a
careful discussion of such specific
opportunities would require a lot of detailed
information and therefore would be (00
difficult or time consuming - even with the
benefits of hindsight. The amount of
information required to identify coordina-
tion opporruniries is the issue that we want to
consider next.
Two pessimistic and one optimistic
view of coordination problems
Coordination beyond stylized models
Above we have tried to link the IT-programs
to recent theoretical work on innovative
complementarities, GPTs and coordination
problems in order to identify more clearly the
basic principles. However, understanding the
basic principles of coordination problems
does not take one very far in the direction of
35. Cf. Olsen et al. (1997). p.vii. One should keep in mind that when the Norwegian research councils were
completely reorganized in 1992 by the establishment of the Norwegian Research Council. it was largely based
on the hope that this should promote coordination of related but poorly coordinated activities that previously
had been organized by different research councils.
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useful, practical conclusions about how to
construct technology policy. Understanding
the basic problems, one is lead to a new but
not simpler set of questions: What activities
in what firms are complementary and need to
be coordinated, and in what way? An
appropriate choice of policy tools requires a
detailed understanding of the externalities
and the innovative complernentarities
involved, as well as the nature of the firms'
behavior and constraints.
Matsuyama (1997) and others have
emphasized that the informational require-
ments at a practical level raises serious
questions about the possibilities for
government policy to correct coordinating
problems in the real world. Matsuyarna
argues that coordination problems are
pervasive phenomena and he emphasizes that
economists' illustration of coordination
problems by means of simplistic game
theoretic models are useful to illustrate
coordination problems as a possibility. But
such game theoretic models tend to trivialize
the coordination difficulties that face policy
makers; in real coordination problems, the
nature of 'the game', the pay-off structure,
the identity of the players and even their
number are often unknown to the policy
makers. Furthermore, the nature of the game
can change rapidly and dramatically due to
outside influences. These problems might be
particularly relevant in a rapidly developing
rechnological field such as information
technology and in a small open economy
such as the Norwegian.
Consider as an example the case of Norsk
Data which was one of the largest, and no
doubt the leading manufacturing firm in the
Norwegian IT-industry in the 1980s. Norsk
Data's production of minicomputers with its
36. SeeSteine (1992), p.ll.
integrated software was highly successful
until the mid 1980s and it was recognized as
the fastest growing and third most profitable
computer firm in the world in 198636•
However, the situation was entirely different
two years later when it became clear that so-
called open standards - in particular the
UNIX operating system - eliminated the
need for tight integracion between
production of the computer hardware and
the software. Norsk Data was running large
deficits at the end of the decade and heading
fast towards bankruptcy. It was finally
dissolved and partly sold to the German firm
Siemens/Nixdorf in 1991. As mentioned
above, Norsk Data was the largest recipient of
project support within the National Program
for Information Technology, something
which perhaps illustrates the information
problem emphasized by Matsuyama (1997).
Institutional inertia as a barrier to coordination
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) have
made a related point in their analysis of
coordination problems associated with
general purpose technologies. They argue
that the institutions designed to correct the
coordination problems display much more
inertia than the leading technologies. When
a GPT era approaches its end and a new
GPT emerges, the old institutions will resist
change and the economy might 'get stuck'
with the wrong institutions, namely those
that have been designed to solve the
coordination problems associated with the
previous GPT.
This argument is consistent with what Olsen
et al. (1997) noted, that "institutional
resistance never produced a climate
conducive for cooperation and coordination
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among the relevant institutions" within the
'National Plan for Improved Utilization of
Information Technology in the Norwegian
Industry 1992-95'. Institutional resistance
and inertia was also a basic problem in the
implementarion of the National Program for
Information Technology and an important
reason why the heading committee of the
program was reorganized twice during the
four years it lasted. The previously mentioned
repon to the Parliament discussing research
programs more generally37, suggests that the
problem of sluggish institutional changes in
new technological and scientific fields have
been quite pervasive. The problems and
discussions leading up to the recent establish-
ment of the Norwegian Research Council
underscores this point, cf footnote 35.
In other terms, even though coordination
problems suggest that Pareto improvements
are possible, widespread institutional
resistance show that policy reforms create
'winners', bur also 'losers' which, although
they could be compensated in principle,
makes it difficult to implement desirable
policy changes even when we disregard the
information problem discussed above.
Coordination through the market: The
optimistic view
Coordination problems illustrated by game
theoretic analysis are based on non-
cooperative behavior as an assumption. How-
ever, it is not obvious that firms in the same
industry or firms that are vertically related are
unable to implement cooperative solutions
through negonatIons and contractual
relationships. This view has been most
forcefully stated in the classical paper by
Coase (I960), where he claimed that
coordination problems associated with
complementary activities often will be solved
through such market mechanisms. This
optirnistic view appears to be orthogonal to
Matsuyama (1997) and the cited argument in
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), but it
leads to a similar conclusion about the
limited role for governments to act as a
coordinator. Coase has argued that the
market mechanism will tend to incorporate
or compensate for external effects if
transaction costs are not high38• His point is
that - in the presence of positive external
effects - there are strong incentives to sign a
contract or organize a compensation
arrangement between e.g. a firm receiving a
positive external effect and a firm providing
the source of this effect. Coase also argued
that economists tend to ignore such options
for compensation through the market. A
rhetorical remark by Matsuyama (1997)
echoes this argument:
If the coordination problem were simple
enough for even the outsider, such as the
economists or the bureaucrat, to know
how to solve it, it would have been taken
care of a long time ago by those directly
involved with the problem.'
The ability of the market itself to facilitate
coordination, has to a large extent been
ignored in economic studies of technical
change and in recent research on 'new'
growth theory". However, when we examine
the Norwegian IT-industry, it is clear that the
firms are involved in a large set of
coordinating arrangements organized
through contracts and other private
institutions. According to Aakvaag et al.
37. Ch. MinisrryofChurch, Education and Research (1992).
38. See Coase (I988) where he has elaborated on this argument.
39. See, however, the recent literature on research joint ventures, e.g. Karnien et al. (1992).
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(I996), about 60 percent of the Norwegian
electronics firms report that they participate
in technological cooperation schemes.
Parmer firms often have a pardy inregrated
ownership structure, which is one important
market arrangement to internalize this type
of externalities. A different example of
coordination through private institutions is
given by Steine (1992), who argues that an
important contribution to the early success of
Norsk Data was its close contact with
demanding customers. Norsk Data organized
a formal user group in order to coordinate the
development of their minicomputers and
software with organizational and other
innovations developed by its customers.
Similar user groups and other coordinating
relationships are well known throughout the
computer industry. Formal contracts
coordinating the development of new
technologies in the primary innovating firm
and 'partner'. firms using the new technology
are regularly announced in the business press.
To take a recent case, the Norwegian
electronics company MRT Micro, which has
developed PC-cards to digitalize pictures, has
announced that they have signed
collaboration contracts with four firms using
these PC-cards40• These four firms are quite
different; one is e.g. making identification
system for the police and defence, while
another is making measurement instruments
for opticians and eye-doctors. Industry
associanons are another set of private
institutions which are important m
facilitating coordination of innovative
activities". In a theoretical study, Romer
(1993) has examined new institutional
arrangements to improve the coordinating
function of such organizations. However, it
must be left for future research to examine the
empirical performance of such organizations
in coordinating R&D activities and privately
funded research joint ventures more
generally. Our point here is only to illustrate
the widespread coordination of comple-
mentary innovative activities across indepen-
dent firms through contracts and other
private institutions.
Conclusions
The motivation for the IT programs in
Norway in the 1980s and 1990s seem to a
large extent to accord well with the
coordination problems identified in the new
growth theory and especially the recent
theory on 'General Purpose' Technologies'
introduced by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995). Having studied the Norwegian IT
industry, we have no reason to doubt that
innovative complernentarities associated with
such technologies can be pervasive
phenomena, and that these complemen-
rarities create a number of coordination
problems. A major question we have
addressed in this study is to what extent the
considerable public funds spent on
coordinating and promoting the R&D
activities in the Norwegian IT industry have
been successful in overcoming such
coordination problems and stimulated the
performance of this industry and closely
related industries. Our findings suggest that
the results have been very modest and that
the IT programs were largely unsuccessful",
40. Dagens Næringsliv, 13.11.97, p.8.
41. The industry association for IT firms in Norway (ITF) reports a large number of coordinated reasearch projects
and research joint ventures in its annual repon (The IT-Industry's Association, 1996).
42. Wicken (I994. pp. 271-2), summarizing a number of studies on the history of Norwegian technology policy
from World War II onwards, draw a similar conclusion.
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Why did not these technology programs
succeed, despite their appeal ex ante and
according to economic theory? In contrast to
the situation with illustrarive and simplistic
, game theoretic models, in real coordination
problems, information is a serious obstacle;
what is the nature of the game, which players
are involved, what do the pay-off structure
look like and how rapidly is it likely to
change? Or in less formal terms; exactly
which firms and what activities should be
coordinated and in what way? These serious
questions are very hard to answer in a rapidly
developing field such as information
technology and might be particularly hard to
solve in a small open economy where a large
majority of the innovations take place
abroad. We believe that industrial innovation
is an activity where coordination problems
and 'market failure' often are pervasive, but it
is probably also an activity where policy
makers and bureaucrats often lack the
information needed to improve on the
market solution.
The coordination problems created by
complementary innovative activities across
different firms seem in many cases to be at
least partly resolved by private institutions
such as industry associations, privately
funded research joint ventures and other
cooperative research agreements. In future
research it could be interesting to examine
more directly the role of such cooperative
acrivitiesv'.
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Abstract
A number ofmarket failures have been associated with R&D investments and significant amounts of public money have
been spent on programs to stimulate innovative activities. In this paper, we review some recent microeconometric studies
evaluating effects of government-sponsored commercial R&D. We pay particular attention to the conceptual problems
involved. Neither the firms receiving support, nor those not applying, constitute random samples. Furthermore, those not
receiving support may be affected by the programs due to spillover effects which often are the main justification for R&D
subsidies. Constructing a valid control group under these circumstances is challenging, and we relate our discussion to recent
advances in econometric methods for evaluation studies based on non-experimental data. We also discuss some analytical
questions, beyond these estimation problems, that need to be addressed in order to assess whether R&D support schemes
can be justified. For instance, what are the implications of firms' R& D investments being complementary to each other, and
to what extent are potential R&D spillovers internalized in the market? © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: 030; 040; LI O
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1. Introduction vast, and there is also a steadily growing empirical
literature verifying the importance of spillovers in
R&D and innovative activities. There is conse-
quently little controversy among economists about
the desirability of governmental support to these
activities 2, and all OECD countries have over sev-
The theoretical literature on market failures asso-
ciated with R&D and technological innovations is
• Corresponding author. Tel.: +47-22-85-51-34; fax: +47-22-
85-50-35; e-mail: t.j.klette@econ.uio.no, http://www.uio.no/
- totjkl
IWe have benefited from comments by Tore Nilssen, John van
Reenen and participants at the NBER productivity meeting in
December 1998. This project has received partial financial support
from the Research Council of Norway.
2 See, however, the heated and wide-ranging debate on this
issue in Research Policy, starting with the review by David
(1997) of Kealey's book on economic issues of scientific research
(Kealey, 1997). See also the exchange between Friedman (1994)
and Griliches (1994).
0048-7333/00/$ - see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science B.v. All rights reserved.
PIl: S0048-7333(99)00086-4
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eral decades spent significant amounts of public
money on programs intended to stimulate innovative
activities. However, compared to the size of the
programs and the emphasis put on technology policy
by politicians, the effort to evaluate in quantitative
terms the economic benefits and costs of R&D
subsidies has been rather modest.
In this paper, we review some recent contribu-
tions to this evaluation literature that use economet-
ric techniques based on microdata, in particular
firm-level data. More specifically, we review the
microeconometric literature evaluating the effects of
government sponsored commercial R&D. This kind
of government support to commercial R&D projects
is supposed to target projects with large expected
social benefits, but with inadequate expected returns
to private investors. An important question is whether
the government agencies are able to choose projects
with high social returns that the private sector would
not undertake on its own. 3
Evaluating the effects of government sponsored
projects, one has to face the question of what would
have taken place without the subsidies, and it is
important to realize that evaluating large scale sub-
sidy programs is an exercise in counter factual analy-
sis. Neither the firms receiving support,nor those not
applying, can be considered random draws. Con-
structing a valid control group in this setting is quite
challenging and we relate our discussion to the re-
cent advances in econometric methods for evaluation
studies based on non-experimental data.
Most of the available evaluation studies of R&D
programs have not been based on microeconometric
techniques, but instead on case studies and inter-
views with program and project managers. 4 These
key persons are typically asked to report the payoff
from the projects, and similar questions might be
asked also to downstream users of innovations
emerging from the R&D program in question. 5 It is
3 See, e.g., Yager and Schmidt (1997) for a detailed and
skeptical discussion of the government's ability to reduce market
failures in R&D activities.
4 Mansfield (J 996) surveys this methodology and gives refer-
ences to the previous literature.
5 Cf., e.g., Link (J 996) and Link et al. (J 996). The 1996 book
by Link is reviewed by Averch (J 997).
easy to conceive an upward bias in the payoff re-
ported by project managers, not least because a high
estimate typically increases the chances that the R&D
program will be considered successful and continued
or replaced by a similar program. Also, one should
not underestimate the problems for the project man-
agers in constructing an estimate of the payoff from
individual projects, since such estimates are based on
counter factual questions similar to those faced by
the econometrician. 6 Another disadvantage of the
case studies is that they have high costs per case
(project) considered, and case studies consequently
tend to be quite selective and suffer from the objec-
tion that they may not be representative. Finally,
evaluation studies not based on 'objective data' may
more easily be biased, e.g., by prior beliefs, which is
a problem because evaluation studies typically are
done by 'professional evaluators' who are part of the
political process that formulates the programs, and
who "are dependent on those commissioning the
evaluation studies for further projects and studies,
and risk losing future clients if they voice strong
criticism" (Luukkonen, 1998).
It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss in
detail evaluation studies based on interviews and
case studies. Our study focuses on microeconometric
studies of firm level data or similar data sources, as
we pointed out above. It is also narrowly focused on
the impact on manufacturing performance of direct
government support to commercial R&D-projects,
and it largely ignores closely related issues such as
the impact of research in governmental labs, defense
related R& D-contracts, support to basic research in
universities and tax-breaks for R&D. 7 Furthermore,
we do not review the literature that exclusively
considers to what extent R&D subsidies crowd out
privately financed R&D investments 8, but our dis-
cussion addresses this issue in the context of the
more wide-ranging studies that we consider.
6 Notice that the project manager might have less information
than the econometrician about economic results of competing
projects or firms,
7 See the survey by Hall and van Reenen (1999) on taxes and
R&D, and Mowery and Rosenberg (1998) for a wide ranging
discussion of the other issues and further references.
8 See David et al. (J 999) for a survey.
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We start in Section 2 by considering five microe-
conometric studies that directly try to evaluate the
effects of government sponsored commercial R&D,
and we refer to these studies at several points in the
rest of the paper. Section 3 discusses some general
issues considered in the recent econometric literature
on evaluation studies when only non-experimental
data are available, which is typically the case for
R&D programs. Section 4 discusses more narrowly
how the five studies and related studies address the
essential issue of R&D spillovers. In Section 5, we
discuss some analytical questions related to market
imperfections and spillovers that need to be ad-
dressed to decide whether the R& D support schemes
can be justified. Our suggestions for future research
are summarized in the last section.
2. Five microeconometric studies of government-
sponsored R&D
2.1. The SEMATECH research consortium in the US
Irwin and Klenow (1996) evaluated the SEMAT-
EcH program in the US, which was a research
consortium established in 1987. SEMATECH was
set up to promote US manufacturing's role in the
development of technology for production of semi-
conductor products. 9 The consortium was initiated
with fourteen firms but has since been somewhat
restructured with a few of the initial firms pulling
out. About half of the consortium' s annual budget
(about US$200 Mill.) was financed through govern-
ment subsidies in the period 1987-1996. 10
In their study based on annual firm-level data for
the period 1970-1993, Irwin and Klenow (1996)
found that SEMATECH was successful in eliminat-
9 Link et al. (1996) evaluate the returns to SEMATECH pro-
jects through interview studies.
10 The government support to SEMATECH was ended in 1996,
but the consortium has continued with private funding only. In
August, 1998, it was announced that SEMATECH and the gov-
ernment jointly will sponsor new university-based research centers
to "study new methodologies in designing, testing and connecting
microchip components".
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ing excessive duplication of R&D, which was a
major objective of the consortium. At the same time,
the SEMATECH firms had on average a more rapid
growth in sales than non-member firms. Irwin and
Klenow also compared the SEMATECH firms' per-
formance in terms of physical investment, returns on
assets and sales, and labor productivity growth, but
found no systematic difference from non-member
firms for these variables. Their analysis was based
on running a set of similar regressions of the form
1';r= ai + f311';,r-1 + f32DfMT + Dummies + ei"
(1)
where 1';r is the performance measure of interest,
e.g., private R&D to sales ratio, for firm i in year t,
while DfMT is a dummy which is one if the firm was
a member of SEMATECH and zero otherwise. Their
regressions include firm-specific parameters, ai'
which are treated as so-called firm fixed (or corre-
lated) effects. II The dummies include time dummies
and firm age dummies, while eir is an error term,
The 'experiment' in the data allowing Irwin and
Klenow to identify the interest parameter f32' is the
observations for non-member firms in the same in-
dustry as the SEMATECH members (i.e., the elec-
tronic components industry, SIC 367). The presence
of observations prior to the establishment of SE-
MATECH is useful to add precision to the estimates
of the auxiliary parameters.
Irwin and Klenow focus on their estimate of f32'
which, according to their computations, suggests sav-
ings in R&D around US$300 Mill. But this estimate
does not account for the dynamic effects captured by
the lagged dependent variable in their model. The
long run effect of R&D membership is given by
f32/(I - (31)' which is about 75% higher, and their
estimated model consequently indicates that the R&
D saving from SEMATECH was substantially higher
than US$300 Mill.
The study by Irwin and Klenow convincingly
suggests that SEMATECH has been a profitable
II However, their regressions do not account for the bias created
by the presence of these fixed effects in combination with a
lagged dependent variable. See Nickell (J 98 I).
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project in terms of social costs and benefits, as the
consortium has managed to eliminate wasteful dupli-
cation of R&D, while preserving the same or per-
haps even better R&D output despite the cut in
R&D spending. It would seem useful to repeat their
exercise with a sample covering also the period after
1993. As recognized by Irwin and Klenow, the most
important reservation one could raise against their
analysis is probably the validity of the control group.
Comparing the list of SEMATECH member firms to
the non-member US firms, it is clear that the SE-
MATECH members are the leading US manufactur-
ers in the electronic components industry, and this
was true also when SEMATECH started. Irwin and
Klenow try to account for the differences by incor-
porating the fixed effects, but even when they condi-
tion their analysis on such permanent differences, it
remains questionable whether the non-members of
SEMATECH in the same industry reveal what the
members would have experienced without SEMAT-
EcH in place. We will return to this issue when we
discuss methodological questions in evaluation stud-
ies based on non-experimental data in Section 3
below.
2.2. The Small Business Innovation Research pro-
gram in the US
While SEMATECH largely targeted large and
leading high-tech firms, the Small Business Innova-
tion Research (SBIR) program was intended to stim-
ulate innovation in small, high-tech firms, The
SBIR-program was initiated in 1982 and the program
mandated all federal agencies spending more than
US$100 million annually on external research, to set
aside 1.25% of these funds for awards to small
businesses. The percentage was increased to 2.5 in
1992, and this amounted to US$1.1 billion in 1997.
SBIR awardees must be independently owned, for-
profit firms with less than 500 employees and a
majority of shares must be owned by US citizens.
A recent study by Lerner O998) has evaluated the
performance of the firms receiving SBIR awards in
the period 1983 to 1985. His study shows that SBIR
awardees grew significantly faster, both in terms of
sales and employment, than similar, non-supported
firms from 1985 to 1995. These findings are based
on an econometric analysis of a sample where the
SBIR awardees are matched with similar firms, 12
The first part of Lerner's analysis presents various
statistics (mean, variance and various percentiles)
from the distribution of growth rates separately for
the supported firms and the non-supported firms. The
second part considers regressions similar to Eq. O),
but without finn fixed effects and with observations
for only two years that are ten years apart (i.e., with
1985 corresponding to t - 1 and 1995 to r). Lerner
explicitly stresses the need to assess the long-term
impact of the awards, and he also states that he
ideally would have liked to examine the relationship
between program participation and firms' valuation.
Using firms' valuation as the dependent variable was
not possible, however, because only a small fraction
of the SBIR awardees was publicly held. He chose
instead growth in sales and growth in employment as
proxies, referring to Gompers and Lerner O997) who
have shown that these measures are highly correlated
with the valuation that venture capitalists assign to
private firms,
Lerner considers different interpretations of his
results including capital market imperfections and
regulatory capture. It is well known that small R&D
intensive firms may have difficulties rising capital
due to infonnational assymmetries, and there is also
an extensive literature suggesting that government
involvement may be affected by distorted incentives
for politicians and government decision-makers. With
respect to the latter group, program managers may
target anticipated winners so that the SBIR "can
claim credit for the firms' ultimate success, even if
the marginal contribution of the public funds was
very low". Lerner argues that picking winners should
be easier in low tech than in high tech industries,
whereas a signal to investors about project quality
should be particularly valuable in high tech indus-
12 To be more specific, Lerner analyses two samples, one where
each of the SBIR awardees is matched with a firm of similar size
from the same industry and another where each of the awardees is
matched with a firm of similar size from the same region. Note,
that even though Lerner uses matching to construct the compari-
son group, he does not proceed using a formal matching estimator
in the analysis. We will discuss various aspects of matching as a
method for constructing the counter factual outcome in Section 3.
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tries where traditional financial measures are of little
use. He finds that the superior performance of SBIR
awardees is particularly significant in high-tech in-
dustries, and furthermore that the first award to a
firm plays a significant role, while the marginal
value of subsequent awards declines sharply. Based
on these findings, Lerner concludes that the SBIR
program seems to have played an important role in
certifying firms' quality and the technological merits
of the firms' projects, thereby alleviating capital
market imperfections. However, he also finds evi-
dence of distortions in the award process. Interviews
with program managers revealed that they had faced
political pressure to make geographically diverse
awards, and this may explain why the SBIR program
seems to have been less effective in regions with few
high-technology firms.
2.3. Japanese research consortia
The SEMATECH program was inspired by the
success of Japanese research consortia in the semi-
conductor industry and other high-tech industries.
Branstetter and Sakakibara (I998) have examined
the performance of the Japanese research consortia
in these industries, combining econometric tech-
niques with an interview study. The Japanese re-
search consortia were heavily subsidized by the
Japanese government; government subsidies covered
on average two thirds of the research costs for the
projects carried out within the consortia. Branstetter
and Sakakibara argue that the Japanese research
consortia were primarily aimed at bringing together
complementary R&D projects, thereby making the
R&D projects more productive and also more prof-
itable. 13 In this view, the research consortia have
raised the learning opportunities and thereby stimu-
lated to more R&D. Notice that this situation is
different from the SEMATECH case discussed above,
where the consortium eliminated excessive duplica-
tion of parallel research rather than promoted com-
plementary research. Branstetter and Sakakibara's
13 They motivate this focus with a reference to Cohen and
Levinthal (I989), who emphasize that firms typically undertake
R&D to learn about competitors' innovative activities. See Section
5.1 for further remarks on this issue.
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econometric results show that a membership in the
Japanese research consortia typically stimulated pri-
vate R&D spending, and also made the research
effort more productive.
Branstetter and Sakakibara's result on R&D
spending is obtained byestimating a model slightly
different from Irwin and Klenow's non-structural
model (cf. Eq. (1) above):
10g(R&Dir) = ai+ f3llog(Capitalir) + f32Sir
+ Dummies + eir (2)
The left hand side variable is private R&D spending
in firm i in year t, while the first explanatory
variable on the right hand side is physical capital
added to control for size effects. Sir is the number of
research consortia in which the firm is involved in
year t and f32 is the parameter of interest. Branstet-
ter and Sakakibara present estimates where they
make different assumptions concerning ai' assuming
ai to be either random effects or firm fixed effects.
The dummies include both time and industry dum-
mies as their sample covers several high-tech indus-
tries. The equation is estimated on an unbalanced
sample of 226 firms over the period 1983-1989,
with 141 firms participating in at least one research
consortium during the sample period, while the re-
maining 85 firms did not. As pointed out above, their
results revealed a positive and statistically significant
value for the interest parameter f32'
To examine whether the research consortia cre-
ated spillovers and thereby made the research effort
more productive, Branstetter and Sakakibara esti-
mated several patenting equations. Using data on
patents granted to Japanese firms in the US,
Branstetter and Sakakibara started byestimating an
equation with the log of patents as dependent vari-
able 14:
10g(Pir+ 1) =ai+f3llog(R&Dir)
+ f3210g(Capital ir) + f33Sir
+ Dummies + eir' (3)
Their point estimate of the consortia coefficient
f33 suggests that membership in an additional consor-
14 Branstetter and Sakakibara follow the patent literature by
dating each patent according to the patent's year of application.
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tium tends to raise patenting by 5%, and this effect is
statistically significant irrespective of whether ai is
treated as a random firm specific effect, or as a firm
fixed effect. Branstetter and Sakakibara consider sev-
eral alternative specifications of Eq. (3) and conclude
that the positive effect of membership in research
consortia is robust.
The final part of Branstetter and Sakakibara's
analysis focuses more closely on the R&D spillovers
associated with membership in a research consor-
tium. This analysis is carried out by augmenting Eq.
(3) with two additional terms representing spillovers.
The basic spillover variable is constructed as a
weighted sum of other firms' R&D, where the
weights reflect the 'technological distance' between
the firm in question and each of the other firms. The
primary additional term representing spillovers in
Branstetter and Sakakibara's analysis is this spillover
variable interacted with a dummy variable reflecting
membership in research consortia. Their parameter
estimate for this interaction term is positive and
statistically significant when a i is treated as a ran-
dom effect, and Branstetter and Sakakibara conclude
that membership in research consortia augments
knowledge spillovers.
One final, interesting aspect of Branstetter and
Sakakibara's study is their use of interviews to sup-
plement the econometric analysis. The responses in
their interview study are consistent with their finding
that government funds did not substitute for private
R&D spending, but rather tended to increase the
firms' own R&D spending. Interestingly, the inter-
views also suggested that selection into the research
consortia was not biased towards the best projects;
firms which are technology leaders in a field tend to
be reluctant to participate in projects which will
spread their superior knowledge and where they have
little to gain. We will discuss how this selection
issue affects the interpretation of the estimated pa-
rameters in Section 3.
2.4. Government support to commercial R&D pro-
jects in Israeli firms
The study by Griliches and Regev (I998) illus-
trates how the production function framework widely
used to study returns on R&D, can easily be adapted
to study the effects on private firm performance of
government-funded R&D. 15 Their study covers the
overall effort by the Israeli government to promote
R&D related to manufacturing activities, incorporat-
ing a number of governmental programs. 16 They
estimate the private returns accrued to the supported
manufacturing firms, created by the government-
funded R&D. Their preliminary results suggest that
there are large private benefits to the firms carrying
out these government-funded R&D projects, and
their estimate of the rate of return on these R& D
investments is high. The social rate of returns is even
higher if these R&D programs in addition generated
any spillovers as presumably was expected.
Griliches and Regev estimate production func-
tions incorporating R&D capital (Kit), allowing for
a separate coefficient on the share of R&D capital
accumulated with government funding (Sir) 17:
In(QI L) it = ai+ /3lln( ClL) ir+ /32In( MI L) it
+ /33In(KIL)ir+( /33S)sir
+ Dummies + eir' (4)
where Q, L, C and M are output, labor, physical
capital and materials. As above, the subscripts refer
to firm i in year t. The dummies include a number
of control variables in addition to year and industry
dummies. The parameter of interest is S, which can
be interpreted as the effective premium or discount
on government supported R&D. As mentioned
above, their preliminary results suggest quite a high,
15 See Griliches (I 979). The production function approach has
previously been used to study the impact of government funded
R&D in US manufacturing firms in Griliches (I986). A very large
share of this R&D in the US has, however, been related to defense
contracts and there are a number of reasons why it is hard to
measure the real effects of defense related R&D projects. as
discussed by Griliches (I 979).
16 This governmental support to R&D includes commercial R&D
projects, support to consortia engaged in 'generic' technologies
(Magnet-program), National S&T Infrastructure program, USA-
Israel binational program, and defense related contracts.
17 This specification is based on the observation that
[Kl +(1 + 8)K21 = [Kl + K2 + 8K2]
= In K + ln( l + 8s) :: In K + Bs,
where Kl and K2 are two types of capital with different effi-
ciency, and K = Kl + K2• 8 is the efficiency premium of the
second type, while s is the share of this kind of capital. The last
approximation is good if 8.1' is small.
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positive and statistically significant premium on gov-
ernment supported R&D, based on a sample ofmore
than 11000 firm-year observations covering the pe-
riod 1990-1995. One suspects that the high premium
is due to the government picking the best firms, and
that the estimated rate of return therefore is upward
biased. However, this does not seem to be the case.
The premium is particularly high when fixed effects
are accounted for, suggesting a negative selection
bias where firms with a high share of R&D capital
accumulated with government funding typically have
low average productivity levels. We will return to
this issue in Section 3.
Their finding of a high premium on R&D pro-
jects funded by the government suggests that these
projects should have been profitable also for the
firms themselves. 18 According to their estimates, the
government picks good projects in commercial terms,
but the projects seem to be too profitable to justify
government support. The question then emerges in
what way a study is useful for evaluation of govern-
mental support to commercial R&D, given the ambi-
guity of the interpretation of rate of return estimates.
That is to say, a low rate of return estimate suggests
that the projects might have been unsuccessful, while
a high rate of return estimate suggests that the firms
should have been able to fund the R&D activities
themselves, unless there are significant capital mar-
ket imperfections affecting R&D investments. One
or two additional steps are consequently required to
draw any conclusions about the social value of these
R&D programs. First, their study should be supple-
mented by a study of how private R&D spending
tends to respond to R&D subsidies and, second,
spillover benefits should be estimated, as we will
discuss in Section 4.
2.5. Government support to commercial R&D pro-
jects in Norwegian high-tech firms
Klette and Møen (I999) study the impact of a
series of governmental programs aimed at supporting
18 As discussed in Griliches and Regev (J 998), a high premium
does not necessarily imply a high marginal rate of return on the
supported projects, as the support typically went to R&D intensive
firms and their model assumes diminishing marginal returns to
R&D capital.
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commercial R&D projects in Norwegian manufac-
turing related to information technology. These IT
programs were intended to stimulate complementary
R&D activities, especially in high-tech manufactur-
ing, and the effort peaked in the four years 1987-
1990. The econometric analysis reveals few signifi-
cant differences between the supported firms and the
non-supported firms in the same industries, despite
the large amounts of R&D support provided. Simi-
larly, at a more aggregated level, the study finds that
targeted industries did not showany outstanding
performance compared to the rest of the manufactur-
ing sector in Norway, nor in comparison to the same
industries in other OECD countries. 19 The study
concludes that the effort to promote IT-related manu-
facturing has been largely unsuccessful, and the study
proceeds by examining why the IT programs had
such a poor coordinating performance.
In terms of the performance measure used by
Griliches and Regev (1998), i.e., total factor produc-
tivity growth, Klette and Møen (I999) find that the
supported firms did significantly worse than the
non-supported firms. Considering this performance
measure alone, one is led towards the conclusion that
governmental support is associated with significantly
poorer performance. However, the systematic differ-
ence between supported and non-supported firms
disappears when a broader set of performance mea-
sures is considered. It is difficult to conceive that
there is a causal relationship between government
support and poor performance in terms of total factor
productivity growth, and it seems more plausible that
the relationship runs the other way; the government
tried to save some of the main high-tech firms as
they encountered problems when the IT industry was
restructured towards the end of the 1980s. This
possible interpretation illustrates why there might be
a negative selection bias in the parameter estimates
capturing the effect of government support, and we
will discuss how this selection bias can be reduced
or eliminated in Section 3.
The microeconometric part of the study by Klette
and Møen is similar to Irwin and Klenow (1996) in
19 The Norwegian governmental support to R&D in the targeted
industries seems to have been high in relative terms also in an
international perspective. See below.
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that the estimating equations are reduced-form equa-
tions with a number of different performance mea-
sures as left hand side variables: private R&D
spending and physical investment, growth in sales,
employment and productivity, and returns on assets
and sales. The estimating equations do not include
lagged dependent variables in contrast to Eq. (1), but
the main results are based on models including fixed,
firm level effects. The first, microeconometric part
of the analysis is based on firm and plant level data
for the period 1982-1995.
As mentioned, the study also contains a more
aggregated analysis, based on industry-level data for
Norway and other OECD countries. This part of the
analysis examines the overall performance of the
targeted high-tech industries. 20 The motivation for
this is that some of the benefits from the program
could spill over to non-supported firms with the
result that the comparison between the supported
firms and the non-supported firms would underesti-
mate the effect of the program. To the extent that
these spillover effects were important, these effects
should show up in the performance at a more aggre-
gated level. At the more aggregated level, it is,
however, difficult to identify a control group, i.e., a
similar non-supported industry, and Klette and Møen
consider two alternatives. The first comparison is
between the targeted high-tech industries and the rest
of the manufacturing sector as a whole. This is
clearly not a clean quasi-experiment, but it is never-
theless interesting to compare, e.g., the profit rates
and the returns to investments (R&D and physical)
in the targeted industries to other industries in a
cost-benefit perspective. The second comparison at
the industry level is based on OECD data for the
targeted high-tech industries in Norway and in other
OECD countries. Once more, the contrast between
industry performance in Norway and the other OECD
countries is far from a clean quasi-experiment, as the
same high-tech industries also received considerable
governmental support in the other OECD countries.
As far as the OECD data go, they suggest that the
20 Two alternative definitions of the targeted industries were
considered: a widely defined group ISIC 382, 383 and 385, and a
more narrowly defined group; ISIC 3825 and 3832.
increase, and perhaps also the level (relative to pri-
vate R&D spending), of governmental support to
these industries was significantly larger in Norway
than in most of the other countries in the second half
of the 1980s.
In a companion study, Klette and Møen (1998)
examine more closely the effect of the R&D subsi-
dies on private' R&D spending in the supported
firms. The first part of their analysis uses a non-
structural econometric approach similar to Branstet-
ter and Sakakibara (1998), as specified in Eq. (2)
above. The analysis suggests that governmental R&D
support did not crowd out private R&D spending,
but nor did the firms increase their own R&D
spending as was expected in the 'matching grant'
contract scheme that was widely used. In the second
half of their study, they introduce a structural model
for R&D investment which incorporates a 'learning-
by-doing effect' in R&D, where accumulated R&D
capital (past R&D effort) has a positive impact on
the productivity of current R&D. 21 This framework
suggests that temporary R&D grants might have had
a more lasting, positive effect on private R&D
spending after the support had expired, but the em-
pirical results at this point are more suggestive than
conclusive.
3. Estimating counter factual outcomes from
non-experimental data
As we will clarify below, the results in the studies
presented in Section 2 are based on the assumption
that R&D subsidies to a large extent are allocated
randomly to firms and projects. With enough ran-
domness in the allocation process, data for the firms
receiving R&D subsidies as well as for similar
non-supported firms provide us with quasi-experi-
ments and a basis for causal, econometric analysis,
Given the many factors involved in the political
economy process that determines the allocation of
R&D subsidies, random allocation may not be too
21 The same framework is also used in Klette (I996) and Klette
and Johansen (J 998).
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misleading in some cases. However, assuming that
governments' deliberate selection process is largely
random is clearly dubious and there might be a
significant bias involved in the estimated impact
parameters. This section tries to clarify the potential
biases involved and explain how the methodology
can be improved by drawing on some recent ad-
vances in econometrics associated with evaluation of
labor market programs. 22
3.J. Selection and the problem of the counter factual
Both Irwin and Klenow O996), Lerner O998) and
Klette and Møen (999) use the outcome of the
non-supported firms to estimate what the supported
firms would have experienced had they not been
supported, and the two studies from Japan and Israel
use their econometric models as devices to generate
similar counter factuals. 23 The difference in perfor-
mance between supported and non-supported firms is
the estimated gross impact of the R&D support
schemes. The performance of the non-supported firms
may, however, differ systematically from what the
supported firms would have experienced in the ab-
sence of the support schemes, and this is the selec-
tion bias problem that we referred to above. 24 As we
shall argue below, such a systematic difference does
not make the evaluation results uninteresting, but it
limits the kind of counter factual questions the evalu-
ation results can answer.
To aid the discussion, let us address the selection
issue somewhat formally, and assume that the perfor-
22 See Angrist and Krueger (1998) and Heckman et al. (1998)
and references cited there. Blundell (I998) gives a simple intro-
duction to the econometric literature.
23 We will not consider the evaluation literature on estimating
•treatment effects' with various levels of •treatment', as this
complicates the analysis considerably. This literature is surveyed
in Angrist and Krueger (J 998).
24 An interesting analysis of the choice of comparison groups
when evaluating technology innovation programs is Brown et al.
(1995). They suggest that the counter factual outcome should be
constructed using the performance of firms with rejected applica-
tions only, and not the performance of all non-supported firms.
The rejected project applications are hardly a random group of
projects, but they may in some settings be as close to a control
group as it is possible to get.
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mance of a firm i in period t, denoted Y;" is given
by
(5)
where Di is a dummy variable which is one if the
firm has received R&D support and zero
otherwise 25, (Xi is a firm specific intercept, Åt re-
flects shocks common across firms, and u it repre-
sents temporary fluctuations in unobservables. We
have abstracted from other (observable) regressors
for simplicity. To be concrete, (Xi represents perma-
nent differences in firm performance while u it repre-
sents temporary fluctuations in performance around
the firm specific means, due to effects specific for
individual R&D-projects. Eq. (5) incorporates het-
erogenous responses to the R&D support (ex post)
as indicated by the subscript i on the f3-coefficient,
and the distribution of these coefficients may differ
systematically between the supported and the non-
supported firms. Indeed, the agency allocating the
R&D support might try to allocate their funds on the
basis of anticipated differences in the f3i 's.
Most of the studies above present estimates where
(Xi is treated as a firm specific parameter, i.e., where
(Xi is allowed to be correlated with Di' In this way,
the estimated impact parameter is not biased even if
the supported firms are non-randomly selected, as
long as the selection is based on firm characteristics
that are largely invariant over time. Assuming that
data are available before and after the supported
firms have received their support, i.e., at times to
and tI' this gives the estimator
=ays-ayn
where ays and ayn are the average changes in
performance from before to after the R&D support
scheme was operating, and the superscripts s and n
refer to the supported and the non-supported firms,
respectively. In the econometric literature, this esti-
25 We have ignored the time subscript on D, for simplicity, and
we will focus the discussion on situations where the econometri-
cian compares outcomes from before and after the program has
taken place.
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mator is now commonly referred to as the 'dif-
ference-in-differences' estimator. 26 Assuming that
D. and u, are uncorrelated, we have thatI It
n--+oo
which is a parameter of interest, representing the
average impact of the R&D-support on the sup-
ported firms. 27 This is the parameter of interest if
we want to do a cost-benefit analysis of the R&D
support scheme. Notice, however, that this parameter
may not be informative of what would happen if the
R&D support scheme was extended to previously
non-supported firms, when there are systematic dif-
ferences in the responses to R&D support between
the supported and the non-supported firms. 28
As mentioned, most of the estimates presented in
the four studies discussed above are based on the
'difference-in-differences' estimator or similar esti-
mators, and the study by Heckman et al. (1998)
suggests that this method is preferable to alternatives
such as the widely-used parametric selection-correc-
tion method introduced by Heckman (1979) and the
more recent matching methods discussed in Heck-
man et al. (1998).
The econometric evaluation literature has noticed
that there may remain a serious problem due to
correlation between the temporary shocks (uit) and
the probability of being selected into the program. 29
Discussing the results from the study by Klette and
26 With observations for more than two years, a preferable
estimator might be the 'within'-estimator widely used in the panel
data literature. The 'within' -estimator is closely related to the
'differences-in-difference'-estimator. It is possible to estimate the
time profile of the impact by considering a number of 'difference-
in-differences' estimates when observations for more than two
years are available. See Heckman et al. (I998).
27 In the econometric literature, this parameter is often termed
the mean impact of the treatment on the treated. We have that
f3s= E(f3;ID;= 1)= ø + E[( f3; - Ø)ID;= 1],
where ø is the population mean impact effect.
28 One could, however, extrapolate the impact analysis to the
non-supported firms also in this case by adding assumptions about
the functional form for the J3 ;-distribution, along the lines in
Heckman (I979).
29 In studies of training programs, it has been observed that
individuals tend to be selected into the program during periods
when they perform particularly badly, i.e., have particularly low
income. This is the so-called' Ashenfelter-dip'.
Møen (1999), we observed above that the poor
growth performance, in terms of total factor produc-
tivity for the supported firms, might have been due
to the government supporting some large firms that
were facing particularly severe problems when the
IT industry was restructured towards the end of the
1980s. In such a case, there is a positive relationship
between receiving R&D support and the prospect of
growing more slowly than the average, and t~e
growth performance of the non-supported firms IS
not very useful for estimating what the supported
firms would have experienced had they not been
supported. Consequently, the 'difference-in-dif-
ferences' estimator underestimates the impact of the
R&D-support on the supported firms. Similarly, in
the Japanese case, Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998)
find from their survey study, that firms with the most
promising projects in a technological field. were :e-
luctant to participate in research consortia, which
creates a similar downward bias in the 'difference-
in-differences' estimator.
On the other hand, it is easy to conceive that the
bias can go the other way in cases where firms apply
for support because they have discovered particularly
promising R& D projects. The screening of projects
in the government agencies will also tend to create a
selection bias in the estimated impact. More pre-
cisely, if there is a positive correlation between a
firm hitting particularly promising projects that tend
to generate above average performance growth in
subsequent years, and the chance of the firm receiv-
ing R&D support, the 'difference-in-differences' es-
timator will overestimate the impact of the R&D-
support on the performance of the supported firm~.
Previous studies of the effectiveness of R&D SUbSI-
dies in stimulating private R&D spending have been
criticized by Kauko (1996) along these lines, and
among the studies we have reviewed in Section 2,
this problem seems particularly relevant for the eval-
uation of the SBIR program by Lerner (1998). He
concludes that the subsidies awarded under that pro-
gram seem to have played a certifying role, helping
the selected firms to attract venture capital. If, how-
ever, awards conveyed information to the market
about the quality of recipient firms, this implies that
the SBIR officials on average succeed in 'picking
winners'. If so, one would expect awardees to per-
form better than non-supported firms even without
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the awards, and the effect of the awards has to some
extent been overestimated
The econometric literature has suggested that such
biases can be reduced or eliminated by augmenting
the 'difference-in-differences' estimator, incorporat-
ing conditioning variables reflecting the pre-program
performance. 30 That is, differences in longitudinal
changes in performance between supported and
non-supported firms should control for pre-program,
temporary shocks that influence the probability of
being supported, e.g., pre-program changes in R&D
or firm growth. Similarly, one would also like to
control for anticipated future temporary shocks that
influence the probability of being supported by con-
ditioning on forward looking variables, in particular
physical and R&D investment and perhaps also
hiring or firing.
In the review of the study of SEMATECH in
Section 2, we raised the issue that the members and
non-members in SEMATECH were to a large extent
quite different firms in terms of size and closeness to
the technological frontier. As emphasized in Heck-
man et al. (I998), such differences make the evalua-
tion results critically dependent on assumptions about
functional forms, both in terms of the performance
equation and the selection equation, and Heckman et
al. find that this tends to generate substantial biases
in the case they examine. Exploring various match-
ing-procedures as well as regression methods, Heck-
man et al. conclude that evaluation results are only
reliable when they are based on 'treated' units (cf.
supported firms) which are similar to some of the
'non-treated' units (cf. non-supported firms). For the
supported firms that cannot be adequately' matched' ,
the comparison to non-supported firms can give quite
misleading inference of the impact.
3.2. Spil/overs and the counter factual: 'Catch-22 '?
Using the non-supported firms to evaluate what
would have happened to the supported firms if they
had not been supported, assumes that there are no
spillover effects of the R& D support scheme to the
ao See Angrist and Krueger (J 998), Blundell (J998) and Heck-
man et al. (J 998) for details.
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non-supported firms, which is clearly a strong as-
sumption. The question is whether the performance
of the non-supported firms can be considered inde-
pendent of the support given to the supported
firms. 31 One could argue both ways in terms of the
bias this problem introduces in the estimated impact
of the R&D program; the impact will be underesti-
mated if the non-supported firms tend to benefit,
e.g., from pure knowledge spillovers from the R&D
in the supported firms, while the impact will be
overestimated if the non-supported firms are hurt as
they lose relative competitiveness to the supported
firms.
This spillover issue is particularly problematic
since spillovers to technologically related firms are
often a major justification for such programs in the
first place. This implies a 'Catch-22' problem: If the
program is successful in creating innovations that
spill over to technologically related firms, it will be
very difficult to find similar non-supported firms that
can identify the counter factual outcome for the
supported firms. This problem is. particularly trans-
parent if one tries to evaluate the performance of the
supported firms by means of the matching procedure
described in Blundell (I 998, Section 5.4.2). The
matching estimator suggested by Blundell is given
by
r3mm = _1 E (1'; - E WijlJ)
Ns JES JEN
where 1'; and lJ are the post-program outcomes for a
supported and a non-supported firm, respectively,
while Ns is the number of supported firms. S and N
refer to the groups of supported and non-supported
firms. wj} is a weight indicating the 'similarity'
between the two firms before the R&D-support was
provided. Our point is that similar weighting schemes
have been used to identify 'technologically related'
firms when estimating the impact ofR&D spillovers,
li Manski (1993) considers a closely related problem; the as-
sumptions required for identification of spillover effects, when we
want to condition on regressors that tend to eliminate independent
variations in the spillover variable. This is largely the reverse of
the question we discuss in this section. See also Griliches (1998,
eh. 12).
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as in studies by Jaffe (I986), Branstetter and Sakak-
ibara (I998) and others that we will discuss in the
next section. This suggests that the better a finn
seems to satisfy the conditions required to identify
the counter factual outcome in the absence of
spillovers, the worse might this spillover problem be.
The motivation for introducing the matching esti-
mator into the econometric tool box is that it requires
only weak assumptions about functional forms, as
we noted above (see Heckman et al., 1998). This
argument suggests therefore that it might be difficult
to identify the impact of R&D programs more gen-
erally, without imposing strong functional fonn as-
sumptions. 32 As is so often the case in economics,
one does not get very far in causal inference with
non-experimental data unless a significant amount of
structure is imposed on the analysis. To conclude,
we face the paradoxical situation that if an evalua-
tion study finds little difference between the sup-
ported firms and the non-supported firms it could
either be because the R&D program was unsuccess-
ful and generated little innovation, or because the
R&D program was highly successful in generating
new innovations which created large positive
spillovers to the non-supported firms.
3.3. Focus on a few successes?
[T]he economic value of one great industrial ge-
nius is sufficient to cover the expense of the
education of a whole town (Marshall, 1920, p.
179).
It has been widely recognized that the economic
benefits from research projects tend to have a highly
skewed distribution, with a median return which
might not be very high, but a few projects generate a
high mean return; see, e.g., Scherer and Harhoff
(I999). 33 This represents a further challenge to re-
gression analysis of the impact of R&D subsidies,
32 See Manski (993) for a formal analysis of the functional
form assumptions required for identification in a closely related
context, and within a regression framework.
33 This observation is closely related to the finding that the
distribution of the value of patents is highly skewed with a ·Iong
right tail, see, e.g., Pakes (986).
and such skewness might be particularly pronounced
for the outcome of government sponsored R&D
projects to the extent that governments tend to sup-
port high-risk R&D. This observation raises the
question of whether the main parameter of interest is
the average impact of the R&D-support on the
supported firms, More precisely, we might be inter-
ested in the average rate ofreturn to the whole R&D
subsidy program, but the weighted average estimates
provided by the 'difference-in-differences' estimator
or similar estimators will typically not apply the
economically relevant weights to the individual ob-
servations, and we may want to pay more attention
to the economically interesting outliers than such
estimation procedures tend to encourage.
To the extent that the estimated impact parameter
is driven by a few high-return observations, the
confidence intervals for the impact parameter will be
large and poorly approximated by the routinely re-
ported intervals based on asymptotic nonnal distribu-
tions. Even if calculated correctly," the confidence
interval obtained will be large, reflecting the substan-
tial uncertainty that prevails in trying to infer the
impact parameter when the outcomes are character-
ized by a highly skewed distribution with long right
tails. This suggests that we might need to consider a
number of independent evaluation studies, say
through meta-analysis, before we can provide an
estimate of the impact of the R& D subsidies with
much precision.
Recent econometric advances suggest that it might
be possible to estimate the distribution of the subsidy
impacts across firms, 35 but we believe that these
methods should only provide a first step in a closer
investigation of the economic benefits of the most
important innovations generated by the R& D sub-
sidy programs. It would be useful to merge econo-
metric studies of the kind discussed in this paper
with more detailed case studies of the most success-
ful projects, and perhaps also some of the less suc-
cessful projects.
34 Whatever that means, but say from bootstrap estimates for the
argument' s sake.
35 See Heckman et al. (997) and Abadie et al. (1998).
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4. Identifying spillovers and the social benefits of
R& D projects
We noted above that spillovers tend to invalidate
the non-participants as a control group. However,
measuring the magnitude of the spillovers generated
is by itself a crucial part of evaluating the programs.
The studies discussed in Section 2 covered quite well
the benefits to the private firms receiving the sup-
port, while in most of the studies the spillovers to
non-supported firms and pecuniary externalities to
customers and consumers were not extensively ad-
dressed.
A full cost benefit analysis of an R&D support
scheme would involve estimating the expression
w(s) = L J7Ti(Si'~)+ L J7Tis)+ L J7T,(S)
ieS jeN leR
+ I:J( CS) - d( s) (6)
where J is used to indicate the (counter factual) shift
in the various variables as follows 36: The first sum
covers the change in profits in the group of sup-
ported firms, S, due to the R&D support scheme.
Note that the benefit for each firm belonging to S
can be decomposed into a direct effect capturing the
increase in profits due to the support they have
received themselves, Si' and an indirect effect captur-
ing the change in profits due to the support received
by other firms, ~. The latter component may be
positive, negative or zero, depending on what kind of
spillovers are present. The second summation term
on the right hand side of (6) captures the change in
profits in the group of non-supported firms, N, in the
same industry as the supported firms. 37 The sign of
this term is also ambiguous. We will refer to it as the
indirect effect on the non-supported firms, and it
may be a mixture of knowledge and rent spillovers.
The next two terms represent rent spillovers alone.
That is, the third sum captures the change in profits
in firms in the rest of the economy, R, due, e.g., to
pecuniary externalities as inputs become cheaper or
36 All variables on the right hand side of (6) should be inter-
preted in tenus of present values of current and future benefits.
37 Our concept of industry is at this point loosely defined as
firms which are technologically related.
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better. The fourth term is the increased consumer
surplus in the economy. The last term represents the
deadweight loss associated with the funding of the
program.
4.1. The treatment of spillovers in the evaluation
studies
Using Eq. (6) to fix ideas, we will now briefly
discuss how far the various evaluation studies re-
viewed in Section 2 go towards incorporating the full
welfare effects of the programs they examine. With
respect to estimation techniques, the most ambitious
attempt to estimate spillovers among these studies is
Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998). Still, this study
explores only the effect of the programs, i.e., the
subsidized research consortia, on the participating
firms and other firms in the same industry. In other
words, they deal roughly with the first two sums in
(6), while ignoring pecuniary externalities to firms in
other industries and to consumers. With respect to
the first sum, the change in profits for the supported
firms, it is not relevant to distinguish between the
direct and the indirect effect of subsidies, as the
subsidies are given to consortia and not to individual
firms.
Branstetter and Sakakibara find evidence that par-
ticipation in research consortia rises research output.
even after controlling for research input and finn
specific effects. It seems reasonable to interpret this
as a pure knowledge spillover, but comparing their
framework to Eq. (6), we should note that they have
not considered how the increased research output
affects the consortia participants' profits. Depending
on how close competitors the participants are in the
output markets, there may be negative rent spillovers
between them, and the innovative gains may partly
accrue to customers and suppliers. However, focus-
ing on innovative output seems like a reasonable
strategy when the total welfare effect cannot be
measured, since increased research efficiency neces-
sarily increases total welfare. Turning next to the
indirect effects of the program on non-supported but
technologically related firms, they find clear evi-
dence of general R&D spillovers, but they do not
identify the extent of spillovers from the subsidized
consortia to the non-members.
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Irwin and Klenow (1996) resemble Branstetter
and Sakakibara in that they consider membership in
a subsidized research consortium and not individu-
ally received R&D subsidies under a program. Re-
ferring back to Eq. (6), one could say that Irwin and
Klenow sign the first term on the right-hand side,
i.e., the effect of the program on the participants, as
they find increased profitability for SEMATECH
members. The level of profitability is obviously af-
fected by other factors than SEMATECH member-
ship, but their results suggest that members have
increased profitability relative to non-members also
when they control for such factors. The difference
could in principle be due to non-members facing
stronger competition after the introduction of SE-
MATECH, i.e., a negative pecuniary externality be-
longing to the second term on the right hand side of
(6), but the authors' interpretation is that it is most
likely due to increased research efficiency within the
consortium. 38
Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998), like Klette and
Møen (1999), try to capture both the effect on the
supported firms and the effect on the non-supported
firms in the same industry, but they ignore possible
rent spillovers to other industries and to consumers.
The empirical part of the study starts out estimating
the effect of the support on the supported firms, 39
but find no significant impact neither in the short nor
in the long run. This could, as mentioned in Section
2, be due to strong spillovers from the supported to
the non-supported firms, and they investigate this
issue by comparing the growth of the supported high
tech industry (including the non-supported firms)
both to growth in overall manufacturing, and to
growth in similarly defined high tech industries in
other OECD countries.
38 Their interpretation is based on the finding that SEMATECH
members significantly reduced their R&D-intensity relative to
non-members, and the assumption that non-members' R&D
spending was not affected by SEMATECH. This assumption is of
course crucial, as we discussed in Section 3 under the heading of
•Selection and the problem of the counter factual.'
39 Since the subsidies in the programs they evaluate are given to
individual firms, they could, in principle, have distinguished
between direct and indirect effects of the support on the supported
firms, but their focus is (implicitly) on the sum of the two effects.
Lerner (1998) concerns himself only with the
effect of subsidies on the subsidized firms, but. he
states explicitly that his inability to assess the social
return to the program is the most critical limitation
of the study. Furthermore, he is well aware of the
estimating problem that positive spillovers represent
in that they, if present, reduce the difference in
performance between subsidized and non-subsidized
firms.
Like Lerner (1998), Griliches and Regev (1998)
do not explicitly deal with spillovers. However, the
framework Griliches and Regev use is one which
easily lends itself to incorporating such effects the
way they are usually treated in the more general
literature on R&D spillovers. We will now tum to
this larger literature as it is obviously of great rele-
vance with respect both to methodology and to R&D
policy. First, we take a closer look at the frameworks
available to study R&D spillovers and then we
briefly review the main findings and raise some
concerns.
4.2. Traditional approaches to the study of R&D
spillovers
There are two main strands of literature investi-
gating the empirical importance of R&D spillovers.
First, there are case studies that try to estimate the
social return to particular research projects by exten-
sively tracing the effects of the resulting innovations.
This approach was first used to evaluate public
investments in agricultural research, but private R&D
investments have also been studied. The most fa-
mous example of the latter is Mansfield et al. (1977)
finding a median social rate of return of 56%, more
than twice the comparable median private rate of
return. 40 The detailed information provided by case
studies has been extremely valuable for understand-
ing the mechanisms at work in technologically ad-
vanced industries and markets. However, as pointed
out in the introduction, case studies always suffer
from the objection that they may not be representa-
40 More recent studies include Bresnahan (1986) on computers,
Trajtenberg (1983; 1989) on CT scanners and the Bureau of
Industry Economics (I994) on 16 innovations in Australia.
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tive. This has motivated econometric work, which is
the other main approach.
Most econometric studies have been performed
within a production function framework where a
'pool' of outside knowledge is included in the pro-
duction function of a firm or an industry. This is the
idea utilized in the study by Branstetter and Sakak-
ibara (1998). 41 The R&D pool is constructed as a
weighted sum with weights (ideally) representing the
relevance of R&D undertaken elsewhere in the
economy, i.e.
Sit = Ewijt Kit
j
(7)
where Sit is the spillover pool, and Wiit is the
effective fraction of knowledge in firm j which is
freely available to firm i at time t. The weights are
usually considered a measure of the proximity be-
tween the firms, and have been constructed in a
number of ways. According to the survey by Mohnen
(1996), bothproduct fields, types of R&D, patent
classes, input-output flows, investment flows and
patent flows have been utilized, 42 and he suggests
other possibilities such as flows of R&D personnel,
qualifications of R&D personnel, and R&D cooper-
ation agreements.
As pointed out by Griliches (1979), there are two
different concepts of spillovers behind these mea-
sures. First, a firm may benefit from research under-
taken elsewhere to the extent that changes in the
market prices of its inputs do not fully reflect the
value of the innovations. From a production function
point of view it is not really a spillover, but a
measurement problem. If price indexes fully reflect
quality adjustments, R&D embodied in inputs will
not be relevant as a separate variable. Lacking qual-
ity-adjusted price indexes, however, one can try to
41 The basic idea is most completely spelled out in Griliches
(I979) and Griliches (I995), but was first applied by Brown and
Conrad (I967) at industry level data. Branstetter and Sakakibara
(I998) build on Jaffe (I986) in their particular implementation of
the framework.
42 Many of the studies reviewed by Mohnen (1996) use industry
level data rather than firm data.
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trace the effect of R&D rents not appropriated
through the product prices by including the R&D
investments of the producers in the production func-
tion of the buyers in proportion to the purchases
done. 43 We follow several previous writers and use
the term 'rent spillovers' for this effect. True knowl-
edge spillovers, however, are ideas borrowed from
other researchers, and one would think that these
spillovers increase with the technical relatedness and
geographical closeness of firms. According to this
view, measures based on product fields, patent
classes, types of R&D, R&D cooperation, or quali-
fications of R&D personnel seem most suited to
constitute the weights in Eq. (7), maybe augmented
with geographical distance. 44
4.3. Estimating knowledge and rent spillovers
It is widely acknowledged in the empirical litera-
ture that it is hard to distinguish knowledge spillovers
from rent spillovers. The methodology of Jaffe (1986)
is probably the one that comes closest to looking for
the former type. Following suggestions in Griliches
(I979), he links an outside pool of R&D to firm
performance. Jaffe also extends the basic framework
by controlling for differences in technological oppor-
tunities across different sectors and by allowing for
the amount of spillovers received to depend on the
firms' own R&D investments. His key contribution,
however, lies in the implementation of Eq. (7). To
isolate pure knowledge spillovers, he uses the degree
of overlap in the distribution of firms' patents to
construct the proximity weights, since patents are
classified according to technological criteria. Fur-
thermore, he uses the constructed spillover pool as
an explanatory variable in a knowledge production
function, utilizing count data on patents as a proxy
for output. The coefficient on the spillover pool is
therefore quite likely to represent pure knowledge
43 Note that this way of getting around the lack of quality-ad-
justed price indexes will miss out on 'spillovers' in final-product
markets, i.e., the increases in consumer surplus represented by the
fourth term on the right-hand side of Eq. (6).
44 Cf., e.g. Jaffe (1989), Jaffe et al. (1993), and Adams and Jaffe
(1996) for the relevance of the geographical dimension.
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spillovers. By studying the effect of the same
spillover pool on profits and market value, he also
sheds light on the effect of negative rent spillovers
through increased competition, as the estimated coef-
ficient then is likely to be a mixture of this effect and
knowledge spillovers. Without underplaying the
methodological difficulties associated with his work,
Jaffe argues that the sum of 'circumstantial evi-
dence' brought out is enough to make a good case
for the existence of spillovers.
Positive rent spillovers from research embodied in
intermediate inputs may best be investigated using a
spillover pool whose weights are based on intermedi-
ate input flows. There are several weaknesses associ-
ated with this approach, however. First, as technical
information may be exchanged between suppliers
and customers, such a measure may pick up some
pure knowledge spillovers as well. Second, data on
firm-level input-output flows are extremely rare and
we do not know any microeconometric studies of
this type. 45 Finally, rent spillovers to final con-
sumers, i.e., increased consumer surplus associated
with new goods or production techniques, cannot be
measured using this framework.
In theory, rent spillovers should be measured as
the area under the final good's demand curve. As
noted by Bresnahan (1986), this may be done either
by econometric techniques or by index-number tech-
niques. 46 Bresnahan uses index numbers to measure
the rent spillovers from the computer industry to
consumers through the effect of computers as inputs
in the financial sector. The computer industry is
chosen because quality adjusted input prices are
needed, and these have been estimated for this indus-
try using hedonic techniques. However, hedonic
techniques are not suited to handle large product
changes, such as the introduction of qualitatively
new product characteristics. Partly for this reason,
Bresnahan only covers the period up to 1972 when
traditional mainframes were challenged by software
45 Note, however, that there exist a large number of studies
based on industry level data which use input-output matrices to
construct the weights.
46 Cf. Mansfield et al. O 977) for an early study utilizing this
idea.
advances and large mini computers. 47 The study of
computer tomography scanners by Trajtenberg (1983;
1989), on the other hand, deals explicitly with the
problem of measuring the welfare gain from the
introduction of qualitatively new goods. The chal-
lenges involved in correctly measuring the welfare
gains from new goods are also discussed in a recent
book edited by Bresnahan and Gordon (1997). The
evidence gathered there indicates that the increase in
consumer surplus associated with the introduction of
new goods may be substantial, and that ordinary
price indexes are likely to underestimate the welfare
gains.
4.4. Surveying surveys and adding a grain of scepti-
cism
Griliches (1997, eh. 5) summarizes available
econometric studies of social rates of returns to
R&D, and he concludes that these social rates of
returns tend to be several times larger than the
private ones. Mohnen (1996), listing more than 50
studies, concludes that "spillovers exist and have to
be taken into account when evaluating the returns of
government-financed R&D". Other surveys, such as
Griliches (1992), Nadiri (1993), the Australian In-
dustry Commission (1995), Hall (1996), and Jaffe
(1996), agree, and their conclusions are not contro-
versial.
There is no reason to doubt the existence of
positive spillovers, but considering first the difficul-
ties involved simply in constructing a measure of the
stock of knowledge and next the uncertainty over
what is an appropriate lag length, it is somewhat
remarkable that almost all studies trying to estimate
something as intangible as knowledge spillovers ac-
tually report significant results. 48 There are at least
47 Another reason was that the regulation regime in the financial
sector changed about that time.
48 Cf. Geroski O 99 I) and Geroski et al. O 998) for studies that
do not find significant spillovers. These studies differ from others
in that they base the spillover pool on innovation count data rather
than on R&D investments. The Bureau of Industry Economics
(994) also finds rather modest spillovers in its 16 case studies.
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three possible pitfalls that justify some concern. First,
the results may be subject to what Griliches (1992)
calls a publication filter, self-imposed by researchers
working in the field or imposed by editors and
referees considering non-significant coefficients to
be of little interest. Second, some of the effects
interpreted as spillovers may actually be knowledge
transfers that are internalized in the market, e.g.,
through cooperative agreements. Third, the reported
significant coefficients could to some extent be spu-
rious, reflecting correlated unobservables across
technologically related firms. Griliches (1998, p. 281)
mentions in particular common technological oppor-
tunities, but correlated productivity shocks or mea-
surement errors would have the same effect. This
potential bias is closely related to the problem of
estimating the counter factual outcome in the pres-
ence of spillovers, discussed in Section 3.
5. R&D spillovers and the case for governmental
support
As emphasized already, the concerns raised above
do not imply that we have doubts about the existence
of spillovers, but there remain some questions con-
cerning the existing estimates. In this section, we
raise another set of questions concerning R&D
spillovers, now taking a closer look at what policy
implications can be drawn, given that spillovers ex-
ist. If spillovers can be received costlessly, it is quite
obvious that the arguments in favor of subsidies are
valid. Firms performing R&D do not reap the whole
benefit, and as they equate marginal cost to marginal
private benefit, their investments will be below the
social optimum. There is, however, a number of
reasons why this argument is incomplete, and below
we will discuss four issues that deserve further atten-
tion in the evaluation of the net welfare gains associ-
ated with R&D subsidies. In Section 5.1, we con-
sider how private investment in R& D is affected by
spillovers when a firm cannot receive such spillovers
without incurring own R&D activity, and Section
5.3 discusses some of the recent insights from stud-
ies of R&D spillovers when such spillovers affect
foreign as well as domestic firms and consumers. In
Section 5.4 we give some remarks on coordination
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through R&D joint ventures and similar market
arrangements, while Section 5.5 considers implica-
tions of spillovers transmitted through the mobility
of research workers. Discussing these issues, we
hope to make clear why and how evaluation studies
often need to go beyond the topics reviewed in
Sections 2 and 4.
5.1. Costless spillovers vs. complementary R&D
activities
Geroski (1995) points out that, even if one ac-
cepts that involuntary diffusion of knowledge hap-
pens and that this knowledge has commercial value
to some of the recipients, it is still one thing to argue
that spillovers exist and another to argue that they
undermine incentives to innovate. Geroski's point is
that firms must typically invest in research them-
selves in order to benefit from external knowledge
pools. This argument is emphasized in Branstetter
and Sakakibara (1998), cf. Section 2 above, and is
perhaps most forcefully stated by Cohen and
Levinthal (1989). 49 Cohen and Levinthal discuss in
detail how a firm's own R&D activity tends to
enhance the absorptive capacity of R&D results
produced in other firms. If such a complementary
relationship exists, "the analogy between spillovers
and manna from heaven" is misleading and it is
"not clear exactly what 'bits' of knowledge have
been produced by one's own learning efforts and
which have spilled over from rivals" (Geroski, 1995).
In this situation, spillovers may actually stimulate
R&D. 50 The returns to own R&D increase in the
size of the spillover pool, and this creates a positive
feedback mechanism between the R&D investments
in technologically related firms. 51 A negative effect
due to imperfect appropriability still exists, but it is
counteracted by an 'absorption' incentive, and conse-
49 Important empirical evidence is presented by Mansfield
(J 98 I), finding that imitation costs on average are about 65% of
the original innovation costs.
50 Cf. Cohen and Levinthal (J 989) for a formal analysis.
51 It has been argued that a similar complementarity exists
between the knowledge stock and new investments in R&D within
individual firms, cf. Klette (J 996), Klette and Johansen (J 998),
and the references cited therein.
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quently the net effect of spillovers on R&D invest-
ments is ambiguous. 52
The empirical evidence regarding the relationship
between own and others' R&D suggests that com-
plementarities in R&D are important in many cases.
In addition to the empirical results presented by
Cohen and Levinthal (989) and Branstetter and
Sakakibara O998), Jaffe O986) and Geroski et al.
(993) find a complementary relationship between
own and others' R&D. 53 Despite the rapidgrowth
in the theoretical literature on R&D investment,
spillovers and welfare, however, little attention has
been paid to the role of such complementarities and
no results seem to be available discussing to what
extent a market equilibrium will lead to too little
investment in R&D in this case. 54 A rather bold
suggestion is that technology policies may be too
focused on sectors such as aircraft, semi-conductors,
computers, electronics components and communica-
tion equipment, where innovations tend to be com-
plementary according to Levin O988). The apparent
paradox, that one observes coinciding high spillovers
and high R&D investments in industries like these
(Spence, 1984), may indicate that these are industries
where spillovers do not undermine the incentives to
innovate, and where rivalry and strategic interaction
mayeven lead to excessive R&D investments.
5.2. Is 'a big push' from government R&D subsidies
needed?
Complementarity in R&D activities, as discussed
above, is related to the discussion of governmental
support to emerging industries. A significant portion
of the support to commercial R&D is targeted to-
wards new, high-tech businesses and emerging tech-
52 Note, however, that if R&D investments can be divided into
innovative research on one hand and imitation costs on the other,
it may be that only imitation costs are complementary to the
spillover pool. If this is the case, there will be no positive
feedback, i.e., it might be that firms with a deliberate imitation
strategy contribute little or nothing to the spillover pool.
53 Bernstein (1988) finds a complementary relationship in R&D
intensive sectors while firms in sectors performing little R&D
tend to substitute spillovers for own R&D.
54 A study that comes close is Kamien and Zang (1998), which
contains a model emphasizing the complementarities in R&D
activities across firms.
nologies, and it seems to be based on infant industry
arguments. That is, support to targeted high-tech
sectors is often rooted on the view that government
support is needed to get emerging industrial activi-
ties to 'take off' and reach 'a critical mass'.
Perhaps surprisingly, this view might be entirely
consistent with the discussion of complementary R&
D activities above, where it was argued that such
complementary spillovers may encourage invest-
ments in R&D. The point is, as emphasized by
Matsuyama (1995), that complementarities tend to
create multiple equilibria where, e.g., one equilib-
rium corresponds to little or no R&D activity in
each of the firms, while another equilibrium corre-
sponds to high R& D activities in several or all
firms. 55 That is, with an emerging industry or .new
technology, the firms might get trapped in a low-level
equilibrium where the lack of complementary
spillovers renders R&D unprofitable in all firms
with the result that the emerging industry never
reaches 'the critical mass' and 'takes off'. This
suggests that the government might playa coordinat-
ing role by triggering higher activity, e.g., through an
R&D program, until the firms and the industry have
reached the high R&D-activity equilibrium.
Klette and Møen (I999) argue that the rationale
for government funding of IT-related research pro-
grams in Norway can be well understood in these
terms. As pointed out in Section 2, their findings
suggest, however, that the Norwegian IT programs
were not very successful in initiating new manufac-
turing activities related to IT, and their case study
elaborates on the informational difficulties involved.
Inspired by Matsuyama O 997), they conclude:
In contrast to the situation with illustrative and
simplistic game theoretic models, in real coordi-
nation problems, information is a serious obstacle;
what is the nature of the game, which players are
involved, what does the pay-off structure look
like and how rapidly is it likely to change? Or in
less formal terms; exactly which firms and what
activities should be coordinated and in what way?
55 Klette and Møen (J 999) elaborate on this point and give
further references.
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These serious questions are very hard to answer in
a rapidly developing field such as information
technology and might be particularly hard to solve
in a small open economy where a large majority
of the innovations take place abroad. We believe
that industrial innovation is an activity where
coordination problems and 'market failure' often
are pervasive, but it is probably also an activity
where policy makers and bureaucrats often lack
the information needed to improve on the market
solution.
Hence, even though complementarities make it
possible, in theory, to improve on the market solu-
tion, it is necessary to analyze whether the govern-
ment, in practice, has the necessary capabilities to do
so before initiating coordination programs.
5.3. International spillovers and high-tech policy
Complementarity between firms in R& D and
other activities is a central idea in the 'new trade
theory' and 'new economic geography' literature of
the last two decades. Much of the policy debate over
support for R&D and innovation is concerned with
international competition and 'dynamic comparative
advantage', and those in favor of public technology
programs are clearly inspired by the infant industry
arguments discussed above. The work of Grossman
and Helpman (1991) is of particular relevance to
technology policy. Grossman and Helpman (1991,
eh. 8) show that if spillovers are geographically
bounded, then history matters, and countries with a
head start in accumulation of knowledge can widen
their lead over time. Moreover, they show that gov-
ernments of lagging countries can improve their
growth prospects by offering a temporary R&D
subsidy. This may eliminate these countries' disad-
vantages in high-tech industries. Similar results are
obtained by Krugman (1987) in the context of leam-
ing-by-doing spillovers. However, as demonstrated
by Grossman and Helpman (1991, eh. 7), the scope
for national policies disappears if knowledge
spillovers are perfectly international, i.e., if ideas
flow as easily between nations as they do within
nations. The extent to which spillovers are 'intrana-
tional' or 'international' is therefore an important
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empirical question. Inspired by these findings,
Branstetter (1996) presents a microeconometric in-
vestigation using panel data for US and Japanese
firms, and he finds evidence that spillovers are
stronger within each of the two countries than be-
tween them. These results are supported by Narin et
al. (I997), finding substantial 'excessive' self-cita-
tion when comparing citations across countries, and
by Eaton and Kortum (1994), finding that technology
diffusion is considerably faster within than between
countries. 56 Branstetter concludes that "the idea
that promotion of R&D can have an impact on
comparative advantage is one that trade economists
should take more seriously".
Trade economists working on growth and devel-
opment are, naturally, focused on export oriented
and import competing sectors. However, it is not
obvious that these are industries where the case for
government support is particularly strong. The total
gain from national R&D investments includes not
only knowledge spillovers, but rent-spillovers to cus-
tomers and buyers of intermediate goods as well. As
argued in Section 3, these may be considerable, and
in the extreme case of monopolistic competition,
often assumed in theoretical models, all profits are
competed away such that only rent spillovers are
relevant for policy. If a substantial part of the
spillovers created through R&D subsidy programs is
to the rest of the world, e.g., because the targeted
R&D intensive industries are highly export oriented,
one may question why the government of the source
country should bear the financial burden. This reser-
vation seems particularly relevant to small open
economies, but it has also been emphasized by sev-
eral commentators in the debate over the funding of
the ATP-program in the US. 57
At a general level, it is not difficult to outline the
implications of international R& D spillovers. Gov-
ernments should only subsidize R& D up to the point
where the marginal cost equals the marginal social
benefit accruing to its own nationals. When evaluat-
ing the marginal social benefit, potential negative
repercussions from increased competition due to un-
56 Cf. Mohnen (1998) for a recent review of the literature on
international R&D spillovers.
57 See, e.g., Yager and Schmidt (J997).
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intentional spillovers received by foreign firms should
be included, 58 but also potential positive effects of
economic growth abroad. 59 Such positive effects
could, e.g., be larger export markets and increased
political stability in developing countries. Empirical
results have obviously not been accumulated to a
level which makes it possible to detennine what
amount of subsidies is optimal according to this
theoretical criteria.
Empirical results suggest, as noted above, that
spillovers to some extent are geographically
bounded. 60 This may justify national technology
programs, but the point we want to emphasize is that
a careful analysis of the likely distribution of
spillovers is necessary as the share of spillovers
accruing to non-nationals may be substantial in some
sectors. Note also that the existence of international
spillovers gives scope for increased global effi-
ciency through R&D cooperation between countries.
The fact that technology policy and R&D programs
within the European Union to some extent have been
moved from individual member states to the union
level since the 1980s, can be interpreted as a re-
sponse to this understanding. 61
58 This effect need not be negative, as increased competition in
the home market benefits consumers and other industries through
input linkages.
59 There is a large theoretical literature on optimal R&D poli-
cies, exploring what may happen under various assumptions re-
garding degree of competition, degree of intra- and interindustry
spillovers, degree of openness, degree of international spillovers,
whether there is strategic behavior or not, whether there is R&D
cooperation or not and whether R&D of the firms in question are
strategic complements or substitutes. Cf. Leahy and Neary (1997)
and Neary (1998) for recent reviews of this literature. The not
surprising policy advice in this literature, as we read it, is that it
all depends on the assumptions. An important challenge for
empirically minded economists, therefore, is to sort out what
assumptions are the relevant ones. Alternatively, one can follow
Neary (998) and many others and conclude that the detailed
information required to improve on the market solution is unlikely
ever to be available to the policy maker.
60 This is not only a finding of the literature on international
spillovers. There is also a literature utilizing national data which
strongly supports the view, cf., e.g., Jaffe (I 989), Jaffe et al.
(I993), and Adams and Jaffe (996).
61 Well known examples of such programs include ESPRIT,
EUREKA, and TSER, among others.
5.4. R&D joint ventures and the Coase theorem
Klette and Møen (l999) argue that firms seem to
internalize spillovers through various market ar-
rangements largely ignored in many of the theoreti-
cal models of R&D investment. 62 One aspect of
this is that the empirical findings emerging from the
literature reviewed in Section 4 might be quite mis-
leading, since some of the effects interpreted as
spillovers may actually be knowledge transfers that
are internalized in the market, e.g., through coopera-
tive agreements. It seems reasonable to believe that
firms know who their customers, suppliers, and ri-
vals are, and according to the 'Coase theorem', firms
would tend to sign contractual arrangements govern-
ing the knowledge flows between them. 63 A large
number of cooperative agreements observed in the
market indicate that this may be an aspect of the
externality issue which has been grossly underem-
phasized. Freeman (1991) reports that "almost all of
the top 20 information technology (IT) firms in US,
EU and Japan made more than 50 cooperative ar-
rangements of various kinds in the 1980s and some
made more than a hundred". With respect to smaller
companies, Aakvaag et al. (1996) report that about
60% of Norwegian electronic firms participate in
technological cooperation schemes. Partner firms of-
ten have an interrelated ownership structure, and this
is obviously a simple and basic market mechanism
for internalizing externalities. 64
Related evidence is provided in the two studies by
Zucker et al. (l998a) and Zucker et al. (l998b). In
the (l998b) study, Zucker et al. demonstrate that the
location of academic experts at the leading edge of
basic bioscience strongly influenced the location of
new biotechnology enterprises in the US. Further
exploring this in the (l998a) study, it was revealed
that firms and star scientists were not merely located
in the same area, but that the scientists were deeply
62 See Leahy and Neary (I 997) and references cited in that study
for a review of recent theoretical studies of R&D joint ventures.
63 More precisely, firms will perfectly internalize externalities in
the absence of information and transaction costs. See Usher
(I998) for a critical view.
64 See Klette (1996) for a study of spillovers between firms with
an interlocking ownership structure.
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involved in the operations of the firms, Hence, what
might have been interpreted as localized knowledge
spillovers using standard methodologies and data
sets (cf., e.g., Jaffe, 1989), was to a large extent a
matter of market exchange.
Our point is not that spillovers are fully taken care
of by contracting, and we recognize that it is notori-
ously hard to write complete contracts for uncertain
and unpredictable activities such as R&D. What we
argue is that both in theoretical and empirical analy-
sis, more attention should be paid to the many
contractual arrangements utilized and invented by
the firms to overcome the potential spillover prob-
lems generated in innovative activities.
5.5. Spillovers and the mobility of research workers
We will end our review of spillover issues related
to R&D policy by turning to the labor market. A
number of authors have pointed to mobility of labor
as an important mechanism for knowledge
diffusion, 65 and it is most often thought of as a
spillover mechanism. Jaffe (1996), making a clear
distinction between rent spillovers and knowledge
spillovers, considers mobility of researchers to be of
the second type, writing that "[kjnowledge spillovers
also occur when researchers leave a finn and take a
job at another finn". Defining knowledge spillovers
as "benefit leakages that occur in absence of a
market interaction between the innovator and the
spillover beneficiary", this seems a bit inconsistent
since mobility of researchers takes place in the labor
market. Jaffe implicitly acknowledges this point,
writing that "important innovative successes are
likely to increase the incentive for researchers to
capitalize on their tacit knowledge by moving to
another finn or starting their own". We will argue
below that, from a theoretical point of view, it is not
entirely clear to what extent labor mobility really is a
spillover, but if it is, we believe it is most correct to
analyze it as a market (i.e., rent) spillover.
65 Cf., e.g., Geroski O 995), Jaffe O996), Almeida and Kogut
(I996) and Zucker et al. O 997) for some recent statements on the
importance of labor mobility. Almeida and Kogut (996), study-
ing patent holders, are particularly interesting, showing empiri-
cally that ideas are spread through the mobility of key scientists.
Our point of departure is that R&D investment
not only increases the firms' stock of innovations, it
also increases the human capital of the research
workers. After all, research is a learning process.
This perspective introduces two interesting ques-
tions. First, who captures the value of the human
capital from R&D activities, and second, how is the
firms' investment incentives affected by the possibil-
ity that research workers may quit? With perfect
labor and credit markets, the answer to the latter
question is that the investment incentives are not
affected. To the extent that research work has a
'general training' element and increases the re-
searchers' future marginal product, they can look
forward to corresponding future wage increases (cf.
Becker, 1964). This gives the research workers in-
centives to bear the cost of the training through
lower wages in the beginning of their career, and
consequently, a research worker who quits does not
impose a cost on his or her employer. 66 If the fairly
steep wage profile thus associated with a research
career does not suit the researchers' consumption
preferences, they can borrow for current consump-
tion towards future wage increases. With respect to
the question about who captures the value of the
human capital from R&D, this analysis implies that
it is the research workers, but they also pay the
investment costs. The flip side of this conclusion is
that labor mobility is not a mechanism that causes
underinvestments in R&D, and should not be con-
sidered a spillover channel either.
A first objection to the analysis above is that
credit markets are not likely to deliver all the neces-
sary services given the moral hazard problems in-
volved in borrowing on future income. This market
failure will, evaluated in isolation, cause underin-
vestment in R&D. 67 If there is larger uncertainty
over the future gains from research work than there
is over future income from alternative career paths,
66 See Pakes and Nitzan Cl983) for a related, formal analysis.
67 The utility loss associated with low consumption in the
beginning of the career will shift the supply-of-research-Iabor
curve downwards, increase the equilibrium wage of research
workers and thereby the price on R&D investments. This will
result in R&D investments below the level associated with a
perfect credit market.
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risk aversion at the individual level will magnify the
underinvestment problem. 68 Imperfections in the la-
bor market may, on the other hand, increase firms'
incentives to invest in research work by reducing the
mobility of researchers across firms. Such labor mar-
ket imperfections include search costs and asymmet-
ric information about the human capital of the em-
ployees. These effects will result in wages being
below marginal product, and hence give firms an
incentive to invest in workers' general (i.e., non-firm
specific) human capital. 69
Determining the total effect of the 'training as-
pect' of R&D on investments and wages is in the
end an empirical task, and little can at this moment
be said. In order to investigate the issue, a frame-
work explicitly linking R&D investments of firms
with human capital accumulation in research work-
ers, must be developed. Given the increasing number
of matched employer-employee data sets now be-
coming available, we think future research in this
direction will prove fruitful. It might be essential,
however, that these data sets are able to trace the
mobility of researchers across establishments, as such
mobility and entrepreneurship can be a major com-
ponent of the pay-off for successful researchers.
6. Conclusions
We have not succeeded in answering all our
problems. The answers we have found only serve
to raise a whole set of new questions. In some
ways we feel we are as confused as ever, but we
believe we are confused on a higher level and
about more important things (Øksendal, 1985).
Estimates of the economic returns to R&D pro-
jects have gone a long way since this line of research
68 It might be the individual's aversion towards high skewness
rather than high variance which is the more important issue here.
Notice that risk-neutrality at the firm level is irrelevant for the
argument.
69 Cf. Acemoglu and Pischke (I999) for a review of some
relevant literature.
started more than 40 years ago (cf. Griliches, 1958).
We have in this paper focused on a relatively small
number of recent studies that try directly to evaluate
the social returns from subsidies to commercial R&D
activities. Four of the five studies suggest that the
subsidy schemes have had a positive effect on per-
formance in the targeted firms. We have, however,
pointed out some of the shortcomings in the avail-
able studies and raised some questionmarks about
the conclusion that these subsidy schemes have re-
duced market failures. Discussing similar shortcom-
ings related to causal inference from observational
studies, Cochran (1965) notes that a reader, "if later
asked for a concise summary of the paper, may quite
properly report: 'He said it's all very difficult'." We
recognize that our paper may leave the same impres-
sion on our readers, but we also believe, as Cochran
emphasizes, that "[al listing of common difficulties
is . .. helpful in giving an overall view of the prob-
lems that must be overcome if this type of research
is to be informative." Furthermore, we have tried to
emphasize that many of the unresolved questions are
ready for further research with tools and data sets
within our reach.
On the methodological side, a more careful infer-
ence of the magnitude of the impact parameters of
interest can be made, drawing inspiration from the
recent advances in the evaluation literature in labor
market econometrics. A more ambitious approach
would be to go beyond these largely non-parametric
techniques and try to merge the model of perfor-
mance and subsidy impact with a structural model of
how the government allocates the R&D subsidies. A
structural model of the allocation of R& D subsidies
should address the question of how the government
can construct operational procedures to identify R&D
projects with high social returns, 70 and the empirical
analysis based on such a structural model can help us
to identify to what extent the government agencies
succeed in implementing these procedures. These are
clearly interesting and worthwhile research tasks in
70 The practical difficulties in selecting R&D projects with high
social returns are discussed in some detail in Yager and Schmidt
(1997). The ongoing ATP/NBER project is particularly notewor-
thy in its attempt to draw on the insights from the econometric
literature to resolve some of these difficulties.
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themselves, and if completed successfully they will
give us an alternative handle to eliminate the poten-
tial selection biases that we discussed at some length
in Section 3.
A large number of research papers on R&D and
spillovers have emerged over the last decade, but we
have argued that several theoretical and empirical
aspects of spillovers deserve more attention before
conclusions about R&D policy can be drawn. Many
of the issues we have raised seem to require a more
detailed investigation of the nature of the spillovers
and also a more detailed investigation into the vari-
ous contractual arrangements that prevail in the mar-
ket between firms and between the researchers and
their firms.
Finally, evaluation of the economic returns to
R&D subsidy programs seems to require a combina-
tion of empirical investigations at different levels of
observation. We have argued that the microecono-
metric approach that has been the focus of this paper
should be supplemented with detailed case studies to
get a more precise estimate of the economic returns
from the few, outstanding innovations that might
typically generate a very large share of the economic
benefits emerging from risk-oriented R&D subsidy
programs. On the other hand, in order to estimate the
impact of an R&D subsidy program in the presence
of knowledge spillovers, we need to look beyond the
direct impact of the subsidies on the performance of
targeted firms and consider changes in performance
of the industries or 'technological clusters' to which
the supported firms belong. This may lead us to a
more aggregated, industry-level analysis. It is en-
couraging to observe that economic researchers al-
ready have many of these elements in their tool box,
but they have not yet been fully tied together.
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ABSTRACT: Labor mobility is often considered to be an important source of knowl-
edge externalities, making it difficult for firms to appropriate returns to R&D in-
vestments. In this paper, I argue that inter-firm transfers of knowledge embodied
in people should be analyzed within a human capital framework. Testing such a
framework using a matched employer-employee data set, I find that the technical
staff in R&D-intensive firms pays for the knowledge they accumulate on the job
through lower wages in the beginning of their career. Later they earn a return on
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"Don't let your employees do to you what you did to your former boss."
The goldenrule of protecting trade secrets,
as definedby Intel general counselRoger
Borovoy(Jackson; 1997)
lIntrod uction
Labor mobility is likely to be a very important source of knowledge diffusion. Sur-
veying one hundred founders of companies on the 1989 Inc. '500' list of the fastest
growing companies in the United States, Bhide (1994) finds that 71 percent "repli-
cated or modified an idea encountered through previous employment." With respect
to technical employees, Almeida and Kogut (1999), demonstrate by an analysis of
patent data from the semiconductor industry that ideas are spread through mobil-
ity of key engineers. Evidence of this kind, however, does not justify the common
proposition that labor mobility is an important source of knowledge spillovers. Such
spillovers (or externalities) are thought to cause underinvestment in private R&D be-
cause workers have incentives to exploit their employers' research results by setting
up or joining a competitor.
The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, I want to clarify how labor mobility
can affect R&D investments. I will argue that there are market mechanisms that
may internalize the potential externalities involved. Second, I present a framework
to test the existence of such market mechanisms. Third, I present empirical find-
ings suggesting that these mechanisms actually exist. My results are, however, not
entirely conclusive with respect to the exact mechanism.
The link between labor mobility and knowledge spillovers dates back to Arrow's
(1962) article on the public good aspect ofknowledge. Arrowwrites that "no amount
of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something
so intangible as information" and adds that "[m]obility of personnel among firms
provides a way of spreading information" (p. 615). FollowingArrow's seminal work,
a large literature on R&D spillovers has evolved, and economists working in the field
have continued to consider labor mobility an important spillover channel. Geroski
(1995) expresses what appears to be a common view", writing that "[ljast but not
lJaffe (1996) writes that "[kjnowledge spillovers also occur when researchers leave a firm and
take a job at another firm". Stephan (1996) writes that "[f]uture work should also focus on the
role mobility within the industrial sector plays in facilitating spillovers". Gersbach and Schmutzler
(1997) write that "[sjpillovers arise because employees who change jobs take with them all their
knowledge, some of which is not specific to their original firm."
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least, spillovers occur when a researcher paid by one firm to generate new knowledge
transfers to another firm (or creates a spin-off firm) without compensating his/her
former employer for the full inventory of ideas that travels with him or her."
That workers do not make such compensations seems obvious since they al-
ready possess their employers' knowledge when they decide to leave. The timing
of events that Geroski implicitly suggest, however, is misleading. To the extent
that research work has a general training element, workers may pay for knowledge
as it is accumulated. Whether labor mobility actually reduces appropriability and
R&D investments, therefore, is an empirical question. The approach I suggest to
answer this question, is to test key implications of models that assume perfect mar-
kets. If using standard methodologies/ for estimating R&D spillovers without first
considering such a 'benchmark' case, the results of ordinary market exchange may
mistakenly be interpreted as R&D spillovers, and public policy will be misguided",
The basic implications of labor mobility follows from classical human capital
theory, cf. Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962, 1964). To the extent that workers in
R&D-intensive firms get access to valuable knowledge on the job, they will expect
higher wages in the future. When holding jobs that give access to such knowledge,
they should therefore be willing to pay for what they learn by accepting wages below
their alternative wage. This hypothesis can be tested using extended Mincer (1974)
wage regressions, which is the standard approach in the training literature.
Utilizing a large matched employer-employee data set from the Norwegian ma-
chinery and equipment industry, I find that the technical staff in R&D-intensive
firms pay for the knowledge they accumulate on the job through lower wages in
the beginning of their career, and that they later earn a return on these implicit
investments through higher wages. Scientists and engineers have to accept a wage
discount in the order of six percent in their first year after graduation if choosing an
'R&D intensive' career. This should be considered a conservative estimate, due to a
likely ability bias. Towards the end of their career, they receive a wage premium in
the order of seven percent. Similar results apply for workers with secondary tech-
nical education. The fact that I find as strong results for workers with secondary
technical education as for scientists and engineers, indicates that R&D-intensity is
not only a measure of learning associated with doing research, but also a proxy for
the value of general work experience from high-tech firms. When estimating the
2Cf. e.g. Jaffe (1986) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993). See the concluding section
for a short discussion of the problem with these methodologies in my contex.
3Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998), Klette and Møen (1999) and Klette, Møen and Griliches
(2000) elaborate on this point.
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price paid for learning separately from the return to research experience", I find
that having work experience from R&D intensive firms is associated with higher
wages, while the employers' current R&D intensity reduce wages for workers with
less than 20 years experience. Furthermore, as predicted by human capital theory,
the youngest workers appear to invest most heavily in on-the-job learning. These
findings suggest that the potential externalities associated with labor mobility, at
least to some extent, are internalized in the labor market".
With respect to mobility patterns, I find a turnover rate of about 20 percent re-
gardless of the firms' R&D intensity. Excess labor turnover, however, is less in R&D
intensive firms. This effect is particularly pronounced for workers with secondary
technical education. If changing employer, workers tend to move to a firm with an
R&D intensity similar to their former employer. Consistent with the lower excess
turnover in R&D intensive firms, research experience from the current employer
appears to be more valued than research experience from previous employers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section outlines some
relevant theoretical models. Section three discusses the data. Section four derives
empirical results regarding R&D investments and wages. Section fivederives empir-
ical results regarding R&D investments and labor mobility. Section six contains my
concluding remarks.
2 R&D investments and human capital theory
Research is a learning process, and R&D investments, therefore, may not only in-
crease a firms' stock of innovations, but also increase the human capital of research
workers. In the literature, however, R&D capital (Griliches; 1973), and human
capital (e.g. Becker; 1964) are rarely discussed together.
R&D capital is knowledge that can earn a monopoly rent, and this rent is what
motivates investments in R&D. If the results of a research project can be perfectly
protected by patents or other intellectual property right instruments, labor mobility
is not a concern to firms when it comes to appropriating returns. However, often,
the intellectual property rights cannot be effectivelyprotected. The R&D capital of
firms is then to a large extent embodied in the employees. Such knowledge is what
Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1994, 1998) have called intellectual human capitol",
41will use 'R&D experience' as a short term for experience from R&D intensive firms.
5This does not guarantee optimal R&D investments, however, as credit restrictions or risk
averse preferences may reduce workers' willingness to 'co-finance' R&D. 1 will return to this in
the concluding section.
61ntellectual human capital is human capital that can earn a monopoly rent because the knowl-
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Under these circumstances labor mobility is potentially a threat to the firms. Pakes
and Nitzan (1983) analyze the investment incentives of entrepreneurs facing such a
situation, and conclude that it is possible to design labor contracts which solve the
problem, see below.
As knowledge diffuses, intellectual human capital will become 'ordinary' human
capital that can be acquired through schooling or on-the-job training. On-the-job
training also has relevance for an analysis of labor mobility and R&D investments.
There may be more to learn in firms conducting research because such firms are
likely to use the most up-to date technology and frequently change their products
and production processes. This training may be valuable to other firms. Further-
more, the distinction between intellectual human capital and on-the-job training
does not constitute a clear dichotomy. Many innovations are incremental product
and process improvements made at the factory floor, and in the limit they may
as well be considered excellent craftsmanship as innovations. A case where differ-
ent firms offer different opportunities for on-the-job training is analyzed by Rosen
(1972).
The rest of this section will outline the theoretical models of Rosen (1972) and
Pakes and Nitzan (1983). Although highly relevant for work on R&D-investments,
training and labor turnover, these models have received modest attention in the
literature. The main predictions of the models will be discussed and tested in the
empirical part of the paper.
Rosen's 1972 model Rosen (1972) models on-the-job learning using a compen-
sating differential framework, and turns it into "an economic theory of occupational
mobility". Rosen thinks of jobs as tied packages of work and learning. Workers sell
the services of their skills and simultaneously purchase an opportunity to augment
edge is not publicly available nor perfectly protected. This distinguishes it from 'ordinary' human
capital which is widely diffused knowledge that can be acquired at a cost and earns a normal
rate of return on the implied investment. How quickly intellectual human capital depreciates and
becomes ordinary human capital depends both on the complexity and tacitness of the knowledge
and on whether those who posess the knowledge try to keep it secret. Innovations that can be
communicated at no cost represents a limiting case and will not add to anyone's human capital
once the idea is in the public domain. Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998) stress that scientific
discoveries that create intellectual human capital is "characterized by natural excludability", and
that this solves the appropriability problem. From the point of view of an individual scientist,
this is correct, but not from the point of view of an investing firm or entreprenur. Zucker, Darby
and Armstrong (1998) recognize this within their setting, writing that "much of the fruits of the
biotechnological revolution was much more appropriable by the star scientists than by the univer-
sities that (typically) employed them." They also recognize that universities indirectly appropriate
returns through the wage mechanism, cf. footnote 42.
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those skills. Some jobs provide more learning opportunities than others. The dif-
ference between the maximum market rental of a worker's existing skills and the
wage that he or she receives in a given job, is the implicit price the worker pays
for learning. Basic human capital theory suggests that a worker's incentive to accu-
mulate human capital is largest at young age. As the worker grows older he or she
will have fewer years to collect returns on a given investment, and obviously workers
have no incentives to pay for increasing their human capital in the last year before
retirement. This imply that the "optimal human capital investment program is im-
plemented by a sequence of job assignments in which workers systematically move
and are promoted across jobs that offer successively smaller learning opportunities"
(Rosen; 1986).
The point of departure in Rosen's model is a net wage equation
y = wH - P(k) (1)
where y is income, w is the unit rental price of human capital and k is an index
measuring potentiallearning-by-experience on the job, k E [0,kl. P(k) is an implicit
or shadow price function giving the market equalizing wage differential between a job
with no learning potential and a job with learning potential k. The actual amount
of learning by individual i is proportional to k and depends on individual i's ability,
ai E [0,Il such that
(2)
The workers problem is then to choose a sequence of jobs, kt, over his or her lifetime,
T, to maximize the present value of income, Le.
(3)
subject to an initial stock of human capital, Ho and Hit
requires that at any time, t E [0,Tl,
aik. Optimization
P'(kt) = ::::[1_ e-r(T-t)] .
ai r
(4)
The expression on the left hand side is the marginal cost of investing in human
capital, and the expression on the right hand side is the discounted marginal return.
It seems reasonable to assume that P'(k) > ° and P"(k) > 0, Le. that the marginal
cost of learning is positive and increasing. Given this, optimality requires k; to be
largest at the time of entry into the labor market and then to decrease monotonically
over time.
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Note that the marginal cost of a given real investment in human capital de-
creases with ability. Hence, workers with higher ability will, all else equal, find it
profitable to choose jobs with greater learning potential. In the words of Rosen
(1972): "Economic incentives induce more 'able' workers to learn more and to ac-
cumulate knowledge more rapidly than the less 'able'." This will give rise to a
potential selection problem (ability bias) in the empirical application of the model.
The Pakes-Nitzan model In Rosen (1972) firms differ with respect to learn-
ing opportunities, but they do not have market power. Pakes and Nitzan (1983)
formalize learning in a different way, downplaying training, but emphasizing the
strategical aspects of the innovation process. Their point of departure is Arrow's
(1962) reference to labor mobility as a source of R&D spillovers, and the obser-
vation that scientists get access to valuable information". They argue that even
though mobility of scientific personnel will spread knowledge produced in industrial
laboratories, it need not be a mechanism which reduces the profitability of research
projects and employment in such projects. Both scientists and firms are aware of the
fact that working on a research project gives access to valuable information". Once
such information is disclosed or developed, scientists, if they are to stay with the
firm, will have to receive a wage increase reflecting their new market value. Thus,
scientists expect that accepting a research position implies a future wage increase,
and consequently they accept an initial wage below their alternative wage".
Next, Pakes and Nitzan notice that if the innovation makes the firm a true
monopolist, it will never be profitable for the firm and the scientist to split, since
the sum of rents in a duopolistic market will be less than the monopoly rent lO.
7Note that Pakes and Nitzan (1983) is, strictly speaking. not a model about human capital.
Research scientists learn about research results, but do not increase their generic productivity.
Hence, the modellack the training perspective crucial in Rosen (1972).
8Pakes and Nitzan (1983) explicitly model the uncertainty involved in research. This feature
of the model does not alter the simple intuition given here, however, because they assume that
utility functions arc linear in income. Discussing this assumption, they acknowledge that both risk
aversion and a lower bound on wages will affect R&D investments.
9Cf. Anand and Galetovic (2000) for a model where the firm cannot commit ex ante to share
profits with the researcher. In this setting underinvestment in R&D may occur.
lOPakes and Nitzan (1983) model only a situation with one entrepreneur and one scientist. If
several scientists have equal access to the same critical information, this will complicate the analysis
because of potential strategic interaction among the scientists. Cf. Combes and Duraton (2000) for
a game theoretic model where a continium of workers share the same (exogenously given) strategic
knowledge. They show that the 'joint profit' effect driving the result in Pakes and Nitzans' model
is not robust to this variation. Pakes and Nitzan dismiss the case with a large number of workers
sharing exactly the same strategic knowledge about a firm as being of little relevance. They do
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Mobility, therefore, should only be observed when it increases the joint profit of the
firm and the scientist. This may happen if the firm cannot avoid that other firms
get access to valuable information and enter the market!". The scientist, by setting
up a rival, will then break into profits which otherwise accrue to third parties, and
since this profit will be part of the scientists alternative wage in 'period two', it is
possible for the firm to extract this rent when setting the 'period one' wage. Another
situation which may induce the scientist to join or set up a rival is when the research
project create 'spin-offs', some of which are better exploited in a separate firm due
to coordination costs+'. Summarizing the insight of their model, Pakes and Nitzan
writes that
mobility of scientific personnel is not, in itself, a source of concern to
entrepreneurs. ... [Aln optimizing entrepreneur who is free to choose
among alternative contracts will always choose one which only induces
the scientist to leave and join a rival if the sum of the benefits to the
two agents increases as a result of the scientist 's leaving. Contracts
which specify labor payment in the form of a flat wage and stock option
(or other profit sharing agreement) ought to be able to induce close
approximation to this behavior.
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1985) provide empirical evidence in support of Pakes
and Nitzans' prediction. Surveying 105 companies in the Route 128 region around
Boston, they find that incentive pay programs are far more common in high-tech
firms than in other firms, and that such programs are used for broad levels of
technical employees. In addition, key scientists and engineers who help form the
companies at an early stage, are given long term stock options.
not present strong arguments, but it seems reasonable to assume that if several scientists work on
the same project. their knowledge is more often complimentary than substitutable. Cf. Rajan and
Zingales' (2001) 'horizontal hierarchy' for a model with this flavor.
11Note that spillovers at this point enter the story, but mobility will be a consequence of spillovers,
not a source of spillovers. Information can leak out to third parties by reverse engineering, inspec-
tion of patent documents, independent research on the same technological problem, etc. Cf. Levin,
Klevoric, Nelson and Winter (1987) for a survey of the importance of various information channels.
Labor mobility receives a middle score in their study.
12Cf. Franco and Filson (2000) for a model focusing particularly on spin-off firms, but looking
at process innovations in a homogeneous product industry. Franco and Filson get results similar
to Pakes and Nitzan in that knowledge spillovers are internalized in the labor marked, but they
do not endogenize mobility by considering the potential 'joint profit' resulting if a spin-off firm is
not established.
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3 Data
The data used in this study comes from three main sources: Governmental admin-
istrative records prepared by Statistics Norway, the annual manufacturing census of
Statistics Norway, and the biannual R&D survey of Statistics Norway supplemented
with other surveys of immaterial investments and innovation done by the same bu-
reau. The Norwegian data are extraordinary in the sense that the entire working
population can be followedover a number of years, and in the sense that extremely
rich information is available both about the workers and about their employers.
When analyzing wage profiles and labor mobility, the extensive coverage offered by
the Norwegian data is a great advantage.
I have chosen to focus on the technical staff13 in the machinery and equipment
industries as these industries have many high-tech firms and have a fairly complete
coverage in the R&D surveys. The matched employer-employee data set covers
the years 1986 to 1995, and I have only included men employed full time in the
analysis below. Women do not constitute a large share of the labor stock in these
industries, and they are known to have different career patterns and preferences
than men. Roughly speaking, the main sample has annual observations of about
30,000 workers in 750 plants.
Both the (normalized) length of the highest attained education, and the type of
education, is recorded in the data. Occupation, however, is not available. Hence, it is
not possible to look specifically at researchers, and workers' learning will be proxied
by the employers' R&D intensity. I measure R&D intensity as R&D man-years per
employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms!", If all workers within
a firm participate equally in the firm's R&D efforts, R&D man-years per employee
will measure the share of time that each worker uses to perform R&D. Since R&D
work obviously is not shared equally among the employees, R&D intensity is a noisy
proxy for what we want to capture. Measurement errors in the R&D variable add
to this noise.
Further information about the data is given in the data appendix and in Tables
A1-A6.
131define the technical staff as workers with secondary technical education and workers with
higher technical or scientific education. 1 refer to the latter group as scientists and engineers.
14This means that R&D intensity is measured at a level 'in between' the firm and the plant. 1
will use the term firm level R&D intensity in what follows. If R&D man-years were not reported,
the value has been imputed based on the firms' R&D spending. 1 have censored the R&D in-
tensity variable at 0.8 in order to reduce the influence of outliers. This affects OA percent of the
observations with positive R&D intensity.
91
4 The effect of R&D investments on wages
Pakes and Nitzan (1983) predict lower starting wages and higher wage growth for
workers doing research, and Rosen (1972) predicts the same pattern more generally
for workers having jobs with a high learning potential!". A key assumption behind
both models is that workersmainly acquire general human capitalon the job. Test-
ing these models, Le. testing to what extent different firms offer different learning
opportunities, and to what extent workers pay for their knowledgeaccumulation, we
would like to estimate equation (1) which is Rosen's point of departure. In principle
this is possible. Human capital, H, can be decomposed and the price or relative
weight of its various components can be estimated using a standard log-linear he-
donic wage regression. Furthermore, potentiallearning-by-experience on the job, k,
may be proxied by the employer's R&D intensity as it seems reasonable to assume
that workers in 'high-tech', R&D intensive firms learn more than workers in 'low-
tech' firms. However, some problems are immediately evident. Work experience
needs to be decomposed according to the training or research content of the jobs
that workers have had at different stages of their career, but complete information
about the workers' career histories is not available!". Furthermore, it is far from
obvious how one can summarize what is known about the workers' experience from
different firms into a good measure of human capital. In what follows,I will suggest
several solutions to these problems.
A first look at the effect of R&D on the earnings profile One way to
get around the missing career data, is to assume that workers career trajectories
are such that the R&D intensity is constant over their career. Table 5 show that
this assumption is valid as an approximation!". We can then utilize the structural
relationship between kand H, given in equation (2) together with the optimal
time path for learning investments implicit in (4). Under this assumption the R&D
intensity will at each point of time reveal information both about k and about
the component of H representing accumulated R&D experience. More specifically,
the estimated joint effect will give the returns to R&D experience minus the cost
of learning. Working for a highly R&D intensive employer should cause a large
151will discuss the relationship between the two models more in detail towards the end of this
section.
16Cf. the data appendix for details.
17The correlation coefficient between R&D intensity in year t and t-l is 0.84. It falls somewhat
when the time intervall is increased, but the coefficient is still 0.57 and highly significant between
year t and t-9. This is the longest observable time span. Note that the correlation coefficients are
downward biased due to measurement errors in R&D intensity.
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negative wage premium early in the career, reflecting the implicit price paid for the
R&D experience. At the same time, this experience has not had much time to affect
the stock of human capital. As time goes by, workers' willingness to pay for human
capital accumulation decrease and approaches zero, but differences in previous R&D
experience will translate into differences in human capital. Workers who are in R&D
intensive firms and have a long R&D intensive career behind them, will therefore
have a large positive wage premium reflecting the human capital accumulated.
Table 1 reports the results of OLS wage regressions where cross-terms between
experience and current R&D intensity are added to test the hypothesis that employ-
ees with a career in R&D intensive firms have a steeper experience-earnings profile
than other workers. Additional control variables included are years of schooling,
seven experience dummiesl", a quadratic in plant number of employees and year
dummies. In column 1 and 3 the experience dummies are interacted directly with
R&D intensity while column 2 and 4 report the results of interacting the experience
dummies with a dummy which is one if the R&D intensity is above 0.219. 'An R&D
intensity of 0.2 represents the 97th percentile for workers with secondary technical
education, and the 82th percentile for workers with higher technical or .scientific
education. The dummy approach is used as an easy way to assess the magnitude of
the effect of R&D intensity on wages. An alternative illustration is given in Figure
1, where earnings-experience profiles for workers in firms with no R&D and in firms
with R&D intensity 0.2 is graphed, based on a specification continuous in experience.
The results support the main theoretical prediction of Rosen (1972) and Pakes
and Nitzan (1983). Early in the career both workers with secondary technical edu-
cation and scientists and engineers accept a significant wage discount when working
for R&D-intensive firms, but over time this discount is changed into a significant
wage premium. Note that both the discounts and the premia are biased towards zero
due to measurement errors in the R&D variable. The pattern strongly suggests that
R&D-investments of firms translate into general human capital, and that workers
both pay and get paid for the knowledge they accumulate.
181have chosen to use experience dummies rather than a higher order polynomial in the main
specification because the tabulation of cross terms between R&D intensity and a higher order
polynomial is difficult to interpret.
191nthese regressions, workers in firms with medium R&D intensity have been excluded. Medium
R&D intensity is defined as an R&D intensity between 0.05 and 0.2. The exclusion is done to
facilitate a sharper comparison between workers in firms with high and low R&D intensity. Note
also that average R&D-intensity is likely to be a poorer proxy for each individual's R&D exposure
in firms with intermediate levels of R&D-intensity than in firms with high or low R&D-intensity.
The results are, however. robust to including workers in firms with medium R&D intensity, and to
using the 90th percentile for each group as a cutoff point instead of 0.2 R&D intensity.
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It is evident from Table 1, columns 2 and 4, using the dummy variable approach,
that the discounts as well as the premia are of economic significance. Scientists
and engineers working in firms with an R&D intensity above 0.2, have on average
6.1 percent lower wages in their first year than scientists and engineers in firms
with R&D intensity below 0.05. Scientists and engineers with more than 35 year
experience and working in a firm with R&D intensity above 0.2, have wages that
on average are 6.8 percent above the wages of scientists and engineers with similar
experience in firms with R&D intensity below 0.05. The magnitudes of the discounts
and premia are similar for workers with secondary technical education in R&D
intensive firms. They have a 5.5 percent wage discount in the beginning of their
career, and an 8.6 percent premium in the end of their career.
Figure 1, which is based on a specification with a quartic in experience interacted
with a quadratic in R&D intensity, gives the same qualitative results as Table 1. In
Figure 1, however, the premium late in the career is particularly evident for scientists
and engineers. The wage discount early in the career, on the other hand, is most evi-
dent for workerswith secondary technical educatiorr'". Given that research is mostly
performed by workers with higher education, the significant effect of R&D on wages
for this group, brought out both in Table 1 and Figure 1, is somewhat surprising. I
will return to this issue later, when discussing in depth the relationship between the
Rosen and the Pakes-Nitzan-model. Presumably R&D-intensity measures not only
direct research exposure, but works as a general proxy for technological training at
all levels within firms.
One way to check the plausibility of the coefficients is to calculate the internal
rate of return to choosing an R&D intensive career. For a worker with secondary
technical education, the internal rate of return is 5.7 percent, and for workers with
higher technical or scientific education it is 3.6 percent'". These numbers should be
20Another slight anomality in Figure 1, is the increase in the wage discount for workers with
. secondary education over the first ten years of their careers. Looking at the standard errors in
Table L however, we see that the shape of the wage profile is not very precisely estimated in this
intervall. Furthermore, such an increase in the very first years is also found in Table 1-3, and is
not inconceivable, as discussed in footnote 26. Whereas the dummy specifications are completely
flexible with respect to the length of-such an effect. the specification behind Figure 1 causes some
interdependence in discounts and premia accross time. This may explain why the effect is most
visible there.
21The calculation is based on the regressions in Table L column 2 and 4. I assume that the
workers are employed in a firm with 100 employees, and that the business cycle is as it were in
1995. Workers with secondary education are assumed to have 12 years of schooling and work for
45 years. Workers with higher education are assumed to have 15 years of schooling and work for
42 years.
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considered rough estimates, but they are in a reasonable range.
Estimates based on earnings growth One major obstacle to identifying com-
pensating differentials, whether associated with training or other job amenities, has
been the potential correlation between job amenities and unobserved individual char-
acteristics. In Rosen's model, an ability bias arises because highly talented workers
have a lower cost of learning, and absorb more knowledge in a job with a large po-
tential for learning, than less talented workers+', This imply a tendency for talented
workers to self-select into R&D intensive firms, causing the wage discount in the
beginning of the career to be underestimated, and the wage premium in the end of
the career to be overestimated+'.
In addition to ability bias and the bias due to measurements errors in R&D
already mentioned, there is another potential bias in Table 1 associated with workers
switching between employment in 'high-tech' and 'low-tech' firms. Although Table
5 indicates that this kind of behavior is not very common, it clearly does happen.
A bias then arises because the regressions in Table 1 assume that we can compare
experienced workers in R&D intensive firms to experienced workers in less R&D
intensive firms, and learn how much more human capital is accumulated in R&D
intensive firms. Workers who transfer out of R&D intensive firms, however, will
increase the wage level of the 'comparison group' in the less R&D intensive firms,
and cause a downward bias on the estimated gain from working in R&D intensive
firms. In the same way,workers who transfer from firms that do not invest much in
R&D to firms that do, have less human capital than those who have been in R&D
intensive firms for their entire career. Hence, they will reduce the average wage level
in R&D intensive firms and add to the bias. The result is that the wage premia
associated with the last periods of a 'high tech career' are underestimated, i.e. we
will underestimate the steepness of the experience earnings profile/".
A simple way to avoid the potential ability and 'switching' bias, is to estimate
22Cf. Autor (2000) for a model with the same feature.
231t is in this respect interesting to note that the estimated coefficients on R&D-intensity be-
come smaller (more negative) if the share of scientists with post graduate degrees at the plant
is included in the regression, despite this variable being strongly correlated with R&D intensity
(not reported). One possible explanation is that the share of post graduate scientists also is corre-
lated with unobserved worker ability. This would be consistent with the 'O-ring theory' of Kremer
(1993).
24Byreducing the steepnes of the experience earnings profile for workers with a high-tech career,
this bias could explain why the estimated net return does not become positive until! the workers
have somewhere between 10-20 years experience. The bias is eliminated when current and previous
R&D is included separately in the regression. cf. Table 3 below.
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the wage equation in first differences,Le. investigate how firms' R&D intensity affect
wage growth directly. This is done in Table 2. The drawback of this specification is
that we do not learn about the effect of R&D on the wage level25. Given that ability
is expected to bias results against finding support for the hypothesis that workers
pay for R&D experience, however, this is not a serious problem.
The broad picture emerging from the upper part of Table 2 is that workers
with technical or scientific education in R&D-intensive firms who do not change
employer, have higher wage growth throughout their career26. This is consistent
with the previous finding that R&D translates into human capital that workers earn
a return on27• Wage growth also appears to leveloff towards the end of the career,
consistent with workers having less incentive to accumulate human capital when
getting closer to the retirement age.
Since the correlation between firms' R&D intensity and workers' learning invest-
ments is expected to be strongest for young workers, it should be possible to observe
changes in 'payment' associated with transitions between firms with different R&D
intensities. Moving from an R&D-intensive firm to a less R&D-intensive firm early
in the career should induce a wage increase, and transitions the opposite way should
induce a wage decrease. Both types of moves will contribute to a negative relation-
ship between wage growth and change in R&D intensity. For old workers, a change
in R&D intensity should not affect wages as much, since they are not expected to
invest much in human capital. The estimated coefficientsdo not fully confirm these
hypotheses. For old workers, the coefficients are small and not very significant as
expected, and for young workers with secondary technical education the coefficient
is negative and highly significant, but for young scientists and engineers the coef-
ficient is positive and significant. A problem with the estimates, however, is that
mobility cannot be considered exogenous/".
25The wage level is identified if using a fixed effects specification, but such a specification does
not perform well. This may be due to its more restrictive assumption regarding the dynamics of
unobserved worker characteristics.
26Note, however, that wage growth for workers with secondary technical education is negatively
correlated with the employers' R&D intensity in the first two years of the career. This is also
evident in Table 1, column 1, Table 3, columns 1-2 and in Figure 1. It may reflect that it takes
some time to 'absorb' the complexity of R&D intensive firms, or that workers due to imperfect
information about the quality of the training, are unwilling to pay the full cost of the training at
once, but that firms are able to extract this premium through lower wage growth during the very
first years of the workers' career.
27Cash flow before wage payments per worker, is included to control for the rent sharing effect
of successful innovations found by van Reenen (1996). Such a rent sharing effect is present in the
data, but it does not dominate the effect of R&D.
28If e.g. young scientists and engineers who perform well tend to move to more R&D intensive
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Estimating the price of learning and the return to R&D experience sep-
arately Table 1 utilize cross sectional information only, and estimates in one co-
efficient the return to previous R&D experience minus the price paid for current
learning opportunities. Utilizing the longitudinal dimension of the data set it is
possible to specify these two components separately. The learning opportunity that
a worker faces depends only on current R&D intensity, while average R&D inten-
sity in previous years reveal information about the workers' R&D experience. Note,
however, that the stability in R&D intensity over the workers careers, evident in
Table 5 and footnote 17, makes current and previous R&D intensities somewhat
collinear. A high level of precision can therefore not be expected when including
both variables.
Table 3, columns 2 and 4, reports the results of interacting current R&D intensity
and the average of previously observed R&D intensities separately with experience
dummies. The first thing to notice is that the coefficients on the average of previously
observed R&D intensities, Le. the return to R&D experience, are mostly positive,
while the coefficients on current R&D intensity, Le. the implicit price paid for
learning opportunities, are mostly negative. Note also that current R&D intensity
has a more negative impact when previous R&D experience is included, cf. column
1 and 3.
The price paid for learning decreases over time as predicted by theory, but the
data do not bring out the expected wage increase over time that should be associated
with R&D experience. Furthermore, the coefficients on current R&D, Le. learning,
does not go to zero, but becomes positive late in the career. These two features seem
connected. The employer's current R&D intensity appears to be a better proxy for
old workers' human capital than the average of previously observed R&D intensities.
This could be due to some selection process where workers whose technological
experience has become obsolete, move out of or are displaced from R&D intensive
firms. .
In order to assess the importance of learning for the industry on an aggregate
level, I have summarized the estimated wage discount for all R&D firms. This sum
amounts to 0.7 percent of the total wage bill for technical personnel in all R&D
performing firms and 2.6 percent of industry R&D investments. Looking only at
firms with R&D intensity above 0.2, the wage discount represent 3.0 percent of
their total wage bill and 2.5 percent of their R&D investments. These numbers are
not very big, but nor are they negligible.
firms,. while young scientists and engineers who do not perform well tend to move to less R&D
intensive firms, this may explain the positive coeffcient.
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The value of R&D experience from the current employer vs. previous
employers Lengermann (1996)and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998, 1999)who
study the effect of formal on-the-job training, find that the return to training received
from previous employers exceed the return to training received from the current
employer. Loewenstein and Spletzer argue that this may reflect that employers
extract some returns to general training, and that workers do not realize the full
returns until they change jobs. If something similar applies to the value of experience
from R&D intensive firms, it would imply that the potential R&D spillovers involved
when workers in R&D intensive firms change employers, is only partially internalized
in the labor market. In order to investigate this possibility, I have for each employee
where sufficient career information is present, calculated the average observed R&D
intensity in previous years when working for the current employer and the average
observed R&D intensity in years working for previous employers.
With a smaller sample size and three R&D measures, an extension of the spec-
ification with experience dummies interacted with R&D-intensities, used in Tables
1 and 3, is not feasible. It is necessary to put more restrictions on the specification
and I have chosen to approximate the price paid for learning opportunities with cur-
rent R&D intensity and its interaction with years of overall work experience. R&D
experience built up with the current employer is proxied with the average observed
R&D intensity in previous years working for this employer times years of tenure
with this employer. R&D experience built up with previous employers is proxied
with the average observed R&D intensity while working for previous employers times
years of experience prior to the current employment relationship. These measures,
resembling sums of R&D intensities, are consistent with equation (2).
Table 4, column 1 and 3, reports the results. Column 2 and 4 report a slightly
less restrictive specification where non-linear interactions with experience and tenure
are allowed. All regressions confirm the previous finding that current R&D intensity
have a significantly negative impact on wages early in the career. The positive
cross-term with experience also confirm that this negative impact, interpreted to
be the price paid for learning opportunities, diminishes over time. With respect
to the R&D experience built up over the career, both R&D experience from the
current employer and R&D experience from previous employers have a positive and
significant impact on wages. R&D experience from the current employer, however,
seems to be more highly valued. Unfortunately, this result is more suggestive than
conclusive. In order to construct the variables needed, all years working with the
current employer must be included in the sample, while information about previous
employers can be less complete. Hence, the average R&D intensity in years working
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for previous employers is measured with greater error than average R&D intensity
in years working for the current employer, and coefficients on variables involving
the former measure will therefore be more biased towards zero/". In addition, the
coefficient on R&D experience with the current employer could be upward biased.
This would happen if recent R&D experience shows that knowledge accumulated
earlier in the career has not become obsolete. The results for old workers in Table
3 indicate that this may be the case.
Robustness and econometric issues A number of alternative specifications
have been tried to asses the robustness of the results". In one specification, more
than 30 additional control variables were included, such as proxies for hours worked'",
the capital to labor ratio, the Herfindal index, the market share of the firm, the union
density+' and four-digit industry dummies. This did not change the quantitative re-
sults. The results are also robust to including firm size, years of education and union
29If the sample is restricted to workers whose complete career is known, the return to R&D
experience from previous employers appears to be above the return to R&D experience from the
current employer for workers with higher education, while both coefficients become insignificant for
workers with secondary education. For these workers the coefficient on previous R&D experience
even has a negative sign.
30In addition to trying out different specifications within the sample of workers with technical
education, I have also run the basic regressions on workers with non-technical education. The effect
of R&D experience on workers with non-technical secondary and higher education resembles the
effect on workers with technical education in that they seem to have a steeper experience-earnings
profile if working in R&D-intensive firms. The results are fairly strong for workers with secondary
non-technical education, but less evident for workers with higher non-technical education. It is not
clear why these workers should be affected by the R&D-intensity of their employers, but several
explanations are possible. First, many workers with a general secondary degree are in fact produc-
tion workers, and hence quite comparable to those with secondary technical education included in
the main sample. Second, R&D intensive firms may be advanced along many dimensions, and offer
valuable work experience also to the non-technical staff. Third, R&D intensive firms also appear
. to be intensive in formal training. In years where the dataset includes measures of both R&D
investments and formal training, these measures are significantly, positively correlated. Fourth, it
is possible that not only the technical staff, but also administrative managers in R&D intensive
firms have access to sensitive technological information. Then the Pakes and Nitzan (1983) model
applies to this group as well as to the technical employees, and it is in any case conceivable that
R&D intensive firms to a larger extent than other firms use stock options and similar compensa-
tion schemes for their managers, e.g. due to cash constraints. Finally, the Norwegian economy is
strongly unionized. Unions often demand similar earnings plans for all employees in a firm.
31The following measures are available: Average hours per week worked at the plant, number of
part time jobs and number of months unemployed.
32The union density is only available after 1990. In 1990 and before, I have used the 1991 value,
since union density as a firm characteristic is fairly stable over time.
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density in interaction with experience. Dividing the sample into different time peri-
ods, however, reveals that the effect of R&D on the wage-experience profile is more
pronounced in the 1980sthan in the 1990s. This may be related to the severe reces-
sion in the Norwegian economy starting in the late 1980s, causing a restructuring
of, and a decline in, some of the most innovative subindustries'". The decline in the
profitability of high-tech firms is likely to have affected both the returns to previ-
ously accumulated human capital and workers' willingness to pay for access to new
knowledge.
All regressions reported in Tables 1, 3 and 4 allow for correlated error terms
across observations of the same individual in different years. However, one could
also argue that error terms for workers belonging to the same firm may be correlated.
Allowing for such correlations when computing the standard error of the estimated
coefficients, reduce their significance, but the qualitative results are even robust to
including firm specific fixed effects in the regressions.
Rosen (1972) versus Pakes and Nitzan (1983) It has not been an objec-
tive of this paper to test the two theoretical models that motivated the empirical
specification against each other. It may, however, be worthwhile to reflect on the
conceptual differences between them.
Narrowly interpreted, as a two period model about information, Pakes and
Nitzan predict a wage discount when a scientist enter a research firm and a wage
rise thereafter, regardless of when in the career this happens. The wage profile is
driven by a rent which exists as long as the research results are not completely dif-
fused in the industry. In Rosen's model, on the other hand, a steeper wage profile
is associated with high-tech or research experience rather than research results.
Since the experience gained by working on a new technology may be of value
after the rent associated with the technology is competed away, the human capital
investments in Rosen's model is likely to depreciate more slowly than the 'intellec-
tual' human capital investments in Pakes and Nitzans' model. While young workers
thus have a stronger incentive to invest in ordinary human capital than old workers,
workers of different age may have more similar incentives with respect to investing
in access to research results. In principle, the two models could be tested against
each other based on this difference. However,when going beyond stylized versions of
the models, the effects of research experience and research rents are complementary
rather than alternative explanations for finding a steeper wage profile in research
firms. Clearly, doing research has a training element in addition to giving workers
33Cf. Klette and Møen (1999).
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insight in particular research results, and given that R&D is a cumulative process
where detailed knowledge about the current technology is an important input in the
development of the new technology, it is highly unlikely that an old worker will get
a 'high-tech' job without being on a high-tech career track already. Taking account
of this cumulative aspect of R&D, and thinking in terms of a 'multi period' Pakes
and Nitzan model, a worker who continuously invests part of his or her wage in rel-
atively short term R&D projects is likely to have a steadily increasing wage profile
over the whole career". This is because R&D investments on average should have
a higher return than financial savings due to the higher risk, and because workers
may become exposed to more and more valuable research results as they gain general
research experience.
Rather than testing the models of Rosen (1972) and Pakes and Nitzan (1983)
against each other, it seems natural to ask about the relative importance of research
rents versus research experience. A rough decomposition of the difference in ob-
served wages between firms with high and low R&D intensity can be based on the
assumption that early in the career an estimated effect of R&D on wages will reflect
both ordinary human capital and intellectual human capital investments, while late
in the career a wage discount and subsequent wage growth associated with R&D
would primarily reflect intellectual human capital investments. Hence, the effect of
current R&D should not go to zero or become insignificant late in the career as they
seem to do in Tables 2 and 3. There should be a positive effect on wage growth and
a negative effect on the wage level although significantly smaller than the effects
earlier in the career".
Based on this reasoning, it may seem like the estimated coefficientsin my analysis
are driven mostly by the long term value of high-tech experience, Le. accumulation
of ordinary human capital as modelled by Rosen. Given the broad categories of
technical personnel used and the weak identification of the separate 'Pakes-Nitzan
effect', this is perhaps not very surprising. Identifying a separate effect of research
rents is probably more difficult than estimating the training effect of high-tech ex-
perience. First, measurement errors present in the R&D data bias the coefficients
towards zero, and the collinearity of current and previous R&D add to the difficulty
of identifying a possible small effect of current R&D late in the career. Second, the
importance of intellectual human capital or research rents for wages vary between
workers according to how close they are to the innovative core of the firm. In order
34Changes in R&D intensity within a research career will, however, reduce the smoothness of
such a wage-profile.
35Estimating a separate 'Pakes-Nitzan effect' based on workers who moved between firms with
different R&D-intensities does not succeed either. cf. the bottom part of Table 2.
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to identify how involved each worker is in the actual research process, occupational
data is necessary. Such data is not available, and R&D-intensity, even if measured
correctly, will be an imprecise measure of the amount of research done by individual
workers within firms. R&D-intensity may, on the other hand, be a fairly precise
proxy for firms' technology level, and hence perform reasonably well as a measure
of training in the Rosen (1972) sense. In order to make a separate evaluation of the
Pakes and Nitzan model, I believe detailed survey data on wage contracts for key
scientists is necessary. Gathering and analyzing such data are left for future work.
The significant finding in this study, is that workers seem willing to do intertemporal
wage trade-offs that can internalize potential R&D spillovers.
A comparison with the training literature It may be worthwhile to compare
the overall results of my analysis to similar analyses of 'on-the-job training'. Al-
though this paper, as far as I know, is the first to look at the effect of R&D on wages,
there exists a large literature on the effect of formal training. In this literature, a
number of authors have found training to be correlated with wage growth, but find-
ing support for a negative effect on starting wages such as human capital theory
predicts, is unusual, cf. e.g. Barron, Black and Loewenstein (1989), Lynch (1992)
or Barron, Berger and Black (1999)36. Common interpretations are that workers
do not pay for general training, or that the implicit price is masked by a positive
ability bias. In this perspective, the strong negative effect of R&D on starting wages
present in this sample, is remarkable. It suggests that firms' technology levels are
more important to wages than formal on-the-job training. One explanation for this
could be that while most formal training is short term, working in a technologically
challenging environment affects human capital accumulation for the entire duration
of a job.
5 R&D investments and labor mobility.
At first sight, Rosen (1972) and Pakes and Nitzan (1983) seem to have specific
predictions not only with respect to wage profiles, but also with respect to mobility
patterns. A main prediction of Rosen's model is that workers consistently move to
jobs with less learning opportunities. In my context, that may imply that workers
move from more to less R&D intensive firms, but as pointed out by Rosen himself,
360ne exception is Autor (2000). Studying temporary help firms, he finds that "[wJages are
lower at firms offering training by a modest, but statistically significant magnitude". Lynch (1992)
find a negative effect of uncompleted training for workers with less than high school education, but
not for workers with a high school degree or some college education.
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there is heterogeneity with respect to the learning content of jobs not only across,
but also within firms. Hence, a clear prediction cannot be deduced.
Pakes and Nitzan (1983) predict that R&D firms are able to avoid turnover, and
thereby spillovers, by sharing the monopoly rent at stake with the workers. In the
presence of spin-off innovations or sources of spillovers other than labor mobility,
however, they show that mobility actually can be a way of appropriating returns.
The model, therefore, like Rosen's, fails to give clear predictions with respect to
worker mobility between firms. Furthermore, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) do not con-
sider firm specific knowledge. If firms with different levels of R&D intensities differ
with respect to firm specific human capital, this will also influence the relationship
between turnover and R&D investments'".
In lack of strong predictions, empirical mobility patterns cannot be used directly
to test the theories. A descriptive analysis of mobility patterns still has interest,
however, as it will give insight into the outcome of the different forces at play.
The extent to which technically educated workers change employers also illuminate
how important labor mobility may be as a source of knowledge diffusion and hence
indicate the size of the potential externalities involved.
R&D investments and worker flows Based on Rosen's model, despite the lack
of a clear prediction, one would expect a tendency for workers to move from more
to less R&D intensive firms as a way of reducing their learning in accordance with
an optimal human capital investment plan. To investigate this I have calculated a
transition matrix of job changes for technical employees between plants with known
R&D intensities. The matrix is reported in Table 5. The most striking result is
that workers tend to move between firms with similar levels of R&D intensity. 65.5
percent of workers leaving a firm that does not conduct R&D (within the plant 's line
of business) move to another firm that does not conduct R&D, even though jobs in
such firms account only for 34.6 percent of all jobs. 64.0 percent of workers leaving a
firm with R&D intensity above 0.2 move to another firm with R&D intensity above
0.2, although such firms only account for 5.9 percent of all jobs. The pattern is the
same for workers leaving firms with intermediate levels of R&D intensity.
One explanation for the observed stability in R&D intensity across jobs may
be that there is some specificity associated with a given technology level within
37In the training literature. the effect of training on turnover propensities has been used to assess
whether the human capital built up is general or firm specific, cf. e.g. Loewenstein and Spletzer
(1999) and Parent (1999). For a theoretical model of knowledge diffusion with partly firm specific
human capital, see Fosfuri, Motta and Rønde (2001) who analyse a firm's decision to invest in
production facilities abroad.
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the industry. As workers growolder, they will then prefer jobs with less learning,
within firms at the same level of R&D intensity as those they have previously worked
for. Another explanation may be that workers have preference for work at a given
technology level38.
R&D investments and labor turnover As explained above, Pakes and Nitzan
(1983) investigate the relationship between R&D and labor turnover theoretically
without reaching a firm conclusion. Table 6 reports labor turnover for technical em-
ployees in firms with different levels of R&D intensity in my sample. The turnover
rate is about 20 percent, and does not seem to vary much across firms with different
levels of R&D intensity. What seems most relevant to explore, however, is how R&D
investments affect 'churning', Le. hires and quits over and above the level necessary
to accomplish changes in the number of employees. Excess turnover, a measure of
churning'", lies between 5 and 10 percent and seems to decrease with R&D intensity
both for workers with secondary technical education and for workers with higher
technical or scientific education. A descriptive analysis of excess turnover is not suf-
ficient, however, as a closer inspection of the data reveal that there are significant
differences between firms having different levels of R&D intensity, with respect to
other characteristics known to influence turnover such as workers' experience. In or-
der to isolate the effect of R&D on excess turnover, therefore, a regression framework
is called for.
Table 7 reports regression results for both a tobit and a maximum likelihood
38The work of Almeida and Kogut (1999), Stern (1999) and others suggests that scientists and
technical personnel have preferences regarding the technological environment that they work in.
39Cf. Burgess, Lane and Stevens (1996) and Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999). The excess turnover
rate is half the churning rate. I have calculated the excess turnover rate as separations out of jobs
that continue, divided by the number of continuing jobs.
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grouped logit estimator". The estimated relationship is
excess turnover it = j(R&D-int. * D'": =, R&D-int. * Dhigher edu., X) (5)
The unit of observation is educational groups within plants. Control variables, X,
include a quadratic in the educational group number of workers, a quadratic in their
average experience, a quadratic in plant age and year dumrnies'".
In the tobit regression I have followed Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) byexcluding
small units, limiting the sample to educational groups that consist of at least five
workers, cf. footnote 40. Both the tobit and the grouped logit specification show that
excess turnover is lower in R&D intensive firms. The effect is, however, particularly
evident for workers with secondary technical education. One possible explanation is
that human capital accumulated by workers with secondary technical education is
more firm specific than human capital accumulated by workers with higher technical
or scientific education. It may also indicate that the mechanisms related to spin-
off innovations and other spillover channels, modelled in Pakes and Nitzan (1983),
are relevant in the industries investigated. Workers with higher education would
probably be most affected by these mechanisms which increase turnover.
The results in Table 7 is consistent with other findings in the empirical liter-
ature. Pacelli, Rapiti and Revelli (1998) who estimate the probability of worker
firm separations in Italy, find that "more innovative firms cultivate more durable
employer-employee relationships", and Greenhalgh and Mavrotas (1996) analyzing
40Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) estimate the effect of employers' wage policies on excess turnover,
and treat the excess turnover rate as a characteristic of the firm. This leads them to use a tobit
estimator. Within such a framework, the observed excess turnover rate must be considered an
estimate of a target rate implicit in the firms' personnel policy, and Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999)
think in terms of a latent variable censored from below at zero. (One might add to this that
the excess turnover rate is also censored from above at one.) As an estimate for the target rate,
however, the observed rate is heteroscedastic with a variance proportional to the inverse of the
number of employees. Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) do not explicitly discuss this, but alleviate the
problem by limiting the analysis to large firms. Grouped logit eliminates this heteroscedasticity
problem. Thinking of the data in this way also changes the perspective from the firm unilaterally
deciding an excess turnover rate to individual employer-employee relationships which mayor may
not continue, depending on both firm and worker characteristics. I find this to be a preferable
perspective, as individual employer-employee relationships is the true unit of observation, and it
makes sense conceptually to divide observed quits into two groups, those who are replaced, and
those who are not replaced. The first type of quits constitute excess turnover while the second
type of quits are due to job destruction. Ifwe knew which of the workers who separate that belong
to which group, we would no doubt use logit or probit. When we only know the proportion of
workers belonging to each group, we can apply grouped logit or probit, cf. Greene (1997, chapter
19.4.3).
41A complete list is given in the subtext to Table 7.
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the British labor market, find that sectoral R&D is negatively correlated with mobil-
ity. They attribute this only to the presence of firm specifichuman capital, however,
claiming that "the skills acquired [inR&D intensive sectors] are rather more specific
than average".
6 Concluding remarks
Labor mobility is often considered to be an important source of knowledge exter-
nalities, making it difficult for firms to appropriate returns to R&D investments.
Pakes and Nitzan (1983), however, analyze the problem formally, and find that la-
bor turnover should not be a problem for R&D firms. Both scientists and firms
are aware of the fact that working on a research project gives access to valuable
information. Once such information is disclosed or developed, scientists, if they
are to stay with the firm, will have to receive a wage increase reflecting their new
market value. Thus, scientists expect that accepting a research position implies a
future wage increase, and consequently they can accept an initial wage below their
alternative wage, without experiencing a welfare loss.
Research firms are likely to use the most up-to date technology and frequently
change their products and production processes. Because of this, one would think
that even workers who don't have direct access to the results of the R&D projects,
learn more in these firms. Rosen (1972) provides a model where different firms offer
different opportunities for on-the-job learning, and derive implications with respect
to wages that resemble those of Pakes and Nitzan (1983). Rosen thinks of jobs
as tied packages of work and learning. Workers sell the services of their skills and
simultaneously purchase an opportunity to augment those skills.
I have argued in this paper that inter-firm transfers of R&D-results embodied in
people, should be analyzed within a human capital framework similar to the models
of Rosen (1972) and Pakes and Nitzan (1983). Testing such a framework using
matched employer-employee data from the Norwegian machinery and equipment
industries, I find that the technical staff in R&D-intensive firms indeed pays for
the knowledge they accumulate on the job through lower wages in the beginning of
their career. Later in the career they earn a return on these implicit investments
through higher wages. These results appear despite the existence of several biases
against finding different experience-earnings profiles in R&D intensive and non-
R&D-intensive firms. This suggests that potential externalities associated with labor
mobility out of research firms, at least to some extent, are internalized in the labor
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marketv'.
An alternative explanation for the steeper experience-earnings profile in R&D
intensive firms has been suggested to me. Inspired by e.g. Freeman (1977) one may
imagine that workers and firms are uncertain about the workers' ability=', and that
high ability workers have higher productivity in research firms than in firms using
well known technologies demanding less problem solving'". All workers are in this
case willing to accept a lowerwage in R&D firms because the expected wage growth,
is higher. As information about ability is revealed, ex post high ability workers in
research firms perform well while others, ex post low ability workers, exit having
lost in the 'lottery'45. Such a model, which does not involve any kind of human
capital accumulation, is consistent with the results in Tables 1 and 2, but not with
the results in Table 3 where previous R&D experience is introduced in addition
to current R&D. In a model like the one sketched above, current R&D should be
associated with a wage premium as soon as the firm and the worker have learned
about the worker's ability and be stable thereafter, while previous R&D experience
should not affect wages. This is not the case.
An important question that this analysis has not addressed is whether workers
pay for the full value of the knowledge they accumulate in R&D intensive firms. The
conceptual distinction between knowledge diffusion and true externalities motivated
my analysis, but identifying possible true externalities is challenging. Building on
previous methodologies such as Jaffe (1986) one could construct a spillover pool for
each firm based on R&D conducted in other firms which the firm in question has
recruited from. This measure could be inserted in a knowledge production function.
The problem is that it is not possible to know whether the coefficient on such a
spillover pool represents an externality or whether the knowledge is 'bought' in the
labor market. Inserting the spillover pool in a profit function will not solve the
problem, either. In equilibrium, labor mobility should affect the profit of all firms,
42The only related finding I know of in the literature is Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998) who
in an academic setting, claim that "competitive university salaries are lower, other things equal,
in areas where faculty expect the possibility of receiving substantial outside income or wealth as a
result of skills developed doing research at the university."
43Freeman's point of departure is that "[nlot all prospective research workers prove equallyadept.
Moreover. no individual can be certain in advance just how well he will do. As time passes, his
capabilities become clearer to himself as well as to his employer."
44An alternative formulation is that there is uncertainty about the quality of the match, cf. e.g.
Jovanovic (1979), and that match quality is more important in research firms than in other firms
with more 'routine jobs'.
45Freeman (1977) focuses on risk averse workers' demand for a wage contract with insurance, but
it follows from his model that if workers are not completly risk averse they will accept a beginning
wage below their alternative wage in order to participate in the implicit 'lottery'.
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and only by comparing different equilibria with exogenous variation in the degree
of labor mobility, could an effect of mobility-induced externalities be identified.
This is obviously difficult. I believe the best way to proceed is to model explicit
mechanisms that might cause externalities, and derive testable implication from
such specific models. Case studies of firms that have lost or hired workers with
strategic knowledgewould also be valuable.
From a theoretical point of view it is conceivable that labor mobility does cre-
ate some externalities. If firms have limited ability to commit themselves to share
future profits with their employees, or if several workers have access to exactly the
same research results, this may undermine the 'joint profit' effect underlying op-
timal R&D investments in Pakes and Nitzans' model'". Furthermore, information
asymmetries and other barriers to mobility may enhance the firms ability to appro-
priate rents, while at the same time reduce workers' incentives to pay for knowledge
accumulation''". Mechanisms which induce employers to pay for general human cap-
ital accumulation create a positive externality to the worker's future employer if
the worker decides to quit or if the firm goes out of business. A complete welfare
analysis must also incorporate that, even if workers pay for all the knowledge they
accumulate, this 'solution' to the spilloverproblem does not guarantee optimal R&D
investments. If workers co-finance R&D through lower wages, and if the value of
the knowledge they accumulate depend on the outcome of the R&D project, they
become exposed to the risk associated with the project. Risk aversion among work-
ers may then become a new source of distortion since human capital investments
cannot be diversified'": Liquidity constraints making workers unwilling to trade off
current wage for future wage on a large scale, may also create problems'".
46Cf. footnote 9 and 10.
47Cf. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) although these authors do not write with reference to R&D
investments. A particularly important kind of imperfection may be distortions in the wage structure
which makes a wedge between wages and marginal productivity increase with the workers' human
capital. Firms then have an incentive to invest in R&D producing general human capital because
they get a share of the return. A simple mechanism which could cause such wage compression, is
that firms receive a fraction of the productivity of the workers as profit due to matching, search
costs or other sorts of labor market friction. If the employer receives a fraction of the workers'
productivity, the employers level of profit will increase with the workers' productivity and therefore
with their human capital. Another possible mechanism is complementarity between firm specific
and general human capital. In this case, the alternative wage for the scientist will increase less
than his or her productivity as he or she receives training.
48Cf. footnote 8.
49Cf. Fosfuri et al. (2001) for a model emphasizing this in a developing country context.
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Appendix on data issues
Information about individual workers comes from a number of governmental admin-
istrative records, which are prepared by Statistics Norway for research use. Barth
and Dale-Olsen (1999), appendix 2, give some details on the various registers in-
cluded in the data base. I have taken great care to improve the data quality by
checking for consistency across years and across related variables for the same in-
dividual. Missing values are imputed where possible. The available registers cover
the years 1986 to 1995.
Plant level information about employers comes from the annual manufacturing
census of Statistics Norway''". Microdata are available from 197251. Information
about R&D at the line of business level within firms are collected from R&D sur-
veys and other surveys of immaterial investments and innovation. Prior to 1991 the
R&D surveys were conducted by the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research. Thereafter the surveys have been conducted by statistics Nor-
way52. Microdata is available for 1970, biannually 1975-81, annually 1981-85 and
biannually 1985-95. The 1970 survey has been linked to the 1972 manufacturing
census. In the machinery and equipment industries utilized in this study, the R&D
surveys have close to full coverage for firms with more than 20 employees. For years
and firms not covered by the R&D surveys, three other data sets has been utilized.
A survey of immaterial investments was conducted by Statistics Norway in 1988,
covering the years 1986-88, and in 1990 covering the years 1988-9053.Furthermore,
an innovation survey was conducted by statistics Norway in1993 for the year 199254.
I have used the followingprocedure when constructing the R&D database: First,
I have linked the R&D surveys to the manufacturing census. Next, for firms and
50The census is documented in the series Manufacturing statistics, Official Statistics of Norway,
Statistics Norway, Oslo.
51The microdata are documented in a mimeo from 1991 by Halvorsen, Jensen and Foyn in
Statistics Norway.
52The R&D surveys are documented in the series FoU-statistikk Forsknings- og utviklingsar-
beid Utgifter og personale (1970-1991 by Forskningsrådenes samarbeidsutvalg and Norges Forskn-
ingsråd); FoU-statistikk og indikatorer (1995 by Utredningsinstituttet for forskning og høyere ut-
dannelse); and Det norske forskningssystemet - statistikk og indikatorer (1997 by Norges forskn-
ingsråd). More details are given in the series FoU virksomhet Utgifter og personale i næringene
industri, berquerksdrift og anleggsvirksomhet, by NTNF and in Report 96/14 from Statistics Norway
by Skorge, Foyn and Frengen. All publications have summaries in English.
53These surveys are documented by Frenger in Interne notater 90/11 and Notater 93/14 from
Statistics Norway.
54This survey is documented in the reports 95/7 and 95/26 from Statistics Norway by Frengen,
Foyn and Ragnarsøn. Report 95/26 is in English.
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years not included in the R&D surveys I have used R&D information from the
surveys of immaterial investments, and from the innovation survey. For firms and
years were R&D information is still missing, I have used survey information about
planned R&D one and two years ahead, and information about previous R&D. In
the final stage, missing R&D variables were imputed by linear interpolation, and
by extrapolating the first observed R&D intensity backwards in time and the last
observed R&D intensity forward in time, firm by firm. Firms' R&D investments
are known to be stable over time. Imputing missing information when possible,
therefore, seems preferable to deleting the observations. 80 percent of the worker-
year R&D variables are from surveys, 5 percent are imputed by interpolation and 15
percent are imputed by extrapolation. 65 percent of the imputed R&D intensities
are zero.
Even though the data set is rich, I do not have complete information about the
workers' careers. First, the individual records start in 1986. Second, despite my
effort to collect R&D information as described above, small firms are not necessarily
covered. Third, the match between the different data sources is not perfect. Due
to the second and third problem, R&D information is missing for approximately 20
percent of the worker-year observations. On the positive side, however, I can extract
some information about workers' careers prior to 1986, the first year included in the
matched data set. I knowwhen the workers started the job they held in 198655, and
this can be combined with information about the employers' R&D investments, in
some cases dating as far back as 1970.
Earnings is measured as taxable labor income. I have often referred to this as
the workers' wage. Experience is measured as real work experience for the youngest
cohorts, years since graduation for older cohorts, and potential work experience
for cohorts graduating before November 1970. Potential work experience is age
minus schooling minus seven. Real work experience is measured as years since
graduation adjusted for pre graduation work experience, part time employment and
unemployment within the sample years 1986-1995. Both experience and tenure are
measured in years (with decimals) completed at the beginning of the calendar year.
Dummy variables for experience are based on the integer of experience.
In the mobility analysis, all observations with complete information are used.
In the wage regressions observations with unreliable earnings measures have been
excluded. Information about trimming procedures is given in Table AI. Trimming
based on earnings reduces the sample by 8 percent. Tables A2-A6 describe the
55Note, however, that for 16 percent of the observations, the starting date is censored at April
30th 1978. I have used a dummy variable to resolve this problem in regressions where tenure is
included.
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sample and the main variables.
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Figure 1. Estimated earnings-experience profiles
Workers with higher technical or scientific education
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The graphs are based on regressions similar to those in Table 4, column (I) and (3) except that experience dummies
interacted with R&D intensity is exchanged with a quartic in experience interacted with a quadratic in R&D intensity. R&D
intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. The sample
consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full time in the machinery and equipment industry in
Norway 1986-1995. The graphs for workers with higher education are based on 15 years of education and a firm with 100
employees. The graphs for workers with secondary education are based on 12 years of education and a firm with 100
employees. Business cycle conditions are assumed to be like 1995.
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Table 1. The effect of R&D on the experience-earnings profile
(I) (2) (3) (4)
Secondary technical Higher technical or scientific
education education
R&D
* less than one year experience -.207*** -.055** -.132*** -.061**'"
(.049) (.024) (.044) (.014)
* 1-2 year experience -.297*** -.048** -.097*** -.044***
(.052) (.019) (.025) (.009)
* 3-5 year experience -.163*** -.029*** -.049** -.025***
(.032) (.0 Il) (.021) (.007)
* 6-10 year experience -.169*** -.025*** -.012 -.018***
(.026) (.009) (.022) (.007)
* 11-15 year experience -.083*** .001 .008 -.009
(.032) (.010) (.026) (.009)
* 16-20 year experience -.065* .023** .025 .001
(.035) (.0 Il) (.032) (.009)
* 21-35 year experience .088*** .045*** .101*** .031***
(.029) (.009) (.029) (.009)
* more than 35 year experience .222*** .086*** .229*** .068***
(.048) (.016) (.055) (.019)
R&Dmeasure Intensity dummy intensity dummy
Sample size 244657 207776 71372 50216
R-squared .20 .20 .28 .26
The dependent variable is In (real annual earnings). Control variables included in the regression, but not reported are seven
experience dummies, years of schooling, a quadratic in plant number of employees and year dummies. The coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within
individuals, are given in parentheses. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of
business level within firms. The R&D dummy is one if the R&D intensity is above 0.2. Observations with R&D-intensity
between 0.05 and 0.2 are excluded from the regressions in column (2) and (4). The sample consists of men with technical or
scientific education employed full time in the machinery and equipment industry in Norway 1986-1995.
*** Significant at the l% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 2. The effect of R&D on biannual earnings growth
Secondary technical
education
Higher technical or
scientific education
Stays with same employer from year (-2 to year (
* 2 year experience * R&D-intensity
* 3-5 year experience * R&D-intensity
-.203**
(.082)
.017***
(.027)
.079***
(.016)
.101 ***
(.016)
.093***
(.018)
.063***
(.011 )
.047**
(.022)
.021
(.040)
.065***
(.017)
.048***
(.012)
.039***
(.014)
.049***
(.015)
.007
(.011)
.008
(.021)
* 6-10 year experience * R&D-intensity
* 11-15 year experience * R&D-intensity
* 16-20 year experience * R&D-intensity
* 21-35 year experience * R&D-intensity
* above 35 year experience * R&D-intensity
Separates in year t-I
* 2-10 year experience * .:\R&D-intensity
* 11-20 year experience * ~R&D-intensity
-.232***
(.057)
.044
(.045)
-.076*
(.045)
.097***
(.037)
.037
(.033)
-.021
(.040)
* above 21 year experience * .:\R&D-intensity
Sample size
R-squared
139108
.09
42466
.13
The dependent variable is the first difference of In (real annual earnings) between year I and year (-2. Control variables
included in the regression, but not reported are cash flow before wage payments per employee, seven experience dummies.
a dummy for being a separator in year (-linteracted with dummies for the three levels of experience used for separators. a
quadratic in the change in plant size measured by number of employees and year dummies. The coefficients are estimated
using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are given in parentheses. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per
employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. R&D intensity for stayers is the average over year I, 1-/, and
1-2. The sample consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full time in the machinery and equipment
industry in Norway 1986-1995.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 3. The effect of current R&D and previous R&D experience on earnings
(3) (4)(1) (2)
Higher technical or scientific
education
Secondary technical
education
Current R&D-intensity
* less than one year experience -.134***
(.044)
-.131***
(.030)
-.058**
(.023)
.010
(.023)
.014
(.027)
.031
(.034)
.094***
(.030)
.222***
(.056)
-.130***
(.044)
-.266***
(.038)
-.123***
(.027)
-.097***
(.0.25)
-.062**
(.069)
-.022
(.038)
.039
(.032)
.265***
(.062)
-.204***
(.050)
-.314***
(.062)
-.190***
(.031)
-.177***
(.028)
-.080**
(.032)
-.069*
(.036)
.089***
(.029)
.234***
(.048)
-.204***
(.050)
-.342***
(.073)
-.233***
(.039)
-.208***
(.032)
-.084**
(-.037)
-.079*
(.041)
.038
(.030)
.285***
(.053)
* 1-2 year experience
* 3-5 year experience
* 6-10 year experience
* 11-15 year experience
* 16-20 year experience
* 21-35 year experience
* more than 35 year experience
Average R&D-intensity over previous career
* 1-2 year experience .261 ***
(.051)
.142***
(.038)
.186***
(.036)
.167***
(.038)
.134***
(.052)
.165***
(.053)
-0.149
(.103)
.055
(.093)
.094
(.057)
.070
(.055)
.010
(.062)
.028
(.059)
.171 ***
(.060)
-.158**
(.072)
* 3-5 year experience
* 6-10 year experience
* 11-15 year experience
* 16-20 year experience
* 21-35 year experience
* more than 35 year experience
Sample size
R-squared
227418
.19
227418
.19
65422
.28
65422
.28
The dependent variable is In (real annual earnings). Control variables included in the regression, but not reported, are seven
experience dummies, years of schooling, a quadratic in plant number of employees and year dummies. The coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within
individuals, are given in parentheses. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of
business level within firms. The sample consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full time in the
machinery and equipment industry in Norway 1986-1995. Workers, for whom no R&D information from previous years is
available, have been excluded.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 4. The effect of current R&D, R&D experience from the current employer and R&D
experience from previous employers
(4)(3)(1) (2)
Higher technical or scientific
education
Secondary technical
education
-.157***
(.052)
.008
(.007)
-.0001
(.0002)
-.480***
(.063)
.038***
(.008)
-.001***
(.0002)
-.104***
(.034)
.003
(.002)
-.316***
(.042)
.017***
(.002)
current R&D intensity
* experience
* experience 2
mean R&D intensity in previous years with current
employer
* tenure .089***
(.014)
-.008***
(.002)
.028***
(.008)
.124***
(.018)
-.014***
(.002)
.032***
(.007)
* tenure 2
mean R&D intensity in years with previous employer(s)
* (experience - tenure) .013**
(.006)
-.0004
(.0003)
.008**
(.003)
.005
(.008)
.0001
(.0003)
.005**
(.002)
* (experience - tenure) 2
Sample size
R-squared
62243
.23
62243
.24
17675
.33
17675
.33
The dependent variable is In (real annual earnings). Control variables included in the regression, but not reported, are years
of schooling, a quadratic in plant number of employees, a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for having
changed employer at least once, year dummies and a dummy variable for job relationships whose starting date is censored at
April 30th 1978 together with its interactions with all tenure variables. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least
squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedastisity and correlated error terms within individuals, are given in
parentheses. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within
firms. Mean R&D intensity is calculated over the years where information about the R&D intensity is available. The sample
consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full time in the machinery and equipment industry in
Norway 1986-1995. Workers in firms where R&D information is not available in the sample year and in at least one prior
year, and workers who have had previous employment without R&D intensity being known in at least one year, have been
excluded.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 5. Worker mobility between plants with known R&D intensity
with with with with Total
noR&D R&D- R&D- R&D- number
intensity intensity intensity ofsepa-
E (0,.05] E (.05,.2] >.2 rations
left a non R&D-plant and joined a plant 65.5 27.3 5.7 1.5 3 168
left a plant with R&D-intensity E (0,.05] andjoined a plant 27.8 61.1 8.9 2.2 3330
left a plant with R&D-intensity E (.05,.2] andjoined a plant 11.9 42.6 40.4 5.1 2841
left a plant with R&D-intensity >.2 and joined a plant 12.9 9.3 13.9 64.0 497
percentage of jobs in plants 34.6 42.3 17.2 5.9
The numbers are percentage shares of total separations from each category of plants and sum to 100 horizontally. The
sample consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full time in the machinery and equipment industry
in Norway 1986-1995 at a plant where the R&D-intensity is known. Transitions out of the sample have been excluded.
R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms.
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Table 6. Labor turnover by education and R&D intensity
Turnover Excess Numberof
rate turnover job-year
rate observations
Secondary technically educated in a plant
withno R&D .194 .095 110 091
with R&D-intensity E (O, .05] .210 .091 84886
with R&D-intensity E (.05, .2] .211 .072 37280
with R&D-intensity >0.2 .208 .059 7246
Higher technically or scientifically educated in a plant
withno R&D .191 .074 14806
with R&D-intensity E (O, .05] .210 .075 20444
with R&D-intensity E (.05, .2] .211 .071 20782
with R&D-intensity >0.2 .216 .065 Il 838
The turnover rate is separations in year t as a share of employment in year t. The excess turnover rate is separations out of
jobs that continue as a share of continuing jobs. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-
digit line of business level within firms. The sample consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full
time in the machinery and equipment industry in Norway 1986-1995.
Table 7. The effect of R&D intensity on excess turnover
R&D-intensity
* secondary technical education
* higher technical or scientific education
-.119***
(.030)
-.042
(.030)
-2.041 ***
(.416)
-.721 *
(.376)
Estimator
Sample size
Pseudo R-squared
Tobit
6904
.42
Grouped logit
266173
.01
The dependent variable is the excess turnover rate within plant educational groups. The excess turnover rate is separations
out of jobs that continue as a share of continuing jobs. Control variables included in the regressions, but not reported are a
dummy for higher technical or scientific education, plant job destruction rate, plant job creation rate, a quadratic in the
educational group number of workers, a quadratic in their average experience, a quadratic in plant age and year dummies.
The sample sizes in the tobit regressions refer to the number of within plant educational groups. Educational groups with
less than five workers have been excluded from the tobit regressions due to the turnover estimates being uncertain when
based on few workers. The sample sizes in the grouped logit regressions refer to the number of workers. Standard errors are
given in parentheses. In the grouped logit regressions, the standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedastisity and correlated
error terms within plants. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business
level within firms. The sample consists of men with technical or scientific education employed full time in the machinery
and equipment industry in Norway 1986-1995.
*** Significant at the l% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table AI. Sample size and trimming procedures
Total number of observations in the machinery and equipment industries 1986-1995 810 559
+Women
- Part time workers
- Workers with unknown education
- Workers with primary education
- Workers with secondary or higher non-technicaJlnon-scientific education
Total number of observations offull time working male technical staff
125 III
Il 314
8968
141 216
94325
429625
- Workers in firms that cannot be matched to the time series files of the manufacturing statistics
- Workers in firms where R&D information is not available
Total number of observations of full time working male technical staff in the matched sample
39527
46744
343354
- Workers not working for the whole year because they are entering the labor force
- Workers not working for the whole year because they are leaving the labor force
- Workers with secondary technical education and earnings below NOK 75.000 (1995 value)
- Workers with higher technical or scientific education and earnings below NOK 150.000 (1995 value)
9982
14044
2723
566
Main sample (trimmed) 316029
Each entry refers to the number of observations deleted among the observations left after the deletions in the rows above
have been conducted. Workers with secondary technical education and earnings below NOK 75.000 (1995 value), and
workers with higher technical or scientific education and earnings below NOK 150.000 (1995 value) have been excluded
because such low earnings suggest that they have not worked full time for an entire year. Tables 5-7 are based on all
observations of full time working male technical staff in the matched sample, whereas the wage regressions in Tables 1-4
are based on the trimmed 'main sample'.
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Table A2. Observations in main sample by year and education
Numberof Secondary technical Higher technical or
workers education scientific education
1986 29256 75.0% 25.0%
1987 30329 75.8% 24.2%
1988 29450 76.0% 24.0%
1989 29952 76.2% 23.8%
1990 31576 77.1 % 22.9%
1991 31482 79.6% 20.4%
1992 33857 79.2% 20.8%
1993 33261 78.8% 21.2 %
1994 35315 78.3 % 21.7 %
1995 31551 77.4% 22.6%
Observations 316029 77.4% 22.6%
Table A3. Observations in the main sample by experience and R&D intensity
Observations NoR&D R&D-intensity R&D-intensity R&D-intensity
E (0,.05] E (.05,.2] >.2
Less than one year experience 7017 36.6% 42.9% 16.5 % 4.0%
1-2 year experience 18446 36.8% 40.3 % 16.9% 6.0%
3-5 year experience 36167 37.7% 37.7% 17.6% 7.0%
6-10 year experience 57802 42.1 % 32.8% 17.5 % 7.5 %
11-15 year experience 44545 41.0% 32.3 % 19.3 % 7.4%
16-20 year experience 37563 42.9% 32.0% 18.6% 6.4%
21-35 year experience 86846 40.6% 33.9% 19.3 % 6.2%
More than 35 year experience 27643 41.4% 35.7 % 17.8 % 5.1 %
316029 40.6% 34.4% 18.4% 6.6%
R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms.
124
Table A4. Worker characteristics by education
Secondary technical Higher technical or
education scientific education
Years of education
mean 1l.2 14.5
st.dev. (.9) (1.7)
lOthpercentile 10.0 13.0
90thpercentile 12.0 17.0
Years of experience
mean 16.8 17.4
st.dev. (1l.9) ( 1l.6)
lOthpercentile 3 3
90thpercentile 34 35
Years of tenure!
mean 6.3 6.0
st.dev. (5.6) (5.1)
lOthpercentile .9 .9
90th percentile 13.2 12.5
Wage in 1995 NOK
mean 245400 353500
st.dev. (71 000) (125900)
10thpercentile 176500 240200
90thpercentile 336100 479700
Union membership
share 44% 27%
Working at R&D performing plant
share 54% 78%
R&D-intensity if at R&D performing plant
mean .057 .125
st.dev. (.085) (.134)
10thpercentile .002 .006
90thpercentile .152 .278
The numbers are based on all worker-year observations in the machinery and equipment industry included in the main
sample, cf. Table Al. An R&D plant is a plant belonging to a firm that conducts some R&D within the plant's three-digit
ISliC industry. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within
firms. Wage in 1995 NOK is rounded to the nearest 100.
~ 16 percent of the observations have the job starting date censored at April 30th 1978.
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Table A5. Plant characteristics by plant size
Number ofemployees· Less than 50 5Q-200 more than 20Q AIl plants
Number of employees
mean 18.3 96.2 483.3 83.3
st.dev. (12.9) (38.6) (347.7) (169.9)
IQthpercentile 4 54 221 6
9Qthpercentile 39 158 9Q6 185
Average experience of technical staff
mean 16.9 17.1 17.2 17.0
st.dev. (6.6) (4.4) (4.4) (5.9)
10'h percentile 9.3 12.0 12.2 10.2
9Q'h percentile 25.3 23.Q 22.5 24.1
Average tenure of technical staff
mean 5.7 6.0 6.1 5.8
st.dev. (3.3) (3.0) (3.3) (3.2)
10'h percentile 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.Q
90'h percentile IO.Q 9.8 10.7 IO.Q
Average education oftechnical staff
mean 11.7 11.7 12.Q 11.8
st.dev. n.:) (0.8) 1.0 (1.1)
10'h percentile 10.7 10.8 11.2 10.8
9Q'h percentile 13.0 12.9 13.4 13.0
Share ofwork force with higher technical or
scientific education
mean 10% 10% 13% 10%
st.dev. (16) (11) (12) (14)
10'h percentile O 1% 2% O
9Qthpercentile 32% 23% 31% 29%
R&D performing firm
share 34% 54% 63% 42%
R&D man-years per employee if R&D performing
firm
Mean .14 .Q7 .08 .10
st.dev. (.18) (.Q9) (.10) (.15)
IQ'hpercentile .QQ7 .QQ5 .003 .006
90'h percentile .39 .17 .21 .26
Capital per employee in 1995 NOK
Mean 805800 831 700 977 IDO 828900
st.dev. (I 137600) (682300) (746400) (995 100)
10'h percentile 245700 268300 233700 262 QOO
90'h percentile 1359600 1575200 1 838500 1 472 800
Union density among technical staff
Mean 23% 33% 41% 27%
st.dev. (36) (39) (43) (38)
Market share
Mean 2% 6% 19% 5%
st.dev. (8) (12) (25) (13)
Part of multi-plant firm
Share 37% 47% 64% 42%
Plants founded before 1972
Share 44% 64% 66% 52%
Number of plant-year observations 4728 2195 697 7620
The numbers are based on all plant-year observations in the machinery and equipment industries included in the main
sample, cf. Table AI. An R&D plant is a plant belonging to a firm that conducts some R&D within the plants three-digit
ISIC industry. R&D man-years per employee and R&D sales ratio are measured at the three-digit line of business level
within firms. Market share is measured at the five-digit line of business level for the firm that the plant belongs to. Capital
per employee is rounded to the nearest 100 .
• 16 percent of the underlying employee observations have the job starting date censored at April 30'h 1978.
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Table A6. Aggregate growth from 1986 to 1995 and R&D intensity by sub-industries
Number of Qlants Number of observations R&D
ISIC 1986 1995 ~ 1986 1995 ~ intensity
38210 Engines and turbines 9 11 2 939 856 -9% .03
38220 Agricultural machinery 52 33 -19 514 597 16% .04
38230 Metal and wood-working machinery 37 26 -Il 200 183 -9% .04
38241 Oil and gas well machinery and tools 92 104 12 4709 8270 76% .02
32249 Other industrial machinery 73 104 31 607 878 45% .06
38250 Computers and office machinery 50 28 -22 1052 334 -68% .26
38291 Household machinery Il 8 -3 95 92 -3 % .04
38292 Repair of machinery 709 458 -251 480 594 24% .11
38299 Other machinery 339 351 12 4132 3197 -23 % .09
38310 Electric motors and eq. for el. production 139 153 14 2428 2010 -17 % .07
38320 Radio, TV and communication apparatus 190 135 -55 3335 2858 -14 % .17
38330 Electrical household appliances 32 20 12 251 187 -25 % .12
38391 Insulated cables and wires 12 17 5 689 627 -9% .12
38399 Other electrical apparatus and equipment 124 100 -24 596 282 -53 % .04
38411 Building of ships 163 188 -25 3738 4350 16% .01
38412 Building ofboats 438 232 -206 535 400 -25 % .04
38413 Ship and boat engines and motors 36 29 -7 557 353 -37 % .04
38414 Components and fixtures for shipslboats 53 55 2 590 981 66% .02
38421 Railway and tramway equipment l l O 136 178 31 %
38422 Repair ofrailway and tramway eq. 18 8 -10 1258 1015 -19%
38430 Motor vehicles 174 80 -94 740 1207 63% .06
38440 Motor cycles and bicycles l 2 l 114 77 -32 %
38450 Aircraft 28 20 -8 1167 1173 1% .01
38490 Other transport equipment 6 12 6 Il 52 373 % .02
38510 Professional and scientific instruments 57 109 52 306 749 145% .11
38520 Photographic and optical goods 10 8 -2 77 51 -34% .22
382-385 All machinery and equipment industries 2854 2292 -562 25863 30698 19% .10
The number of plants is taken from the manufacturing census. The number of observations refers to the technical staff in the
main sample, cf. Table AI. The growth in the technical staff does not imply that there has been employment growth in these
industries, but is a result of old workers with primary education not included in the sample, gradually being replaced by
workers.with secondary education. R&D-intensity is the weighted average R&D man-years per employee, measured at the
three-digit line of business level within firms, for the plants in the sample over the years 1986-1995.
127
128
Chapter 5
129
130
Spin-offs and spillovers:
Tracing knowledge by following
employees across firms *
by
Jarle Møen 1:
ABSTRACT:
Most R&D projects fail from a commercial point of view, and technological shifts may
quickly turn even successful innovations into failure. It is, however, possible that projects
which fail commercially produce knowledge with some social value. Such knowledge is
likely to be embodied in workers or teams of workers, and in order to evaluate the social
returns to research, it is desirable to trace workers as they move across firms and industries.
In this paper I utilize a large matched employer-employee data set and test for the existence
of potential knowledge spillovers transmitted through the labor market. The specific case
analysed is a series of Norwegian IT-programs so far considered unsuccessful, but which
recently have been linked to the rise of a new generation of successful IT-firms. It has been
argued that know-how and networks built up in leading companies during the programs
still 'fertilize' the Norwegian IT-industry. I find little support for this claim. Workers
with experience from companies that received R&D subsidies were largely re-employed in
IT-industries, but they have not outperformed similar workers without such experience.
An analysis of firms that are spin-offs from formerly subsidized IT-firms reveals that they
perform below; rather than above average.
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1 Introduction
Most R&D projects fail from a commercial point of view", and technological shifts
may quickly turn even successful innovations into failure. This reflects the high
risk associated with research, but also that it is difficult to appropriate the returns
to knowledge. For this reason it is possible that projects and firms that fail com-
mercially still produce knowledge with some social value. This possibility seems
particularly relevant for subsidized R&D, since subsidies are aimed at projects with
high risk and large externalities. The substantial amount of money spent by OECD
governments on R&D subsidies makes it important to test this hypothesise. A pos-
sible 'scrap value' associated with unsuccessful projects and firms may significantly
influence the social returns to R&D and reduce the overall risk associated with
technology programs", This issue has so far not been investigated in the technology
program evaluation literature, nor has there been much empirical analysis of labor
market knowledge flows or spin-off firms in general.
This paper analyzes a series of Norwegian IT programs so far considered un-
successful. Recently, however, it has been argued that knowledge built up in the
subsidized firms has been transmitted to a new generation of successful firms through
labor mobility. Using matched employer-emploee data, I test this hypothsis. Sci-
entists and engineers with experience from the subsidized IT-firms have to a much
larger extent than other scientists and engineers in high-tech industries migrated to
the rapitdly growing IT service industry. There is no evidence, however, indicating
that these scientists and engineers have played a particularly prominent role in the
growth process. Nor do spin-off firms from the subsidized firms perform particularly
well. One possible explanation for these discouraging results is that the technology
shift in the late 1980s rendered much of the intellectual human capital built up
under the programs obsolete.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section discuss labor
market knowledge flows in more detail. Section three discuss the data, the empirical
lCf. e.g. Scherer and Harhoff (2000). Analyzing several samples of innovations they find that
the top ten percent most valuable innovations capture from 48 to 93 percent of the total value.
2According to Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2000) the OECD average share of governments in
the funding of R&D performed by private firms was 10 percent in 1998. The share of government
funding in total R&D was 30 percent.
3Scherer and Harhoff (2000) find that the estimated distributions of the returns to innovations
are so skewed that instability may extend to the level of a whole economy. The risk aspect seems
particularly relevant for small economies. While a large country like the US can be fairly confident
that it will host at least a few major successes like Microsoft, IBM or Intel, chance probably plays
a large role when a small country like Finland becomes the host of a giant like Nokia. Furthermore,
even if a small country succeed in breeding a major company, there is always the risk that the
company will be wiped out by a future technology shock. The extent to which knowledge built
up in high tech firms can be applied elsewhere in the economy and generate spin-offs, therefore, is
particularly important for small countries spending money to subsidize commercial R&D.
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approach and the definition of key variables. Section four gives a brief description of
aggregate subsidies and growth in the Norwegian IT and high-tech industries, and
analyzes the flow of scientists and engineers out of subsidized and non-subsidized
firms. Section five analyze the value of experience from subsidized IT-firms using
wage regressions on a sample of scientists and engineers with experience from high-
tech and IT-industries. Section six analyze the performance of spin-off firms, while
section seven concludes.
2 The importance of analyzing knowledge flows
Since research is a learning process, knowledge built up through failed projects
and firms is likely to be embodied in workers or teams of workers. In order to
assess the value of such knowledge, it is necessary to trace workers as they move
across firms and industries seeking to maximize the returns to their human capital.
Consider the early days of the semiconductor industry as an example of the potential
importance of this approach. If evaluating the social returns to R&D contracts
awarded pioneering firms such as Sprague Electric, Shockley or Fairchild based on
the performance of these firms alone, it seems clear from historical accounts that
the return would appear modest. Yet, it is well documented that key technologies
later utilized in the semiconductor industry by tremendously successful companies
like Intel, was developed in these early entrants and transferred by employees to
new firms better suited to exploit the technologies commercially, see e.g. Holbrook
et al. (2000), Jackson (1997) or Saxenian (1994).
The recent availability of large matched employer-employee data sets makes it
possible to analyze statistically the importance of human capital and employee mo-
bility suggested by such case studies", Furthermore, tracing knowledge flows by
following employees is not only relevant when firms fail. It can also be useful when
analyzing particularly successful firms and technologies, since entrepreneurs often
'cash out' on their investments by selling their company to larger, established firms.
In conventional, firm-level data sets, such companies disappear without there being
any indication of what happened. This problem may be particularly important when
evaluating programs targeted at start-up firms and small businesses". Analysis of
the opposite process, Le. the formation of spin-off firms, is also facilitated within
a framework where employees are followed over time and across firms. Employee
mobility and spin-off firms are closely related phenomena. Again, consider the semi-
conductor industry as an example. According to Saxenian (1994, p. 31), writing
about Silicon Valley,
4An alternative approach is illustrated by Almeida and Kogut (1999) analysing patenting and
patent citation patterns among engineers that change employers.
5The S~all Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the US would be an example of
such a program, cf. e.g. Lerner (1999) and Wallsten (2000).
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"Many of the region's entrepreneurs and managers speak of Fairchild as
an important managerial training ground. ... To this day a poster of
the corporate genealogy of the scores of Fairchild spin-offs, hangs on the
walls of many Silicon Valley firms."
In the present paper, I illustrate how the ideas outlined above can be imple-
mented and analyzed. Matched employer-employee data are used to 're-evaluate' a
series of Norwegian technology programs in the 1980s that subsidized IT manufac-
turing firms. A previous evaluation by Klette and Møen (1999) concluded that "the
IT-programs were largely unsuccessful". Recently, however, claims have been made
that the growth of the Norwegian IT-industry in the late 1990s was stimulated by
knowledge built up in formerly subsidized firms. In particular, employees of the
fallen industry leader, Norsk Data, have been pointed to as key contributors in a
new generation of successful firms. Norsk Data was a 'national champion' and a
leading minicomputer company", It was the second largest company on the Oslo
Stock Exchange in the mid 1980s, but had considerable difficulties in adapting to
the technology shift in the late 1980s represented by the introduction of PCs and
open standards. In 1989 mass layoffs were unavoidable and in 1991 it closed down
its manufacturing plants".
One expression of the idea that Norsk Data had a lasting impact on the industry,
can be found in a publication from the Research Council of Norway (2000) presenting
IT (ICT8) firms and technologies that have benefitted from R&D subsidies. In the
introduction the Council states that"
"[tJhe bankruptcy in Norsk Data received much attention, and left the
impression that the Norwegian ICT industry was severely injured. This
was not the case. Know-how was embedded in the employees, and these
employees were rather quickly absorbed by other Norwegian ICT-firms."
It may not be very surprising that the Research Council in this way tries to
improve upon the public impression of Norsk Data, given that the firm had received
6The company experienced a 40 percent average annual sales growth from 1973 to 1986, and
50 percent average annual growth in profits during the same period. It was considered the third
most profitable computer company in the world, and the stocks were traded in Oslo, Stockholm,
Frankfurt, London and New York. Cf. Steine (1992) and articles published in the business press
for more information about the history of this company.
7What little was left of the company went bankrupt in 1993.
81 do not make any distinction between the concepts IT - information technology - and ICT
- information and communication technologies. The latter abbreviation is of more recent origin,
and its use seems to be associated with the growth of the IT service sector.
9In my translation.
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massive subsidies'!'. A similar, but even stronger statement, however, was made by
Norway's leading engineering magazine, Teknisk Ukeblad, one year earlier. In the
fall of 1999, this bulletin of the Norwegian Engineering Association wanted to elect
the 'engineering achievement of the century'!". Second of ten nominees was Norsk
Data. The magazine argued that this 'industrial adventure ... left behind a thousand
professionals whose knowledge still fertilize Norwegian information technology't+.
It seems that the statements quoted above are based on knowledge about a hand-
ful of cases. Both the Research Council and Teknisk Ukeblad mention e.g. Dolphin
Interconnect Solutions, a company that came out of the R&D department in Norsk
Data when it closed down. In 2000 a part of Dolphin was sold to Sun Microsystems
and in the business press, the price was pictured as sensational. Such 'spin-off re-
turns' from previous investments cannot be captured by ordinary microeconometric
program evaluation methodologies which focus on the performance of the subsidized
firms':', In order to evaluate whether Dolphin and similar cases are representative,
a quantitative framework utilizing matched employer-employee data is called for.
3 Data and empirical approach
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from four main sources: Governmental adminis-
trative records prepared by Statistics Norway, the biannual R&D survey conducted
by the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and Statis-
tics Norway, the manufacturing statistics of Statistics Norway, and the statistics
of accounts for non-financial joint-stock companies prepared by Creditinform and
Statistics Norway. The Norwegian data are extraordinary in the sense that the en-
lONorsk Data was the largest recipient among firms subsidized by the National Program for
Information Technology lasting from 1987 to 1990, and received more than 12 percent of the
budget allocated to commercial R&D under the program. Given the size of the company, this
does not necessarily imply that the subsidies were large relative to Norsk Data's private R&D
investments, but money from the National Program for Information Technology came on top of
subsidies from preceding programs and substantial public procurements which were used actively
to help the company develop new technology throughout its history. Cf. Harlem et al. (1990) and
Bjerkan and Nergård (1990).
llCf. Valmot (1999). A list of all nominees is given in the same journal (Teknisk Ukeblad),
August 12th 1999, pp 10-11.
12Mytranslation. Spelled out in more detail: "All over Norway we see spin-off effects from the
Norsk Data era; thousands of people that worked in or with Norsk Data built up know-how whose
existence it is hard to imagine without this company. Many of these people started new firms
together with old colleagues or business contacts, others have contributed with their experience
in other sectors of the economy." The article was titled "The lighthouse of the Norwegian IT-
industry" .
13Cf. Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000) for a review.
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tire working population can be traced across employers over more than a decade,
and in the sense that extremely rich information is available both about the workers
and about their employers. The data appendix gives further details and descriptive
statistics.
3.2 Hypothesis
The hypothesis under consideration is whether the boom in R&D subsidies and
R&D investments in the Norwegian IT manufacturing industry in the mid and late
1980s, later caused growth in this or other sectors of the economy. Establishing such
a causal link is demanding and involves constructing a counterfactual situation for
the firms and workers involved.
Compared to the standard program evaluation literature, cf. e.g. Heckman,
Lalonde and Smith (1999), several complications are present. First, the 'treatment'
is not dichotomous. R&D investments have both an intensity dimension and a time
dimension. Moreover, there is no clear-cut start of the program as various technology
programs have replaced each other for several decades prior to the period that can
be observedl". Also, the selection problem, fundamental to all program evaluation
where participation is not randomized, has a peculiar twist. There is a 'double
selection' process where firms are selected into programs, and workers self-select into
firms. Deciding on a relevant and valid comparison group under these circumstances
is difficult.
My responses to the problems listed above will be as follows: First, with respect
to the intensity and time dimension of treatment, I will use a regression framework so
that continuous variables can be utilized in addition to a dichotomous classification,
based on cut-off values. Next, with respect to missing data for previous programs,
little can be done. I will, however, argue below that this is not a severe obstacle.
Finally, my response to the potential selection problem will be to allow for individual
fixed effects. A more explicit approach to the selection problem does not seem
necessary. Negative selection is not particularly relevant since R&D programs are
meant to stimulate high quality research'", and positive selection creates a bias
against my conclusion that the programs were not successful.
3.3 How to define 'treatment'
Defining high-tech, R&D firms and IT R&D-firms Treatment, in the con-
text of this paper, is having experience from a subsidized R&D firm in the IT
14Cf. Klette and Møen (1999) for details.
15This is not to say that negative selection could not exist. Various political economy processes
may lead the subsidies to troubled firms, cf. Klette and Møen (1999) for a discussion. Then.
however, the programs would not look successful, nor be successful.
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manufacturing industry. In principle, therefore, we would like to compare similar
workers with experience from IT-firms with and without subsidies. However, it is
difficult to define an IT-industry since information technology does not constitute
a separate class in standard industrial classification schemes'". Too narrow a set
of classes will leave out a lot of true IT-firms, whereas a broader set will include
a lot of non-IT firms. Iget around this problem by utilizing a unique variable in
the R&D surveys which identify the IT-content in each firm's R&D investments.
Using this variable in combination with R&D man-years, I define IT R&D-firms in
the manufacturing sector as firms with an intensity'? of IT-related R&D above 10
percentl". This definition is designed to exclude a large number of firms that per-
form small IT projects without having information technology as their main focus
or being technologically advanced. Almost without exception, units classified as IT
R&D-firms according to this criteria belong to ISle 382-385, Le. the machinery,
electronics, transportation equipment and technical instruments industries'". I will
hereafter refer to these industries together as 'high-tech'. Out of 1173 plants (consti-
tuting 957 firms) with known R&D in the high-tech industries in the period 1986 to
1991, 197 plants belong to 'R&D firms' having an intensity of total R&D20 above 10
percent. Out of these, 108 belong to 'IT R&D-firms', Le. firms having an intensity
of IT-related R&D above 10 percent. There are on average 4.0 observations of each
plant in the years 1986 to 199021.
Defining subsidized firms Since subsidies are awarded unevenly among recipi-
ents, there is also a problem of how to define a subsidized IT R&D-firm (hereafter
referred to as a subsidized firm). For a subsidy to have an effect on a firm's research
activities, it must be of some significance. Hence, any subsidy should not qualify,
and I define the treatment group as IT R&D-firms with an intensity of subsidized
IT-related R&D above 0.5 percent. For a treatment firm with an intensity of IT-
related R&D at the lower limit, Le. 10 percent, this implies that at least 5 percent
of the firm's IT-R&D must be subsidized+'. The criteria is designed so that all large
16Cf. e.g. OECD (2000). The Norwegian industrial classification scheme was based on ISIC rev;
. 2 until 1993/94. Since then NACE rev. 1 (ISIC rev. 3) has been used.
17R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee (per year) at the three-digit line
of business level within firms. Cf. the data appendix for more information. In the text, I will not
distinguish between firms and lines of business within firms.
18These variables are not available, nor as relevant, for the IT service sector. This sector will be
defined using the OECD definition based on industrial classification codes.
19The equivalent NACE classifications are NACE 29-35.
20The sum of IT and non-IT R&D.
21Note that firms, and thereby plants, can change category between years. When giving the
number of plants in different categories above. plants are counted as belonging to an R&D firm or
IT R&D firm if it has this status in at least one of the years 1986-199l.
221know for each firm the share of R&D that is classified as IT. but not the share of subsidies used
in IT-projects. However, since the government had IT high on its agenda, I assume that R&D-
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subsidy recipients known from other sources, that can be identified in the data, are
included='. Out of 108plants belonging to IT R&D-firms in the period 1986to 1990,
79 belong to subsidized firms.
Defining the treatment period Data on individual workers start in 1986, and
the era of large R&D subsidies ended in 1990, cf. Figure 1 below. Hence, I will
consider the years 1986 to 1990 to be the 'treatment period'. As mentioned, there
were targeted IT-programs prior to 1986, but I do not believe the lack of data from
these early years is a severe restriction. The largest R&D subsidy program were in
effect from 1987 to 1990, and the largest IT R&D contracts were awarded in the
years 1985to 198724• Furthermore, with some stability in employment relationships,
a certain persistence in program participation, and both a lag and some persistence
in the effect of subsidies, there will be a positive correlation between the unobserved
and the observed treatment. It is, however, somewhat unfortunate that workers
cannot be observed in a pre-treatment period, so that a clean comparison of pre and
post treatment wages can be undertaken as part of the program evaluation.
Categorizing workers Iwant to assess the value of the core technological know-
how built up in the subsidized firms. This know-how is likely to be possessed by
scientists and engineers, and my analysis will therefore focus on this group. With the
treatment period lasting from 1986 to 1990, many scientists and engineers will have
had several employers, and firms may also have changed subsidy status within this
time interval. I categorize scientists and engineers as having 'experience from subsi-
dized firms' if they are attached to a subsidized firm in at least one year. Similarly
scientists and engineers are categorized as having 'experience from IT R&D-firms'
and 'experience from R&D-firms' if they have at least one year experience from such
firms in 1986 to 1990.
Using these definitions, there are 1755 scientists and engineers with experience
from R&D-firms. Out of these 1290 have experience from IT-R&D firms. In this
group 1095 have experience from subsidized firms. About a quarter of the workers
in subsidized firms were employed by the industry leader, Norsk Data. The numbers
are based on a sample of male scientists and engineers born after 1935and employed
subsidies awarded firms that report to do IT R&D is related to their IT-projects. If subsidies
exceed a firm's IT R&D-investments. the excess subsidies are excluded.
23The ten largest recipients received 35 percent of the funds. These firms were producing elec-
tronic products, telecommunication equipment, instruments and computers. According to Harlem
et al. (1990), the ten largest recipients were Norsk Data, Autodisplay, EB Nera, Nordic VLSI, EB,
LCD Vision, Seatex, Micron, Simrad Subsea and Alcatel/STK. The order reflects the size of the
funding.
24The implementation and organization of the National Program for Information Technology is
extensively documented in Harlem et al. (1990) and Buland (1996).
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full time in a high-tech firm at least one of the years 1986 to 199025. Altogether
there are 3784 scientists and engineers in the sample. 3419 of these are in firms with
known R&D-investments.
Continuous treatment variables The firm categories defined above are based
on cut-off values for R&D intensities that are somewhat arbitrary, and that conceal
a significant amount of variation in research and 'program' exposure. The intensity
of R&D and subsidies varied between firms within each category, and within firms
over time. Furthermore, workers may have stayed with several employers during
the program years. In many of the analyses that follow it is possible to use such
continuous variation in treatment, and therefore I construct a stock measure of
experience in addition to the dummies. This is done by attaching to each worker
information about his employers R&D investments, and adding up intensities in
R&D, IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D over the years 1986 to 1991. I use these
sums as measures of the human capital accumulated'",
3.4 A description of workers and firms by treatment cate-
gory
Descriptive statistics on workers and firms are given in the data appendix. IT R&D
firms are concentrated in the following industries: Computer and officemachinery,
Other machinery, Radio, TV and communication equipment, Insulated cables and
wires, Professional and scientific instruments, and Photographic and optical goods.
Except for computers, non of these industries are dominated by IT R&D firms,
however. Subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-firms coexist in all industries
mentioned except in production of insulated cables and wires, where all workers
belong to subsidized firms. Other R&D firms and non-R&D firms are represented
in a wider set of subindustries than the IT R&D firms. These industries comprise
the production of various types of machinery, electrical equipment and transport
equipment/".
An important thing to notice is that the larger part of the IT-industry received
subsidies. There are 1095scientists and engineers with at least one year of experience
251have excluded women because they are known to have different career patterns and preferences
than men, and do not constitute a large share of the labor stock in these industries.
26Since the intensities are measured in man-years per employee per year, the unit of the 'expe-
rience stocks' are years. This should not be interpreted literary, however. It will only be a precise
measure of individual R&D experience if all workers participate equally in the firms' R&D projects.
This is obviously not the case, and one should rather think of R&D intensities as proxies for how
much there is to learn in a firm at a given time. Summing the intensities over the time dimension
then gives a measure of on-the-job learning.
27About 82 percent of the worker-year observations are from firms with R&D information avail-
able. Out of the 26 subindustries listed, 19 have some IT R&D investments.
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from subsidized IT-firms and 195 that only have IT experience from non-subsidized
firms. Given that the authorities were determined to stimulate the IT-industry, this
is perhaps not surprising, but it leaves a relatively small, and possibly non-random,
control group. That being said, however, there are relatively few observable differ-
ences between workers in subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-firms. Scientists
and engineers in non-subsidized IT R&D-firms are slightly younger, but appear oth-
erwise similar to their colleagues in subsidized firms. Furthermore, my analysis is not
dependent on this dichotomus classification, as I also utilize continuous experience
variables as explained above/".
Subsidized firms are somewhat larger, more unionized and more likely to have a
rural location than non-subsidized firms. They are also more often foreign owned
and younger. The most interesting difference, however, is that subsidized firms
had significantly higher growth rates in the years preceding the awarded subsidies.
Presumably, recent success must have been an important criteria when subsidies
were awarded. With respect to intensity in R&D and IT-R&D the two group of
firms are close to identical. 'Other R&D firms' are somewhat less R&D intensive
than IT R&D-firms and have a slightly lower educationallevel, but they are on the
other hand more capital intensive. Non-R&D-firms have an even lower educational
level than R&D-firms and are more unionized and less often foreign owned. Non-
R&D firms are clearly the oldest group of firms.
With respect to educational composition, subsidized firms are slightly more di-
versified with respect to the human capital they possess than non-subsidized firms.
All R&D-firms, however, even non-IT firms, are highly intensive in various types
of electrotechnical engineering skills. Non-R&D firms also employ many workers of
this type, but mechanical engineers is the most dominant skill group in these firms.
Summing up the differences between subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-
firms, the main impression left by the descriptive statistics is that workers in subsi-
dized and non-subsidized firms are quite similar, although there are some differences
between the two types of firms. In particular, the technology programs seem to have
favored firms with rapid growth.
28This creates substantial variation, as subsidies were very unevenly distributed across firms.
This was part of a long tradition where 'national champions' were considered important catalysts
for growth.
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4 A closer look at investments, performance and
labor mobility
4.1 Industry investments and growth
In the mid 1980s, the Norwegian economy was booming. At the same time, a
large number of firms received R&D subsidies from public technology programs.
Also, significant IT-related R&D contracts were given to the defence industry, and
in connection with the restructuring and modernization of the public telephone
company. The upper graph in Figure 1 shows total R&D investments in the high-
tech industries, i.e. ISIC 382-385 in the years 1984to 1997. The middle graph shows
the share of these investments that were labelled information technology by the firms.
The lower graph shows the share of the IT investments that was subsidized. The
three graphs display a very similar pattern, with strong growth until1987, and then
a decline until1991. Several developments are behind these movements. First, after
the general expansion in the mid 1980s, the economy went into a downturn lasting
from 1988 to 1993. Next, as mentioned in the introduction, the leading technology
firm, Norsk Data, ran into trouble in the late 1980s and went out of business in
1991. Finally, the technology programs and large R&D-contracts came to an end.
An interesting feature in Figure 1 is that R&D investments in IT did not pick up
in parallel with the increase in total R&D investments when the economy started to
recover. This may be interpreted as an indication that the technology programs did
not produce a basis for new growth, at least not within the manufacturing sector.
The development of the subsidized firms is more clearly drawn out in Figure 2,
comparing employment growth in subsidized firms with employment growth in other
categories of high-tech firms. There is a strong decline in employment in subsidized
firms/", Given this picture, the dismal conclusion of Klette and Møen (1999)30,
evaluating the technology programs based on firm level data, are not surprising.
However, as discussed above and suggested by the quotes in the introduction, this
interpretation may be misleading. A more positive way to read Figure 2 is to stress
that workers were leaving the subsidized firms on a large scale, and that they may
have contributed to growth elsewhere.
Figure 3 pictures the growth in the Norwegian IT industry, as defined by OECD,
29Employment in non-subsidized R&D firms and other R&D firms appears to fluctuate more
than the other two categories simply because there are fewer workers behind these graphs. The
strong decline in employment for non-subsidized IT R&D firms from 1992 to 1993 is driven by one
single firm that ran into trouble. Much of the subsequent growth is due to the same firm recovering.
The negative employment growth in subsidized IT R&D firms is not driven by Norsk Data alone.
Leaving out this company does not alter the picture significantly. Furthermore, looking at sales
growth gives a very similar picture, but then I am not able to keep track of plants which change
industry classification from manufacturing to services.
30ef. the introduction.
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from 1995 to 1999. In these years the IT service industry grew considerably faster
than the rest of the private sector. As suggested by the Research Council, work-
ers from previously subsidized manufacturing firms may have played a role in this
process.
4.2 Tracing workers out of the subsidized firms
A natural first step when analyzing R&D-spillovers brought about by labor mobility,
is to see where the technical expertise in the subsidized firms became employed
later on. The results of such an analysis are presented in Table 1. The first column
shows the industry of occupation in 1997 for scientists and engineers with experience
from subsidized firms. The main comparison group is scientists and engineers with
experience from IT R&D-firms that were not subsidized. These are tabulated in
column 2. Columns 3 and 4 give mobility patterns for scientists and engineers
with experience from other R&D-firms in the high-tech industries, Le. firms whose
research activities were not strongly IT-related, and scientists and engineers without
experience from R&D-intensive firms.
The main difference between subsidized and non-subsidized IT R&D-firms is that
a much higher share of scientists and engineers from the subsidized firms has moved
to IT-service industries'". 30 percent of scientists and engineers from subsidized IT-
firms became employed in the IT-service industry=' versus 14 percent of scientists
and engineers with experience from non-subsidized IT-firms. The other columns
show that the less IT and R&D intensive the firms, the less likelyare the scientists
and engineers to move to the IT service sector. The table suggests that the subsidized
IT-activities were service related, or at least that the IT-service industry offered the
best opportunities for scientists and engineers from subsidized firms when these firms
closed down.
31 IT service industries are defined according to OECD and with a few further refinements added
by Statistics Norway, cf. Statistics Denmark (2000). Included sub-industries are Wholesale of
radio and television goods (NACE 51433), Wholesale of office machinery and equipment (NACE
5164), Wholesale of machinery and equipment for trade, transport and services (NACE 51654),
Telecommunications (NACE 642), Renting of office machinery and equipment including comput-
ers (NACE 7133), Hardware consultancy (NACE 721), Software consultancy and supply (NACE
722), Data processing (NACE 723), Database activities (NACE 724), Maintenance and repair of
office, accounting and computer machinery (NACE 725), and Other computer related activities
(NACE 726). Corresponding ISIC codes are 61131, 61235, 7202, part of 833 and all of 8323 which
correspond to NACE 72.
32Looking separately at workers from Norsk Data, the share is as high as 46 percent.
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4.3 A brief summary of some 'non-wage' labor market out-
comes
The main message to take away from Table 1, is that the possibility of a link between
R&D subsidies awarded in the 1980sand growth in the IT-service sector in the 1990s,
is present in the data. Next, I investigate how workers from the subsidized firms
actually performed in the labor market. Were e.g. workers from the subsidized
firms "rather quickly absorbed" in the labor market, as claimed by the Research
Council'r'". Some indicators that can throw light on this issue are reported in Table
2. Row 1 reports the share of displaced workersr" that did not become re-employed
in the same municipality'". Row 2 reports the share of workers who participated in
active labor market programs. Row 3 reports the average employment rate follow-
ing the program'"', row 4 reports the share of workers who took further education
and finally row 5 reports the share of workers that became self-employed/". Taken
together, the results do not suggest that workers from subsidized firms had any
particular difficulties in finding new jobs. Having established this, I will move on to
analyze earnings.
5 Wage regression analyses
If know-how built up in the subsidized firms was not firm-specific and thus provided
a basis for growth in other firms later on, wewould expect experience from subsidized
firms to have higher value in the labor market than experience from other firms. This
assertion can be tested using extended Mincer (1974) wage regressions. Lacking a
'pre treatment' period, I start out exploring scientists and engineers' wage level
during the program. Next, I investigate wage growth following the program and
check the results obtained from these two analyses against the wage levels after the
program. Given that know-how built up in the industry leader Norsk Data has been
considered particularly valuable, and that about one quarter of all scientists and
33Cf. quoted in the introduction.
341have defined a displaced worker as a worker with at least two years tenure who separated
from a plant that downsized at least 25 percent in that year or over that year and next year.
35Note that what is measured is a change in their home address municipality. not merelya change
in municipality of employment. The low number for workers from non-subsidized IT R&D firms
is due to one large firm that went through a mass lay-off, and then rehired many of the workers,
cf. the 'dip' for employment in non-subsidized IT R&D firms in Figure 2.
36Those not employed include everyone who are not employed and not under education. regard-
less of whether they are registered as unemployed or not. Part time workers are counted as part
time unemployed.
37These numbers may be artificially low. Presumably, they do not include workers who are
employed in joint-stock companies that they own themselves. Self-employed are included in the
wage analyses presented in the next section.
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engineers with experience from subsidized firms have worked for this company, I
investigate the robustness off all results with respect to leaving out these workers'".
5.1 The effect of R&D and subsidies on wages during the
program
Several mechanisms related to R&D, IT and subsidies may possibly have affected
wages during the program period. First and foremost, if scientists and engineers
expected to accumulate more general knowledge in subsidized firms (or in IT firms
in general) than in other firms, they should be willing to pay for this through lower
wages39. To the extent that subsidized firms promoted more advanced technolo-
gies, and technologies considered to have a large future potential, such investments
in general human capital are conceivable, although risk aversion and liquidity con-
straints may reduce the effect. Another mechanism, possibly affecting the wages, is
that subsidized firms may have employed scientists and engineers of better (unob-
served) quality. High-ability workers are necessary to develop frontier technologies,
but high-ability workers may also have a preference for working in a technologically
advanced environment=". The net effect of this on wages is not obvious. On one
hand, high-ability workers have better outside options, but workers with a prefer-
ence for technologically advanced firms may, on the other hand, accept wages below
their outside option'". A final possible mechanism is unions. The wage level in sub-
sidized firms would be affected if the workers were able to negotiate higher wages
and thereby extract some of the subsidies as rents.
Table 3 explores the wage level for prime aged male scientists and engineers in
high-tech industries in the program years by including measures of R&D, IT R&D
and subsidized IT R&D in a standard wage regressions. Both a dummy variable
approach (column 1 and 3) and a specification with continuous variables (column
2 and 4) are reported. The dummy approach utilizes the dummies for R&D firm,
IT R&D firm and subsidized IT R&D firm described in section 2. Note that these
dummies are nested in the sense that a subsidized firm is also an IT R&D firm which
is also an R&D firm. In specifications with continuous variables, I use intensities
38This procedure is intended to avoid a detailed and explicit wage analysis of this single company
and its employees.
39This follows from classical human capital theory, cf. Becker (1962, 1964) and the discussion
in Møen (2001).
40The work of Almeida and Kogut (1999), Stern (1999) and others suggests that scientists and
technical personnel have preferences regarding the technological environment they work in.
41Rosen (1986) provides a review of the theory of compensated differentials (equalizing differ-
ences). Stern (1999) shows that this mechanism has relevance for scientists in the private sector.
This is, in the setting of my paper, supported by Steine (1992) who states that the company policy
of Norsk Data was to pay the same as similar firms, or somewhat less. He adds, "[iJtwas attractive
to work in Norsk Data. so why be a wage leader?" (p. 50. my translation).
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measured as the share of the work force doing R&D, IT R&D and subsidized IT
R&D. These variables are also nested, so that in order to find the total effect of a
marginal increase in IT R&D due to a subsidized project, all three of the reported
coefficients should be added.
In all regressions, workers in non-R&D firms is the baseline comparison group.
Non-reported control variables are listed in the subtext to the table. Among these
variables are 15 dummies for different academic degrees, hence, scientists and engi-
neers are compared within detailed educational groups.
In Table 3, column 1 and 2, I do not distinguish between subsidized and non-
subsidized IT R&D, and from Part A of the table, using the full sample, we see that
the wage level in IT R&D firms is significantly below the wage level in other R&D
firms. The average discount is between 2 and 3 percent. Non-IT R&D, however,
does not seem to affect wages. When distinguishing between subsidized and non-
subsidized IT R&D, a puzzling pattern appears. The dummy approach suggests that
the lower wage level is associated with work in subsidized firms while the specification
with continuous variables suggests that the lower wage level is associated with work
in non-subsidized firms.
A clue as to how these conflicting results can be reconciled can be found in Part B
of the table where workers from Norsk Data are excluded. Column 1 and 2, suggest
that the observed lower wage level in IT R&D firms is driven mainly by workers in
Norsk Data. If Norsk Data received enough IT subsidies per worker to be classified
as a subsidized firm, but had, relative to other firms, far higher total investments in
IT R&D per worker, this may explain the observed coefficients in Part A, column
3 and 4. This is not inconceivable. When sources like Bjerkan and Nergård (1990)
describe Norsk Data as a thoroughly subsidized company, they are not so concerned
with direct R&D subsidies as with preferential public procurement, and Norsk Data
is in this respect a special case42. The company is also special in a different respect
relevant for my analysis. The company was famous for rewarding their employees
with shares, something that received much attention in the business press. The
discount that the employees received when buying shares was counted as taxable
labor income and is therefore included in my wage measuret", but the stock market
price of the shares increased so rapidly and for so many consecutive years, that
the employees were likely to value the opportunity to buy shares in the company
highly and trade this off against ordinary wage compensation. Hence, some (but
probably not all, cf. footnote 41) of the apparent discount associated with Norsk
Data may be an artifact of the company's unusual compensation scheme and not a
true compensating differential44.
42Cf. footnote 10.
43Cf. Steine (1992. p. 54-55).
44As far as I know, this wage policy was unique for Norsk Data at the time, as were their
consistently rising stock price. I should also mention that stock options were not much used in
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Looking at Table 3B, column 3 and 4, we see that even when workers from Norsk
Data are excluded, there is to be a wage discount associated with workers in sub-
sidized firms. Both the dummy specification and the intensity specification suggest
that the discount is slightly less than 2 percent compared to non-subsidized IT R&D
firms, although only the intensity specification produces a significant coefficientt''.
Above I have mentioned several mechanisms that may be behind this. In order
to distinguish between some of these possible mechanisms, the analysis in Table 4
can be extended by interacting R&D variables with experience, thereby examining
wage profiles rather than average wage levels. If the wage discount in subsidized
firms is due to workers investing in general human capital, one would expect it to
be associated with young workers taking a wage cut when entering the firms and
then experiencing stronger wage growth as their expectations about the value of
on-the-job training become fulfilled'".
Table 4 gives the results of including R&D, IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D,
interacted with workers' experience. In column 1 and 2, we see that scientists and
engineers have a steeper wage profile in IT R&D firms than in other firms. Consistent
with the idea that IT is a general technology, cf. e.g. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg
(1995), these firms appear to offer lower wages early in the career in exchange for
higher wage growth thereafter. The beginning wages in IT R&D-firms are about
10 percent lower than in other R&D firms, and the annual wage growth is about
0.5 percent higher?". Interestingly, there are no significant differences between R&D
firms that don't specialize in IT and non-R&D firms.
Moving on to column 3 and 4, distinguishing between subsidized and non-
subsidized IT R&D firms, one finds that the average wage discount associated with
subsidies in Table 4 is due to the wage profile in subsidized firms being less steep
the sample years. Due to a very unfavourable tax treatment between 1991 and 1999, it was not
much used in later years, either. For these reasons, I believe that labor earnings is a fairly accurate
measure of monetary compensation in other companies than Norsk Data.
45For the intensity specification, the discount is derived by multiplying the coefficient -0.488 with
0.036, the employers' average intensity in subsidized IT R&D, from table A2.
46Workers may also pay for learning through lower wages later in their career, but that will be
difficult to separate from the wage premia they receive on their previous human capital investments.
cf. footnote 47 and Møen (2001). From a theoretical point of view, their willingness to invest in
human capital should fall gradually towards retirement.
47The dummy and the intensity specification give very similar results. Taking into account the
special wage policy of Norsk Data discussed above, and looking instead at part B, it may seem as
if 10 percent is rather on the big side. If the correct wage discount for entering workers is between
6 and 7 percent. and the wage growth between 0.4 and 0.5 percent. as suggested in Part B, this
imply a pay-back period of about 15 years. Notice also that the firms' IT R&D-intensity times
experience is used as a proxy both for how much the workers are learning, and how much they
have learned on the job, cf. Møen (2001). IT R&D-intensity is a noisy variable, and as a proxy
for human capital, it probably becomes increasingly noisy the further into the career a worker has
reached. This implies that measurement errors may severely bias the coefficient on the interaction
term towards zero.
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than the wage profile in non-subsidized firms. Hence, there is nothing in the data
suggesting that investments in general human capital were particularly large for
workers in subsidized firms.
5.2 The effect of experience from subsidized firms on wages
later in the career
Table 5 contains the results of an analysis of the effect of experience from R&D,
IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D-firms on ten year wage growth from 1986 and
1987 to 1996 and 1997. The advantage of looking at wage growth is that potential
differences in ability and preferences between workers are accounted for, and looking
at the full ten year interval takes one from one boom in the economy to the next.
This is desirable, since it may be difficult to capture the full program effect before
the labor market has adjusted to the many mass layoffs caused by the recession.
The sample consists of full time working male scientists and engineers, having at
least one year full time experience from high-tech or IT industries, including services,
in 1986-199748.Workers without experience from manufacturing, and hence not part
of the previous analysis, are included for two reasons. First, it has some interest to
compare workers entering the expanding IT service industries with background from
manufacturing high-tech industries to workers who have acquired most of their work
experience within the IT-service industries'", Second, these workers help identify
the many control variables in the wage regression, such as experience and dummies
for industries, altogether 72 coefficients'", Given the relatively small number of
workers with experience from non-subsidized IT firms, it is important to identify
common coefficients as precisely as possible'".
At first sight, the results in Table 5A, column 1 and 2, seem to imply that workers
in IT R&D firms have had significantly higher wage growth than other workers.
Looking, however, at column 3 and 4, and Part B, we see a pattern very similar
to the one found in Table 3 and discussed in detail above. This suggests that the
48The sample industries are high-tech and IT, defined as NACE 29-35, 51433, 5164, 51654, 642,
7133 and 72. Cf. footnote 31 for more information.
49As it turns out, there does not seem to be any important differences between these groups, and
I have not tabulated separate coefficients for workers that only have experience from IT service
industries. On average, these workers seem to receive slightly lower wages than workers with
experience from high-tech manufacturing.
50The industry dummies do not follow a particular NACE or ISIC level. Within high-tech and
IT-industries I use a detailed categorization, usually at the five digit level. In less advanced sectors,
with fewer observations in the sample, the dummies are usually at the two or three digit level. Cf.
the subtext to Table 5 for a full list of control variables an other details regarding the regression.
51The assumption that there is a common experience profile, common industry effects and so
on, is of course not obvious, but it seems to be a reasonable approximation. Furthermore, my
conclusions are robust to reducing the sample size by excluding workers without experience from
firms that have invested in IT R&D.
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significant growth results are driven by a possible mismeasurement of compensation
for workers in Norsk Data in the beginning of the period. When excluding these
workers, there is only a small and non-significant wage growth effect left, Le. workers
with experience from IT R&D-firms have a slightly higher wage growth than workers
with experience from other firms, and workers with experience from subsidized IT
R&D-firms have a slightly higher wage growth than workers with experience from
non-subsidized IT R&D-firms, without any of these differences being significantly
different from zero.
Table 6 reports the results of an analysis of the effect of experience from R&D,
IT R&D and subsidized IT R&D-firms in the program years on wages in the years
1996 and 1997. Consistent with tables 3 and 5, the results show that there are no
significant differences related to these various types of experience. In particular,
workers with experience from subsidized firms, started out with a small but sig-
nificant (using the intensity specification) average wage discount, and had slightly
higher, but not significantly higher, wage growth, and they have ended up with a
slightly lower, although not significantly lower, wage level as reported in Table 652.
Changing the specification in Table 6 by including firm specific fixed effects, and
thereby asking whether workers with experience from subsidized firms have ended
up in the best paid positions within their firms, give very similar results to the
specification without firm specific fixed effects and is not reported. With respect
to workers with experience from Norsk Data, a detailed investigation of Table 6,
contrasting Part A with Part B in light of the previous discussion of subsidies and
IT R&D investments in this company, suggests that these workers have wages below
the average for other workers with experience from subsidized firms53.
Before concluding the wage analysis, one should reflect on how the results in
Table 5 and 6 relates to Table 4 which indicated that workers in IT R&D-firms,
whether subsidized or not, accepted a wage discount at the start of their career and
experienced higher wage growth later on. If the estimated wage growth associated
with a career in IT R&D firms had continued after the program period, it obviously
should have caused a significant positive coefficient on experience from IT R&D
firms both in Table 5 and 654. When there is no such positive effect, it implies that
these workers did not receive the return they expected. One possible interpretation
is that their expectations did not come through because of the technology shifts in
52If including the years 1994 and 1995 in addition to 1996 and 1997, the coefficient on experience
from subsidized firms in column 4 becomes marginally significant.
53If running a similar regression for skilled workers with secondary technical education, however,
I find a significant positive wage premium for workers with experience from Norsk Data. This may
suggest that scientists and engineers accumulate more firm specific human capital, and is more
exposed to technological risk than workers with secondary technical education.
54In Table 6 this is so because the average worker with experience from IT R&D-firms, even if
continuing to invest in on-the-job training by staying in such a firm, should have caught up with
and passed workers without such experience by 1996/97.
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the IT-industry in the late 1980s.
Tables 3 through 6, can be summarized in one sentence: Scientists and engineers
with experience fromsubsidized IT R&D-firms performed exactly as good, or rather
as bad, as workers from non-subsidized firms. Workers in all IT R&D firms seem
to have 'co-financed' their employers' R&D investments by accepting wages below
their alternative wage, presumably believing that work experience from these firms
would provide general human capital. The expected wage growth, however, did not
materialize after the program period, leaving them no return on their investment.
With respect to workers in subsidized firms, they do not seem to have gained any-
thing from participating in the subsidized projects. Consequently, my analysis does
not support the idea that the IT R&D programs created significant benefits for work-
ers with experience from subsidized firms. On the positive side, however, workers
in subsidized firms did not perform particularly bad, either, even though many of
them became displaced in the late 1980s as shown in Figure 255.
6 The performance of spin-off firms
A complementary approach to looking at the performance of individualworkers,
is to focus on the performance of spin-off firms defined by groups of workers that
have stayed together. When several workers from the same firm continue to work
together, it is reasonable to assume that they are exploiting know-how built up
in their previous work environment, and that there are positive complementarities
between them that make them stay together. It is also possible that firm profits
is a better performance measure than wages, particularly if the spin-off firms to
some extent are worker-owned. Low tax rate on capital income relative to labor
income may induce employee-owners to substitute wages for return on stocks'", and
employee-owners may also sacrifice wages in order to finance firm growth'".
6.1 Sample and definition of spin-offs
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of my analysis of spin-off firms. Roughly speaking,
Le. leaving out some of the finer details to be laid out below, I define a spin-off firm
55Note that I control for displacement in the wage regressions in Table 5 and 6, but the variable
is not significantly different from zero. Distinguishing, however, between workers with experience
from subsidized firms who have stayed with the same firm. and separators, I find a modest negative
effect for separators (not reported). In the stock specification this negative effect is significant.
56Note, however, that the Norwegian tax system have detailed rules in order to avoid this type
of tax evation.
57One may also think that employee stock options plans would reduce the relevance of taxable
labor income as an earnings measure. and show up in firm profits. This kind of options, however,
has been very unusual in Norway due to an unfavorable tax regime, cf. footnote 44.
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as a firm that was not originally subsidized, but where at least 25 percent of the
employees have experience from a firm that was subsidized.
The sample period is 1994-1997, Le. the years when the IT industry recovered
according to Figure 3. The sample consists of all non-financial joint-stock companies
with more than one employee and at least one scientist or engineer, in industries
with at least one 'program firm', Le. a firm that to a large extent draw on human
capital with experience from subsidized IT R&D firms. Formally, I define program
firms as firms that have, at some point, had at least a 25 percent share of employees
with experience from subsidized firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with
experience from a subsidized firm. Any definition of this type will necessarily be a
bit arbitrary, but the idea is to identify firms that draw significantly on knowledge
that was built up under the program.
The definition of program firms does not distinguish between continuing sub-
sidized firms that has retained experienced workers, and new firms, spin-offs, em-
ploying workers with experience from subsidized firms. This is because I want to
start out by tracing all firms drawing on 'program know-how'. Utilizing information
about plants, however, I can identify those of the program firms that represent a
continuation of originally subsidized firrns'". I label these 'continuing or reorganized
subsidized firms'. This group of firms is defined as program firms that contain one
or more plant that in 1986-1990 belonged to a subsidized firm. Program firms that
do not fall into this category are defined as spin-off firms. According to the above
definitions, there are altogether 109 program firms in the sample, 76 of these are
spin-off firms and 33 are continuing or reorganized subsidized firms.
6.2 Descriptive statistics and results
Program firms are somewhat larger, more capital intensive, more R&D intensive,
and more intensive in use of scientists and engineers, than non-program firms, cf. the
data appendix. They are also somewhat younger and less often in a rural location.
Spin-off firms are significantly younger and smaller than continuing or reorganized
. subsidized firms, as one would expect. Spin-offs are also less R&D-intensive, but
more human capital intensive. This reflect that a larger fraction of the spin-off firms
belong to service industries. 37 percent of the spin-off firms can be identified as
spin-offs from Norsk Data.
The first performance measure I consider is simply sales growth. The results are
reported in Table 7. Spin-off firms perform slightly better than other firms along this
58Firm identification numbers represent legal units, and will change if one firm or plant is bought
by another firm, etc. Plant identification numbers, on the other hand, will change only if the
production is physically moved or substantially altered with respect to industry classification.
Not all registers that are matched to produce my data set, however, use the same plant and firm
identification number system. For this reason the match between plants and firms, and the tracking
of units over time, is slightly imperfect.
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dimension, but the difference is not significant. Moving on to profitability, Table
8 presents return on sales, return on assets and return on equity. It shows that
program firms are significantly less profitable than other firms. On average they
have 1.2 percent lower return on sales, 3.2 percent lower return on assets and 15.5
percent lower return on equity.
Looking separately at spin-offs and continuing or reorganized subsidized firms,
we see that the significant negative results are exclusively associated with the spin-
off firms. It is difficult to explain these coefficients, but one possibility is that the
spin-off firms mostly consist of troubled remnants of previously subsidized units,
and that they are kept running because their core know-how has low alternative
value59. Analyzing wages in spin-off firms (not reported), I find some support for
this hypothesis. Scientists and engineers with experience from subsidized firms that
work in spin-off firms, have a small wage discount. Workers with experience from
subsidized firms that work in continuing or reorganized subsidized firms, on the other
hand, have a significant wage premium'". This may suggest that the most valuable
know-how built up under the program is to be found in the surviving plants and not
in the spin-off firms. In any case, my analysis does not give support to the idea that
important returns from the IT-program ended up outside the originally subsidized
firms.
6.3 Robustness
In all the firm performance analyses presented above, I have controlled for firm
age, firm size, intensity in use of scientists and engineers, current R&D-investments,
business cycle effects, and industry differences. The main results are robust to leav-
ing out these control variables, but without controls, also continuing or reorganized
subsidized firms have a profitability below average.
Since the exact definition of program and spin-off firms is based on a somewhat
arbitrary cutoff value for the share of employees that has experience from firms that
received subsidies, it is particularly important to test the robustness of the results
with respect to these definitions. I have tried both a more inclusive definition,
looking at firmswith a 10percent share of employeeswith experience from subsidized
firms, and a more exclusive definition looking at firms with a 50 percent share of
employees with experience from subsidized firms. In both cases, the main results in
Tables 8 and 8 'hold true. Defining spin-offs based on the share of engineers with
experience from subsidized firms, rather than the share of employeeswith experience
from subsidized firms reduces the significance of the negative coefficients. Finally, I
have looked specifically at spin-offs from Norsk Data. If anything, these firms have
59E.g, sales or service departments, or production teams that move to a new location and try
to continue on their own.
6oef. footnote 55, for a related non-reported analysis pointing in the same direction.
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a weaker performance than other spin-off firms. With respect to a possible time
trend in performance, cf. the strong industry growth present in Figure 3, I find that
the profitability of the spin-off firms is falling over time.
Given that the returns to innovation is known to have a very skewed distribution,
one may also question whether the regression analyses reported above correctly
represent aggregate profits for the different categories of firms. A few large and
profitable spin-off firms could possibly more than outweigh the low profits in the
many small firms dominating the sample. One simple way to explore this issue is to
pool all spin-off firms, all continuing or reorganized subsidized firms, and all non-
subsidized and non-spin-off firms, in order to compute the joint performance of the
various groups. The result of this exercise is graphed in Figure 4. When assessing
the joint performance this way, spin-off firms as a group have a higher return on
sales than non-spin-off firms, but they perform worse with respect to sales growth,
return on assets and return on equity.
A final question one may ask with respect to robustness, is whether the results
are specifically related to the subsidized IT R&D firms, or whether any spin-off from
firms that invested in IT R&D in the late 1980s have performed similarly bad. I
have looked at this question by defining spin-offs from all R&D firms and all IT
R&D firms in the same manner as I have defined spin-offs from subsidized 'IT R&D
firms. This analysis (not reported) show that the negative results are most strongly
associated with spin-offs from subsidized firms. There are, however, only six spin-
offs from non-subsidized IT R&D firms in the sample. In a related analysis (also
not reported) I have regressed firm profitability on a continuous measure of different
types of R&D experience among the firms' scientists and engineers. In this analysis,
R&D-, IT R&D- and subsidized IT R&D experience is measured in the same way
as in the wage regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6. The results do not confirm
the negative effect of subsidies found in the spin-off analysis, but nor do firms whose
scientists and engineers have particularly much experience from subsidized firms
perform significantly better.
6.4 Remarks on profitability as performance measure
An objection to the spin-off analysis might be that current sales and profitability are
not relevant performance measures in the IT industry, and that the spin-off firms
may become successes in the long run. Admittedly, numerous companies in the
"New Economy" have been unprofitable, and still highly valued in the stock market
due to large investments in intangible capital. These arguments are not entirely
convincing, however, as the stock market values such firms far less now than some
years ago. Also, private owners buying a company where previous owners have lost
their money, may make the company look successful and produce positive profits,
without there being a positive social return to the historical R&D investments that
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produced the technology. Comparing total investments to expected future profits is
difficult and requires case studies.
A particularly interesting case in the Norwegian IT-industry is Dolphin Inter-
connect Solutions. This company has been considered the most successful spin-off
from Norsk Data, cf. section 2, but did not make positive profit in any of the sam-
ple years. The founding engineers started to develop the 'Dolphin SCI technology'
in 1988 while still working for Norsk Data, and 1999 was the first year in history
that the company generated positive profits'". Rough calculations suggest that to-
tal investments in Dolphin amounts to about NOK 500 million62• In 2000 a major
part of Dolphin was sold to Sun Microsystems and the price, NOK 171million, was
considered very favorable. Per employee, the price was NOK 8 million, something
which is more than 10 times the cost of an engineering man-year. However, if the
part of the company sold to Sun represents more than one third of the total value
of the company, the rate of return to Dolphin as an investments project has been
negative. A market based evaluation, therefore, is not likely to make Dolphin come
out as a large success.
7Conclusion
This paper illustrates how matched employer-employee data can be used to assess
whether human capital built up in subsidized firms is general or specific. The case
considered is a series of Norwegian IT-programs from the mid and late 1980s. I find
no evidence suggesting that experience from subsidized firms has been rewarded
with a wage premium. Scientists and engineers with experience from subsidized
firms receive on average the same wage as otherwise similar workers without such
experience. This suggests that the return to the knowledge investments made by
the government and the workers themselves, was zero. One possible explanation is
that the technology shift in the late 1980sTenderedmuch of the intellectual human
capital built up under the programs obsolete.
Analyzing the performance of spin-off firms reinforces this dismal conclusion.
Spin-offs from subsidized firms are less profitable than other firms, suggesting that
the identified spin-offs to a large extent consist of troubled remnants of previously
subsidized units. What keeps workers in these firms together may be a low alter-
native value of their know-how, rather than positive complementarities associated
with successful innovations. In any case, my analysis does not give support to the
idea that important returns from the IT-programs ended up outside the originally
6le£. http://www.dolphinics.com.
62This number is calculated on the basis of articles written about Dolphin in the major newspa-
pers Aftenposten, Dagens Næringsliv and Bergens Tidene in the years 1991-2001. The number is
adjusted for inflation. Using an additional 7 percent discount factor, the total investment amounts
to NOK 800 milll. About 20 percent of the investments has been financed by public subsidies.
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subsidized firms.
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Data appendix
Information about individual workers comes from a number of governmental admin-
istrative records, which are prepared by Statistics Norway for research use. Barth
and Dale-Olsen (1999), appendix 2, give some details on the various registers in-
cluded in the data base. I have taken great care to improve the data quality by
checking for consistency across years and across related variables for the same indi-
vidual. Missing values are imputed where possible. The available registers cover the
years 1986 to 1997. Earnings is measured as taxable labor income. I have referred
to this as the workers' wage. The value of stock options received in the employment
relationship is included in the workers' taxable labor income after 1991. The use
of stock options, however, was negligible. Experience is measured as potential work
experience, Le. age minus schooling minus seven.
Workers with earnings less than 150 000 1995 NOK are considered part time
workers, even if coded as full time employed, and are excluded from the wage regres-
sions. Likewise,workers who have not worked for a full calender year are excluded,
and also workers with missing educational information. Starting out with all male
workers that have had some sort of affiliation with high-tech or IT industries in
one of the years 1986 to 1997, and that were employed in at least one of the years
1986 to 1991, these trimming procedures reduce the total sample of worker-year
observations with about 14 percent, somewhat less, 9 percent, for graduate workers.
Plant level information about employers comes from the annual manufacturing
census of Statistics Norway='. Information about R&D at the line of business level
within firms is collected from R&D surveys and other surveys of immaterial invest-
ments and innovation. Prior to 1991 the R&D surveys were conducted by the Royal
Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. In 1991 and later years,
the surveys have been conducted by Statistics Norway'". I merge the R&D data
to plants based on the plants' firm number and three-digit industrial classification
code. This amounts to assuming that there are perfect R&D spillovers between
plants belonging to the same line of business within multi-plant firms.
In the machinery and equipment industries utilized in this study, the R&D sur-
veys have close to full coverage for firms with more than 20 employees. For years
and firms not covered by the R&D surveys, three other data sets has been utilized.
A survey of immaterial investments was conducted by Statistics Norway in 1988,
covering the years 1986-88, and in 1990 covering the years1988-90. Furthermore,
an innovation survey was conducted by statistics Norway in 1993 for the year 1992.
These sources, however, do not contain information about the share of R&D that is
63The census is documented in the series Manufacturing statistics, Official Statistics of Norway.
Statistics Norway, Oslo. The microdata are documented in a mimeo from 1991 by Halvorsen,
Jensen and Foyn in Statistics Norway.
64Microdata with the neccessary variables is available in 1984 and biannually 1985-97.
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IT-related, and also have limited information about subsidies. The data appendix
in Møen (2001) gives references to reports documenting the surveys, and describe
in detail the procedures used to combine the various sources when constructing the
R&D database. When possible, R&D-intensity and the share of IT-related R&D
is imputed by linear interpolation, and by extrapolating the first observed value
backwards in time and the last observed value forward in time, firm by firm. Firms'
R&D investments are known to be stable over time, and the subsidy and share of
IT R&D variables are only available from the biannual surveys. Imputing missing
information when possible, therefore, is a desirable procedure. R&D subsidies is a
less stable variable than the other two, however, and I have therefore extrapolated
this variable only one year forward.
Having performed the imputations described above, about 18 percent of the
worker-year observations stilllack information about R&D-intensity, about 22 per-
cent still lack information about IT R&D-intensity and about 25 percent still lack
information about subsidies'". About 76 percent of the non-missing worker-year
observations of R&D investments are from surveys, 5 percent are imputed by in-
terpolation and 18 percent are imputed by extrapolation. About 62 percent of the
imputed R&D intensities are zero. With respect to subsidized IT R&D investments,
about 59 percent of the non-missing worker-year subsidy variables are from surveys,
and the rest are imputed. About 73 percent of the imputed subsidized IT R&D
intensities are zero. In the regressions, I account for missing R&D information by
using dummies.
The analysis of spin-off firms is based on the statistics of accounts for non-
financial joint-stock companies prepared by Creditinform and Statistics Norway'".
The accounts statistics are from the enterprises' financial statements submitted an-
nually to the Register of Company Accounts in Brønnøysund and cover in principle
the entire population of non-financial joint-stock companies. An important advan-
tage of this data base is that it has information about firms outside the manufactur-
ing industry. Data are available from 1993. Firms with missing information about
return on sales, assets or equity have been excluded. This reduces the sample with 8
percent. The influence of outliers is reduced by replacing values for return on sales,
assets and equity below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and values above
the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
65For scientists and engineers the number is smaller, cf. Table AI.
fifief. the annual statistics of accounts for non-financial joint-stock companies, Statistics Norway,
for documentation.
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Figure 1: R&D investments, IT-related R&D and subsidies to IT-related R&D
in high-tech industries in 1984-1997
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Source: Microdata from R&D surveys conducted by NTNF (The Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research) and Statistics Norway. Annual data points are connected using a cubic spline. High-tech
industries are defined as ISIC 382-385.
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Figure 2: Employment growth 1985-1997 in subsidized IT R&D-firms vs. other cathegories
of firms in the high-tech industry
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Subsidized IT R&D-finns are firms with an intensity ofsubsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005 and intensity of IT-
related R&D above O.l in at least one of the years 1986-1990. Non-subsidized IT R&D-finns are less subsidized
firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above O.l in at least one of the years 1986-1990. Other R&D firms are
other firms with R&D intensity above O.l in at least one of the years 1986-1990. In 1985 there were about Il 100
workers in subsidized IT R&D firms, l 800 workers in non-subsidized IT R&D firms, 5 800 workers in other R&D
firms and 58 600 workers in non-R&D firms. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the
three-digit line of business level within firms, Finns with unknown R&D-intensity are excluded. High-tech industries
are defined as ISIC 382-385. Finns that change industry classification are kept in the sample. Annual data points are
connected using a cubic spline.
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Figure 3: Employment growth in IT vs. all private industries in 1995-1999
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Source: Statistics Denmark (2000) updated with numbers from Statistics Norway (wv.w.ssb.no).IT-manufacturing is
defined as production of computers and office machinery, production of insulated wires and cables, production of
radio, TV and communication equipment, production of instruments except medical and surgical equipment (NACE
30, 313, 32, 332 and 333). The IT service sector comprises wholesaling, telecommunications and consultancy
(NACE 51433, 5164, 51654, 642, 7133 and 72). The various IT sectors are defined as recommended by OECD,
except for wholesaling which is slightly more targeted towards IT. See Statistics Denmark (2000) for details. Total
private sector comprises NACE 15-37,45,50-74,92 and 93. Annual data points are connected using a cubic spline.
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Figure 4: Joint growth and profitability of spin-off firms vs. non-spin-off firms
in 1994 to 1997
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Source: Statistics Norway, Statistics of accounts for non-financial joint-stock companies. Both spin-off firms and continuing or
reorganized subsidized firm are defined as having had at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with experience
from subsidized IT R&D-firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. Together
these two groups of firms constitute the 'program firms'. Spin-off firms are program firms that do not contain a plant that has
been part of an originally subsidized firm. Continuing or reorganized subsidized firms are program firms that do contain a plant
that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. The sample consists of all firms with more than one employee and at least one
scientist or engineer, in industries with at least one program firm.
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Table 1. Industry of occupation in 1997 for scientists and engineers with experience from
high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Workers Workers Workers Workers
from from non- from from
subsidized subsidized other non-R&D
ITR&D ITR&D R&D firms
firms firms firms
High-tech manufacturing industries 40% 53% 49% 44%
Other manufacturing industries 2% 4% 3% 7%
IT services industries 30% 14% 10% 6%
Other services industries 12% 14% 15% 23%
Public sector 5% 5% 6% 4%
Other industries or unknown 2% 1% 8% 8%
Not in the sample 9% 9% 9% 7%
Number of scientists and engineers 1095 195 465 1664
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 with full time experience from a high-tech firm
at least one of the years 1986-1990. High tech manufacturing industries are defined as NACE 29-35 (ISIC382-385).
IT service industries are defined as NACE 51433, 5164, 51654, 642, 7133 and 72. R&D firms are firms with R&D-
intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are R&D firms with intensity ofIT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-
firms are IT R&D-firms with intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. Non-R&D firms are firms that
have R&D intensity below 0.1. Workers are classified in the leftmost column applicable. Workers who are not
observed in 1997 are classified according to their industry of occupation in 1996, if possible. Otherwise they are
classified as not in the sample. R&D-intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of
business level within firms. Workers that only have experience from firms with unknown R&D-intensity are
excluded.
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Table 2. Non-wage labor market outcomes for scientists and engineers with experience from
high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Workers Workers Workers Workers
from from non- from from
subsidized subsidized other non-R&D
ITR&D ITR&D R&D· firms
firms firms firms
Share of displaced workers that were
re-employed in a different municipality! 11% 11% 14% 14%
Participated in active labor market programs 1988-1997 13% 11% 11% 11%
Average employment rate 1988-1997 88% 87% 89% 89%
Re-educated or further educated by 1997 2.1% 2.1% 1.7% 1.7%
Self-employed in at least one year after 1990 .01% .01% .02% .01%
Number of scientists and engineers 1095 195 465 1664
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 with full time experience from a high-tech firm
at least one of the years 1986-1990. High tech manufacturing industries are defined as NACE 29-35 (ISIC382-385).
R&D firms are firms with R&D-intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are R&D firms with intensity of IT-related R&D
above O.l. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are IT R&D-firms with intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005.
Non-R&D firms are firms that have R&D intensity below O.l. Workers are classified in the leftmost column
applicable. R&D-intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level
within firms. Workers that only have experience from firms with unknown R&D-intensity are excluded.
!A displaced worker is defined as a worker with at least two year tenure who left a plant that downsized at least 25
percent in that year or over that year and next year.
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Table 3. The effect of R&D, IT and IT-subsidies on the wage level for scientists and
engineers in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Intensity Dummy Intensity
R&D .007 .048 .005 .025
(.009) (.043) (.009) (.045)
ITR&D -.043*** -.245** .010 -.270***
(.008) (.061) (.015) (.065)
Subsidized IT R&D -.040*** .229*
(.014) (.121)
Number of observations 11 386 11386 11 386 11 386
R-squared .50 .50 .51 .51
B: Without workers with experience from Norsk Data
R&D -.008 .022 -.009 .051
(.009) (.044) (.009) (.046)
ITR&D -.015* -.108* .0002 -.013
(.008) (.063) (.015) (.067)
Subsidized IT R&D -.019 -.488***
(.015) (.125)
R-squared .50 .50 .50 .50
Number of observations 10513 10 513 10513 10513
The dependent variable is In (real annual earnings). The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after
1935 working full time in a (manufacturing) high-tech industry. High-tech industries are defined as ISIC 382-385
(NACE 29-35). The baseline comparison group is workers with experience from non-R&D firms. Control variables
included in the regression, but not reported are a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, dummies for 15
different academic degrees, a quadratic in plant number of employees, dummies for 3 different regions, year
dummies, 6 industry dummies and 3 dummies denoting whether the R&D, IT or subsidy variable is missing. The
coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated
error terms within individuals, are given in parentheses. In the dummy specifications, R&D firms are defined as
firms with R&D intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-firms with an intensity ofIT-related R&D
above O.l. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above
0.005. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within
firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 4. The effect of R&D, IT and IT -subsidies on the wage profile for scientists and
engineers in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Intensity Dummy Intensity
R&D .015 .081 .013 .016
(.016) (.074) (.015) (.075)
R&D * experience -.001 -.004 -.001 .0001
(.001) (.005) (.001) (.005)
ITR&D -.109*** -.600*** -.088*** -.696***
(.015) (.104) (.023) (.108)
IT R&D * experience .006*** .031*** .007*** .037***
(.001) (.008) (.002) (.009)
Subsidized IT R&D -.027 .837***
(.022) (.205)
Subsidized IT R&D * experience -.001 -.051***
(.002) (.017)
R-squared .51 .51 .51 .51
Number of observations 11 386 11 386 11 386 11386
B: Without workers with experience/rom Norsk Data
R&D -.004 .057 -.005 .049
(.015) (.075) (.015) (.075)
R&D * experience -.0004 -.004 -.0004 -.001
(.001) (.005) (.001) (.005)
ITR&D -.064*** -.426*** -.070*** -.426***
(.015) (.109) (.023) (.113)
IT R&D * experience .004*** .028*** .006*** .035***
(.001) (.008) (.002) (.009)
Subsidized IT R&D .009 .138
(.022) (.211)
Subsidized IT R&D * experience -.003 -.050***
(.002) (.017)
R-squared .51 .51 .51 .51
Number of observations 10513 10513 10513 10513
The dependent variable is In (real annual earnings). The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after
1935 working full time in a high-tech industry. High-tech industries are defined as ISIC 382-385 (NACE 29-35). The
baseline comparison group is workers with experience from non-R&D firms. Control variables included in the
regression, but not reported are a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for job relationships whose
starting date is censored at April 30th 1978 together with its interactions with the two tenure variables, dummies for
15 different academic degrees, a quadratic in plant number of employees, dummies for 3 different regions, year
dummies, year dummies interacted with experience, 6 industry dummies, 3 dummies denoting whether the R&D, IT
or subsidy variable is missing and these dummies interacted with experience. The coefficients are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within individuals,
are given in parentheses. In the dummy specifications, R&D firms are defined as firms with R&D intensity above
0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-
firms are defined as IT-firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. R&D intensity is
measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 5. The effect of R&D, IT and IT-subsidies on wage growth 1986-1997 for scientists
and engineers in high-tech and IT industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Stock Dummy Stock
R&D-experience -.017 -.005 -.018 .003
(.018) (.031) (.018) (.030)
IT R&D-experience .042** .069* .003 .093**
(.018) (.038) (.028) (.042)
Subsidized IT R&D experience .047* -.155*
(.025) (.072)
R-squared .23 .23 .23 .23
Number of observations 7130 7130 7130 7130
B: Without workers with experience from Norsk Data
R&D-experience -.010 .015 -.011 .010
(.018) (.031 ) (.018) . (.030)
IT R&D-experience .016 -.003 .011 -.008
(.018) (.039) (.028) (.034)
Subsidized IT R&D experience .007 .045
(.025) (.077)
R-squared .23 .23 .23 .23
Number of observations 6762 6762 6762 6762
The dependent variable is the first difference ofln (real annual earnings) between year I and year t-It) in the period
1986 to 1997. The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935, having some full time
experience in at least one of the years 1986-1990 and having full time experience in a high-tech or IT industry in at
least one of the years 1986-1997. High-tech and IT industries are defined as NACE 29-35, 51433, 5164, 51654, 642,
7133 and 72. The latter six are IT service industries. The baseline comparison group is workers with experience from
non-R&D manufacturing high-tech firms. Control variables included in the regression, but not reported are a quartic
in experience a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for job relationships whose starting date is censored at April 30th 1978
together with its interactions with the two tenure variables, year dummies and dummies for 15 different academic
degrees, a dummy for having experience from IT service, but not from high-tech manufacturing in 1986-1990, a
dummy for not having experience from high-tech manufacturing, nor from IT service in 1986-1990, a dummy for
being displaced in one of the years 1986 to 1993, 28 dummies for industry of occupation at time I, 28 dummies for
industry of occupation at time l-JO, two dummies denoting whether R&D or IT R&D is missing for those with
experience from manufacturing firms and a similar dummy for subsidized IT R&D in column 4. The coefficients are
estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms
within individuals, are given in parentheses. In columns l, and 3, R&D experience is measured as having experience
from a firm with R&D intensity above O.l. Likewise, IT R&D experience is measured as having experience from a
firm with intensity of IT R&D above O.l, and subsidized IT R&D experience is measured as having experience from
a firm with intensity of subsidized IT R&D above 0.005. In columns 2, and 4, R&D experience is measured as the
sum of the employers' R&D intensities over the years 1986-91. Likewise, IT R&D experience is measured as the
sum of the employers' intensities in IT-related R&D and subsidized IT R&D experience is measured as the sum of
the employers' intensities in subsidized IT-related R&D. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per
employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. R&D information is only available for manufacturing
firms.
***
**
*
Significant at the l% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
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Table 6. The effect of R&D, IT and IT -subsidies in 1986-1990 on the wage level for scientists
and engineers in 1996 and 1997 in high-tech and IT industries
(I) (2) (3) (4)
A: All observations Dummy Stock Dummy Stock
R&D-experience .012 .035 .012 .037
(.017) (.027) (.017) (.036)
IT R&D-experience -.007 -.021 .004 -.014
(.017) (.035) (.026) (.038)
Subsidized IT R&D experience -.012 -.041
(.024) (.082)
R-squared .21 .21 .21 .21
Number of observations 10109 10109 10 109 10 109
B: Without workers with experience/rom Norsk Data
R&D-experience .011 .031 .011 .033
(.017) (.027) (.017) (.027)
IT R&D-experience -.003 -.009 .005 .004
(.017) (.036) (.026) (.043)
Subsidized IT R&D experience -.009 -.059
(.025) (.093)
R-squared .22 .22 .22 .22
Number of observations 9632 9632 9632 9632
The dependent variable is In (real annual earnings). The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after
1935, having some full time experience in at least one of the years 1986-1990 and having full time experience in a
high-tech or IT industry in at least one of the years 1986-1997. High-tech and IT industries are defined as NACE 29-
35,51433,5164,51654,642,7133 and 72. The latter six are IT service industries. The baseline comparison group is
workers with experience from non-R&D (manufacturing) high-tech firms. Control variables included in the
regressions, but not reported are a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, a dummy for job relationships whose
starting date is censored at April 30th 1978 together with its interactions with the two tenure variables, year dummies
and dummies for 15 different academic degrees, a quadratic in plant number of employees, a dummy for being
displaced in one of the years 1986 to 1993, dummies for 3 different regions, a dummy for having experience from IT
service, but not from high-tech manufacturing in 1986-1990, a dummy for not having experience from high-tech
manufacturing, nor from IT service in 1986-1990, 28 industry dummies, two dummies denoting whether R&D or IT
R&D is missing for those with experience from manufacturing firms and a similar dummy for subsidized IT R&D in
column 4. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and correlated error terms within individuals, are given in parentheses. In columns l, and 3, R&D experience is
measured as having experience from a firm with R&D intensity above O.l. Likewise, IT R&D experience is
measured as having experience from a firm with intensity of IT R&D above O.l, and subsidized IT R&D experience
is measured as having experience from a firm with intensity of subsidized IT R&D above 0.005. In columns 2, and 4,
R&D experience is measured as the sum of the employers' R&D intensities over the years 1986-91. Likewise, IT
R&D experience is measured as the sum of the employers' intensities in IT-related R&D and subsidized IT R&D
experience is measured as the sum of the employers' intensities in subsidized IT-related R&D. R&D intensity is
measured as R&D man-years per employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. R&D information is
only available for manufacturing firms.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 7: Growth in 1994-1997 in firms that employ knowledge developed in the subsidized
IT R&D firms
(1) (2)
Dummy for program finn .064
(.044)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized finn .075
(.086)
.060
(.045)
Dummy for spin-off finn
R-squared
Number of observations
.93
3641
.93
3641
The dependent variable is ln(Sales). The sample consists of annual observations all firms with more than one
employee and at least one scientist or engineer, in industries with at least one program firm. A program firm is
defined as having had, at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized IT
R&D-finns, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. A spin-off firm is
defined as a program finn that does not contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. A
continuing or reorganized subsidized finn is defined as a program firm that does contain a plant that has been part of
an originally subsidized firm. Control variables included in the regression, but not reported are In(Sales ,_!), a quartic
in finn age, a quartic in finn no. of employees, a quartic in the share of employees that are scientists and engineers, a
dummy for positive R&D-investments, a dummy for R&D-intensity above 0.05, a dummy for R&D-intensity above
0.2, a dummy for no information about R&D investments, year dummies and 38 NACE industry dummies. Firm age
is deliberately censored at 30 and finn no. of employees is censored at 1000. The coefficients are estimated using
ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within firms, are
given in parentheses. The influence of outliers is reduced by replacing values for return on sales, assets and equity
below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and values above the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile.
*** Significant at the I% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 8: Profitability in 1994-1998 in firms that employ knowledge developed in the
subsidized IT R&D firms
Dummy for program finn
(l) (2)
-1.22
(1.00)
1.57
(1.48)
-2.56**
(1.24)
.08 .08
A: Return on sales
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized finn
Dummy for spin-off finn
R-squared
B: Return on assets
Dummy for program finn -3.15*
(1.67)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized finn 1.25
(2.51)
-5.26***
(2.00)
Dummy for spin-off finn
R-squared .07 .08
C: Return on equity
Dummy for program finn -15.51**
(7.57)
Dummy for continuing or reorganized subsidized finn 2.57
(11.79)
-24.19***
(8.68)
Dummy for spin-off finn
R-squared
Number of observations
.06
3719
.06
3719
The sample consists of annual observations all firms with more than one employee and at least one scientist or
engineer, in industries with at least one program finn. A program finn is defined as having had, at some point, at
least a 25 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized IT R&D-finns, and at least one scientist or
engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-finns. A spin-off finn is defined as a program finn that does not
contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized finn. A continuing or reorganized subsidized finn is
defined as a program finn that does contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized finn. Control
variables included in the regression, but not reported are a quartic in finn age, a quartic in finn no. of employees, a
quartic in the share of employees that are scientists and engineers, a dummy for positive R&D-investments, a dummy
for R&D-intensity above 0.05, a dummy for R&D-intensity above 0.2, a dummy for no information about R&D
investments, year dummies and 38 NACE industry dummies. Finn age is deliberately censored at 30 and finn no. of
employees is censored at 1000. The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors, adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and correlated error terms within firms, are given in parentheses. The influence of outliers is
reduced by replacin~ values for return on sales, assets and equity below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and
values above the 95t percentile with the 95th percentile.
*** Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table AI. Worker-year observations of scientists and engineers in high-tech industries by
ISle sub-industry and firm type in 1986-1990
Sub. Non- Other Non- Firms Firms'
ITR&D sub. R&D R&D with un- ITR&D-
firms ITR&D firms firms known intensity
firms R&D weighted
by no.
of obs.
38210 Engines and turbines O O O 351 l .0004
38220 Agricultural machinery O O l 69 4 .0011
38230 Metal and wood-working machinery O O O 5 O .0000
38241 Oil and gas well machinery and tools O O O l 748 106 .0005
32249 Other industrial machinery O O O 132 21 .0004
38250 Computers and office machinery 938 386 17 15 133 .1970
38291 Household machinery O O O 17 17 .0000
38292 Repair of machinery O O 2 35 74 .0000
38299 Other machinery 327 30 233 767 190 .0441
38310 Electric motors and eq. for el. production 10 25 316 381 160 .0253
38320 Radio, TV and communication apparatus l 123 145 660 790 421 .1262
38330 Electrical household appliances O O 25 14 l .0513
38391 Insulated cables and wires 272 O 158 54 24 .1311
38399 Other electrical apparatus and equipment 7 15 5 87 42 .0852
38411 Building of ships O O O 216 135 .0002
38412 Building ofboats O O O 19 17 .0000
38413 Ship and boat engines and motors O O O 102 12 .0004
38414 Components and fixtures for shipslboats O O 13 102 17 .0006
38421 Railway and tramway equipment O O O 29 O .0000
38422 Repair of railway and tramway eq. O O O 60 O .0000
38430 Motor vehicles 19 O 5 102 54 .0804
38440 Motor cycles and bicycles O O O 18 O .0050
38450 Aircraft O O O 128 O .0006
38490 Other transport equipment O O O 1 O .0000
38510 Professional and scientific instruments 81 28 101 119 96 .1311
38520 Photographic and optical goods 34 17 11 O O .1580
382-385 All machinery and equipment industries 2811 646 1546 5361 1 525 .0810
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 working full time in a high-tech industry (ISIC
382-385) in 1986-1990. R&D firms are defined as firms with R&D intensity above O.l. IT R&D-firms are defined as
R&D-firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above 0.1. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an
intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at
the three-digit line of business level within firms.
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Table A2. Characteristics of scientists and engineers by firm type in high-tech industries
Workers Workers Workers Workers
from from non- from other from
subsidized subsidized R&D non-
ITR&D ITR&D firms R&D
firms firms firms
Year ofbirth (average) 1953 1954 1953 1953
Years oftenure (average)! 3.3 2.6 3.3 3.0
Years of education (average) 16.8 16.7 16.7 16.6
Wage in 1995 NOK (average) 350' 347' 377' 352'
Union membership (share in 1991) 16% 13% 13% 18%
Rural residence (share) 6% 6% 10% 16%
Foreign born (share) 6% 4% 6% 7%
Employers' average R&D intensity .19 .17 .13 .03
Employers' average intensity ofIT R&D .16 .16 .03 .01
Employers' average intensity ofsubsidized IT R&D .036 .001 .006 .001
Obs. with R&D info. per worker 1986-91 (averagej F 3.8 3.4 2.7 3.0
Obs. per worker 1986-1990 (average) !! 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
Experience from Norsk Data (share) 26% 0% 0% 0%
Number of scientists and engineers 1095 195 465 1664
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born after 1935 with full time experience from a high-tech firm
(ISle 382-385) at least one of the years 1986-1990. The statistics is based on the first observation of each worker.
Workers in firms with unknown R&D-intensity are excluded. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per
employee at the three-digit line of business level within firms. 'Rural residence' implies that the worker lives in a
municipality where firms have some sort of preferential tax treatment.
: 8 percent of the observations have job starting date censored at April 30th 1978.
!!Only workers who finished their education before 1986 and who were still employed after 1990 are included.
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Table A3. Educational composition by firm type in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Sub. Non-sub. Other Non-
ITR&D ITR&D R&D R&D Total no.
firms firms firms firms ofobs.
Total number ofworker-year observations 18 170 4296 15 114 173756 211 336
Scientists and engineers 15% 15% 10% 3% 10364
College degree in technology 22% 18% 17% 7% 19616
Secondary technical education 24% 27% 33% 46% 90985
Higher general or administrative education 11% 9% 6% 3% 8731
Secondary general or administrative education 18% 21% 19% 18% 38685
Unskilled 8% 9% 14% 21% 40193
Unknown education 2% 1% 1% 1% 2762
100% 100% 100% 100%
Scientists and engineers 2811 646 1546 5361 10364
PhD Engineering 1% 1% 1% 2% 150
MSc Engineering Electrotechnics/Computers 45% 56% 53% 17% 3371
BSc Electrotechnical Engineering 15% 12% 13% 9% 1204
PhD Mathematics and natural science 2% 2% 1% 1% 143
MSc Mathematics 6% 4% 2% 1% 287
MSc Physics 5% 4% 2% 1% 297
MSc Engineering Machinery 6% 5% 9% 32% 2065
BSc Mechanical Engineering 1% 2% 2% 12% 710
MSc Engineering Architecture and Construction .1% 0% .5% 7% 375
MSc Engineering Chemistry and Geology 1% .5% 1% 2% 174
MSc Chemistry and Geology 1% 1% .5% .2% 48
MSc Life Sciences 1% 0% 1% 1% 102
MSc Natural Sciences, unspecified 4% 4% 6% 5% 476
MSc Other engineering 9% 9% 7% 7% 799
BSc Other Engineering 1% .2% 1% 3% 181
100% 100% 100% 100%
The sample consists of male scientists and engineers born between 1935 and 1975 with full time experience from a
high-tech finn {lSIC 382-385) at least one of the years 1986-1990. Workers in firms with unknown R&D-intensity
are excluded. R&D firms are defined as firms with R&D intensity above O.l. IT R&D-finns are defined as R&D-
firms with an intensity of IT-related R&D above O.l. Subsidized IT R&D-finns are defined as IT-finns with an
intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005. R&D intensity is measured as R&D man-years per employee at
the three-digit line of business level within firms.
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Table A4. Plant characteristics by firm type in high-tech industries in 1986-1990
Subsidized Non- Other Non-
ITR&D subsidized R&D R&D
firms ITR&D firms firms
firms
Average number of employees 133 80 86 73
Average experience 16 16 16 18
Average tenure! 4.8 4.3 4.6 5.1
Average education 12.9 l3.1 12.0 10.8
Average share of work force with higher .072 .070 .057 .009
technical or scientific education
Average hourly wage in 1995 NOK 176 183 180 165
Average capital per employee in 1995 NOK 772' 798' 1085' 748'
Average R&D man-years per employee .28 .27 .21 .01
Average share of R&D that is IT-related .89 .91 .18 .04
Average IT R&D man-years per employee .24 .24 .03 .002
Average share of total R&D that is subsidized .19 .002 .15 .06
Average subs. IT R&D man-years per employee .045 .0004 .008 .0002
Average market share .063 .038 .028 .030
Average union density (1991) .42 .20 .32 .52
Plants with rurallocation (share) .25 .14 .25 .31
Share of work force that is foreign born .05 .05 .04 .04
Part of multi-plant firm (share) .61 .47 .45 .44
Part offoreign owned firm (share) .37 .14 .22 .08
Plants founded before 1966 (share) .15 .25 .27 .39
Annual growth rate in 1983-1986~t .34 .19 .18 .19
Plant closed before 1994 (share) .46 .31 .33 .20
Number of plant-year observations 233 101 295 4079
Number ofplants 79 29 89 976
Number of firms 52 27 65 813
The statistics are based on all plant-year observations in ISIC 382-385 in 1986-1990. R&D firms are defined as firms
with R&D intensity above 0.1. IT R&D-firms are defined as R&D-firms with an intensity ofIT-related R&D above
O.l. Subsidized IT R&D-firms are defined as IT-firms with an intensity of subsidized IT-related R&D above 0.005.
R&D man-years per employee is measured at the three-digit line of business level within firms. Firms with unknown
R&D-intensity are excluded. Market share relates to national production and is measured at the five-digit line of
business level for the firm that the plant belongs to. Rurallocation implies that the firm is located in a municipality
where firms have some sort of preferential tax treatment. Multi-plant firms are only counted once in each industry-
year when computing the market share statistics. A foreign owned firm is a firm that has more than 50 percent
foreign ownership. The number of firms and plants refer to the number of unique firm and plant identifiers over the
years 1986-1990, and are classified according to the leftmost column applicable.
t 18 percent of the underlying employee observations have the job starting date censored at April 30th 1978.
~~The reported growth rates are the median within each group. Growth refers to growth in nominal sales.
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TableA5. Characteristics of 'program firms' and spin-offs
Non- Program Program Program
program firms firms that firms
firms are cont. or that are
reorganized spin-
subsidized offs
firms
Average number of employees 116 176 253 129
Median number of employees 21 24 60 8
Average capital per employee l 416' 3486' 879' 5056'
Median capital per employee 551 ' 657' 769' 533'
Average number ofplants per firm 1.6 2.4 1.9 2.7
Average R&D man-years per employee .04 .13 .15 .10
Average share of scientists and engineers in the work force .16 .30 .17 .38
Average share of equity in total assets .31 .36 .35 .37
Average ownership share of the largest foreign owner .20 .20 .18 .20
Share of firms with rurallocation .14 .03 .00 .05
Share of firms founded before 1986 .41 .31 .60 .15
Share of firms founded before 1991 .75 .65 .96 .46
Share of firms classified as belonging to a high-tech or IT-industry .56 .78 1.00 .65
Share offirms classified as belonging to an IT-service industry .36 .34 .15 .46
Share of firms rooted in Norsk Data O .24 .03 .37
Number of firm-year observations 3643 274 103 171
Number of firms 1437 109 33 76
The statistics are based on all firm-year observations in 1994-1998. The sample consists of all firms with more than
one employee and at least one scientist or engineer, in industries with at least one program firm. A program firm is
defined as having had, at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with experience from subsidized IT
R&D-firms, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from subsidized IT R&D-firms. A spin-off firm is
defined as a program firm that does not contain a plant that has been part of an originally subsidized firm. Firms that
are 'rooted' in Norsk Data are defined as having had, at some point, at least a 25 percent share of employees with
experience from Norsk Data, and at least one scientist or engineer with experience from Norsk Data. Capital is
measured in nominal NOK. Rural location implies that the firm is located in a municipality where firms have some
sort ofpreferential tax treatment. High-tech and IT industries comprise NACE 29-35,51433,5164,51654,642, 7133
and 72.
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